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Abstract
We present the system d, an extended type system with lambda-typed lambda-
expressions. It is related to type systems originating from the Automath project.
d extends existing lambda-typed systems by an existential abstraction operator
as well as propositional operators. β-reduction is extended to also normalize
negated expressions using a subset of the laws of classical negation, hence d
is normalizing both proofs and formulas which are handled uniformly as func-
tional expressions. d is using a reflexive type axiom for a constant τ to which no
function can be typed. Some properties are shown including confluence, subject
reduction, uniqueness of types, strong normalization, and consistency. We illus-
trate how, when using d, due to its limited logical strength, additional axioms
must be added both for negation and for the mathematical structures whose
deductions are to be formalized.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of this document
The following section provides a brief overview of d including some simple exam-
ples. The subsequent sections of this chapter contain a more detailed motivation
of the concepts of d. Chapter 2 contains a formal definition of d. Chapter 3
presents some examples of the use of d. Chapter 4 contains proofs of the main
properties of d. Chapter 5 discusses possible variations of d and its relation to
other systems. Appendix B defines and briefly analyzes two mappings from d to
untyped λ-calculus. Appendix C illustrates the use of d as a logical framework.
1.2 Overview of d
In this paper, we will present an extended type system with lambda-typed
lambda-expressions. Since such systems have received little attention we begin
with some general remarks to provide some context.
Most type systems contain subsystems that can be classified as instances
of pure type systems (PTS) (e.g. [4]). As one of their properties, these sys-
tems use distinct operators to form dependent products and functional (i.e. λ)-
abstractions. This reflects their underlying semantic distinction between the
domains of functions and types. In contrast, in the semantics of lambda-typed
systems all entities are (partial) functions and typing is a binary relation be-
tween total functions. As a consequence a function participating in the type
relation may play the role of an element or of a type. Moreover, since in general
the domain and range of the type relation are not disjoint a function can (and
will usually) have a double role both as element and as type. Therefore, in
lambda-typed calculi one has to separate three aspects of an operator: its func-
tional interpretation, i.e. the equivalence class of entities it represents, its role
as a type, i.e. the entities on the element side related to its entities in the type
relation, and its role as an element, i.e. the entities on the type side related to its
entities in the type relation. From this point of view, the semantic distinction
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between dependent products and λ-abstractions can be reduced to the distinc-
tion between the type-role or the element-role of a single underlying function
and therefore, from a calculational viewpoint, a single operator is sufficient.
Type systems outside of PTS using a single operator for dependent prod-
ucts and functional (i.e. λ)-abstractions (i.e. λ-structured types) have been in-
vestigated in early type systems such as Λ [14][32], as well as more recent ap-
proaches [19][22]. In particular [22] introduces the single-binder based ♭-cube,
a variant of the β-cube which does not keep uniqueness of types and studies
λ-structured type variants of well-known systems within this framework.
Before we present the basic elements of d, we would like to point out its
additional underlying semantic assumptions:
• The range of the type relation is a subset of its domain, i.e. every type
has a type. This allows for modelling type hierarchies of arbitrary size.
• The type relation includes entities typing to itself, which allows for gen-
erating type hierarchies of arbitrary size from a finite set of distinct base
entities. We discuss below why this assumption does not lead to well-
known paradoxes.
• There should be no inequivalent types of an element, or in other words,
the type relation is restricted to be a function. This means that d needs
to satisfy the type uniqueness property (see Section 2.3). We will review
this assumption in Section 5.5.
It is well known that types can be interpreted as propositions and elements as
proofs [20]. In our semantic setting this analogy is valid and we will make use of
it throughout the paper, for example when motivating and describing the roles
of operators we will frequently use the viewpoint of propositions and proofs.
Note that in our setting the interest is to formalize structured mathematical
reasoning, hence there is no interest in the computational content of a proof.
Finally we would like to make a notational remark related to d but also to
lambda-typed calculi in general. Since an operator in d can be interpreted both
as element and as type (or proposition), there is, in our view, a notational and
naming dilemma. For example, one and the same entity would be written ap-
propriately as lambda-abstraction λx :a.b in its role as an element and universal
quantification ∀x : a.b in its role as a proposition and neither notation would
adequately cover both roles. Therefore, in this case we use a more neutral no-
tation [x : a]b called universal abstraction. As will be seen this notational issue
also applies to other operators of d.
After these remarks we can now turn to the core of d which is the system
λλ [18], a reconstruction of a variation [32] of Λ, modified with a reflexive
type axiom, see Table 1.1 for its type rules. As usual, we use contexts Γ =
(x1 : a1, . . . , xn : an) declaring types of distinct variables and a β-conversion
induced congruence =λ on expressions. We use the notation a[b/x] to denote
the substitution of free occurrences of x in a by b.
Element-roles and type-roles can now be illustrated by two simple examples:
Let C = [x : τ ]τ be the constant function delivering τ , for any given argument of
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(ax )
⊢ τ : τ
(start)
Γ ⊢ a : b
Γ, x : a ⊢ x : a
(weak)
Γ ⊢ a : b Γ ⊢ c : d
Γ, x : c ⊢ a : b
(conv)
Γ ⊢ a : b b =λ c Γ ⊢ c : d
Γ ⊢ a : c
(absU )
Γ, x : a ⊢ b : c
Γ ⊢ [x : a]b : [x : a]c
(appl)
Γ ⊢ a : [x : b]c Γ ⊢ d : b
Γ ⊢ (a d) : c[d/x]
Table 1.1: The kernel of d: The system λλ [18] modified with τ : τ
type τ . In its role as a type C corresponds to an implication (“τ implies τ”) and
its proofs include the identity I = [x : τ ]x over τ , i.e. ⊢ I : C using essentially
the rules start and absU . In its role as an element C corresponds to a constant
function and it will type to itself, i.e. ⊢ C : C using essentially the rules ax and
absU . I, which as element is obviously the identity function, in its role as a type
corresponds to the proposition “everything of type τ is true” which of course
should not have any elements (consistency is shown in Section 4.11).
More generally, in the rule appl the type-role of a universal abstraction
([x : b]c) can be intuitively understood as an infinite conjunction of instances
(c[b1/x] ∧ c[b2/x] . . . where bi : b for all i). Individual instances (c[bi/x]) can
be projected by means of the application operator. Intuitively, a proof of
a universal abstraction ([x : a]c) must provide an infinite list of instances
(b[a1/x], b[a2/x], . . . where b[ai/x] : c[ai/x] for all i). Consequently, in the rule
absU a universal abstraction ([x : a]b where x : a⊢b : c) has the element-role of
being a proof of another universal abstraction ([x : a]c).
As another example, the introduction and elimination rules for universal
quantification can be derived almost trivially. Note that in this and the following
examples we write [a⇒b] to denote [x : a]b if x is not free in b:
P : [a⇒b] ⊢ [x : [y : a](P y)]x : [[y : a](P y)⇒ [y : a](P y)]
P : [a⇒b] ⊢ [x : a][z : [y : a](P y)](z x) : [x : a][[y : a](P y)⇒(P x)]
When substituting P by a constant function [a⇒c] (where⊢c : b) the deductions
simplify to two variants of the modus ponens rule:
⊢ [x : [a⇒c]]x : [[a⇒c]⇒ [a⇒c]]
⊢ [x : a][z : [a⇒c]](z x) : [a⇒ [[a⇒c]⇒c]]
In contrast to other type systems with λ-structured types, d is using a reflex-
ive axiom (ax). This might seem very strange as the use of a reflexive axiom
in combination with basic rules of PTS leads to paradoxes, e.g. [9][21], see
also [4](Section 5.5). However, as will be seen, in our setting of λ-structured
types, the axiom ax leads to a consistent system. This is actually not very
surprising since λλ does not have an equivalent to the product rule used in
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PTS:
(product)
Γ ⊢ a : s1 Γ, x : a ⊢ b : s2
Γ ⊢ (Πx : a.b) : s3
where si ∈ S, S is a set of sorts
Adding such a rule, appropriately adapted, to the kernel of d would violate
uniqueness of types [22] and allow for reconstructing well-known paradoxes (see
Sections 5.5 and 5.3).
As a consequence of this restriction, functions from τ such as I do not accept
functional arguments such as C1. The lack of functions of type τ is the reason
for achieving both consistency and τ : τ .
Unlike instances of PTS (e.g. [26]), systems with λ-structured types have
never been extended by existential or classical propositional operators. While
the kernel of d is sufficiently expressive to axiomatize basic mathematical struc-
tures (Sections 3.4, 3.6) the expressive and structuring means of deductions can
be enhanced by additional operators. We begin with an operator that effectively
provides for a deduction interface, i.e. a mechanism to hide details of interde-
pendent deductions. For this purpose, in analogy to a universal abstraction
([x : a]b), d introduces an existential abstraction ([x!a]b) (see Table 1.2 for its
type rules). The notation is intended to maximise coherence with universal ab-
(def )
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d[a/x] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [x
.
=a, c : d] : [x!b]d
(absE )
Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢ [x!a]b : [x : a]c
(chI )
Γ⊢a : [x!b]c
Γ⊢a.1 : b
(chB )
Γ⊢a : [x!b]c
Γ⊢a.2 : c[a.1/x]
Table 1.2: Type rules for existential abstractions
straction. The type-role of a existential abstraction ([x!b]d) can be intuitively
understood as an infinite disjunction (d[b1/x]∨ d[b2/x] . . . where bi : b for all i).
A proof of an existential abstraction ([x!b]d) must prove one of the instances (say
d[bj/x]), i.e. it must provide an instance of the quantification domain (bj : b)
and an element proving the instantiated formula (c : d[bj/x]). This is formalized
in rule def with a new operator called protected definition combining the two
elements and a tag for the abstraction type ([x
.
=a, c : d])2. This means that two
deductions (a and c), where one (c) is using the other one (a) in its type, are
simultaneously abstracted from in an existential abstraction type. The element-
role of a existential abstraction ([x!a]b) is not one of a logical operator but of
an entity providing an infinite list of instances (b[a1/x], b[a2/x], . . . where ai : a
for all i). But, as we just discussed above with respect to typing of universal
abstractions (absU ), this is sufficient to type it to a universal abstraction (absE).
1In fact, (I C) cannot be typed since () ⊢ I : [x : τ ]τ , hence I is expecting arguments of
type τ , but ()⊢C : C and τ 6=λ C
2The type tag d in [x
.
=a, c : d] is necessary to ensure uniqueness of types
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Hence the element-roles of universal and existential abstraction are equivalent.
Pragmatically the element-role of existential abstraction is less frequently used
and of less importance. This is the reason why the notation for existential
abstractions is more “type-oriented” than that of universal abstraction.
In analogy to the type-elimination of universal abstraction, projections (a.1
and a.2 3) are introduced as type-eliminators for existential abstraction with
obvious equivalence laws.
[x
.
=a, b : c].1 =λ a [x
.
=a, b : c].2 =λ b
The type rules chI and chB for projections are similar to common rules for Σ
types, e.g. [26].
As an example, the introduction and elimination rules for existential quan-
tification can be derived as follows (with Γ = (P,Q : [a⇒b])):
Γ ⊢ [x :a][z : (P x)][y
.
=x, z : (P y)] : [x : a][(P x)⇒ [y!a](P y)]
Γ ⊢ [x : [y1!a](Py1)][z : [y2 :a][(Py2)⇒(Qy2)]]
[y3
.
=x.1, ((z x.1)x.2) : (Qy3)] : [[y1!a](Py1)
⇒ [[y2 :a][(Py2)⇒(Qy2)]
⇒ [y3!a](Qy3)]]
A more detailed explanation of these deductions is given in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Note how the second example illustrates in a nutshell the role of existential ab-
straction as a deduction interface. It can be understood as the transformation of
a deduction on the basis of a reference (x) to its interface ([y1!a](Py1)]) followed
by the creation of a new interface ([y3!a](Qy3)]) hiding the transformation details
(application of z to the extracted interdependent elements x.1 and x.2). More
applications will be shown in Section 3, in particular in Sections 3.7(Partial
functions), 3.8(Defining functions from deductions), and 3.11(Proof structur-
ing).
The rule absE has the consequence that existential abstractions can now be
instantiated as elements in the elimination rule for universal abstraction, i.e. the
rule appl can be instantiated as follows:
(appl )[[x!a1]a2/a]
Γ⊢ [x!a1]a2 : [x : b]c Γ⊢d : b
Γ⊢([x!a1]a2 d) : c[d/x]
This motivates the extension of β-equality to existential abstractions, i.e. we
have
([x : a]b c) =λ b[c/x] =λ ([x!a]b c)
Note that this properties merely state that both abstractions have equivalent
functional interpretations. Their semantic distinction is represented by their
role in the type relation. For example, note that from x : [y!a]b and z : a one
cannot conclude (x z) : ([y!a]b z). Note also that the extension of β-equality to
3A postfix notation has been chosen since it seems more intuitive for projection sequences.
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existential abstraction precludes η-equality, i.e. to uniquely determine a function
by its value at each point, as this would directly lead to an inconsistency: When
assuming [x : a](b x) =λ b for arbitrary a and b where x not free in b then
[x : a](b x) =λ [x : a]([x!a](b x)x) =λ [x!a](b x)
Finally, one might wonder why not type an existential abstraction [x!a]b to
an existential abstraction [x!a]c (assuming x : a ⊢ b : c)? According to the
intuitive understanding of the type role of an existential abstraction as an infinite
disjunction this would be logically invalid and indeed it is quite easy to see such
a rule would lead to inconsistency4.
The remaining part of d are some propositional operators (see Table 1.3 for
their type rules). d adds a product ([a, b]) as a binary variation of universal
(prd)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [a, b] : [c, d]
(sum)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [a+ b] : [c, d]
(prL)
Γ⊢a : [b, c]
Γ⊢a.1 : b
(prR)
Γ⊢a : [b, c]
Γ⊢a.2 : c
(injL)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ⊢ [a, :c] : [b+ c]
(injR)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ⊢ [:c, a] : [c+ b]
(case)
Γ⊢a : [x : c1]d Γ⊢b : [y : c2]d Γ⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [a ? b] : [z : [c1 + c2]]d
(neg)
Γ⊢a : b
Γ⊢¬a : b
Table 1.3: Type rules for propositional operators
abstraction ([x : a]b), i.e. with an element-role as a binary pair and an type-role
as a binary conjunction. Due to the same notation dilemma as for universal
abstraction, i.e. neither the notation for pairs 〈a, b〉 nor for conjunctions a ∧ b
would be satisfactory, we use the neutral notation [a, b]. The type rules prd, prR,
and prL for products directly encode the introduction and elimination rules for
conjunctions. The equivalence laws for projection are extended in an obvious
way.
[a, b].1 =λ a [a, b].2 =λ b
As a example we show below that existential abstractions without dependencies
(i.e. [x!a]b, where x is not free in b) are logically equivalent to products:
⊢ [y : [x!a]b][y.1, y.2] : [[x!a]b⇒ [a, b]]
⊢ [y : [a, b]][x
.
=y.1, y.2 : b] : [[a, b]⇒ [x!a]b]
4 First, with such a rule the type P = [x : τ ][y!x]τ would have itself as an element,
i.e.⊢P : P . However from a declaration of this type one could then extract a proof of [z : τ ]z
as follows y : P ⊢ [z : τ ](y z).1 : [z : τ ]z.
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However, note that in comparison to existential abstractions, products have an
intuitive symmetric type rule for this case (cf. absE vs. prd).
Similarly d adds a sum ([b1 + b2]) as a binary variation of the existential
abstraction ([x!a]b), i.e. with an element-role as a binary pair and an type-role
as a binary disjunction. Consequently, there is a type sequence analogous to
existential abstraction: Expressions (a1 : b1, a2 : b2) may be used within injec-
tions ([a1, : b2], [: b1, a2]) (injections are the analogue to protected definitions),
which type to a sum ([b1+ b2]) which types to a product. The bracket notation
for products and abstractions is extended to injections and sums for notational
coherence. Similarly to existential abstraction we use a more type-oriented no-
tation for sums. The injection rules directly encode the introduction rules for
disjunctions and rule case introduces a case distinction operator. Two equiva-
lence laws describe its functional interpretation.
([a ? b] [c, :d]) =λ (a c) ([a ? b] [:c, d]) =λ (b d)
As an example, the introduction and elimination rules for disjunction can be
derived as follows:
⊢ [[x : a][x, :b]], [x : a][:b, x]] : [[a⇒ [a+ b]], [a⇒ [b+ a]]]
⊢ [x : [a+ b]][y : [a⇒c]]
[z : [b⇒c]]([y ? z]x) : [[a+ b]⇒ [[a⇒c]⇒ [[b⇒c]⇒c]]]
In the second example, in analogy to existential abstractions, a reference (x) to
an interface ([a + b]) is hiding the information which particular proposition (a
or b) is proven.
In analogy to the β-equality for existential abstraction, projection is extended
to sums.
[a+ b].1 =λ a [a+ b].2 =λ a
Finally, to support common mathematical reasoning practices, d introduces a
classical negation operator ¬a which has a neutral type rule neg and which
defines an equivalence class of propositions w.r.t. classical negation. The central
logical properties are the following:
a =λ ¬¬a [a, b] =λ ¬[¬a+ ¬b] [x :a]b =λ ¬[x!a]¬b
Furthermore, negation has no effect on operators without a possibility of apply-
ing an elimination operator to its use as a type.
¬τ =λ τ ¬[x
.
=a, b : c] =λ [x
.
=a, b : c]
¬[a, :b] =λ [a, :b] ¬[:a, b] =λ [:a, b] ¬[a ? b] =λ [a ? b]
The negation laws define many negated formulas as equivalent which helps to
eliminate many routine applications of logical equivalences in deductions. For
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example, the following laws can be derived for arbitrary well-typed expressions
a, b.
⊢ [x : a]x : [a⇒a] =λ [¬¬a⇒a] =λ [a⇒¬¬a]
⊢ [x : ¬[a, b]]x : [¬[a, b]⇒ [¬a+¬b]] =λ [[¬a+¬b]⇒¬[a, b]]
⊢ [x : ¬[x!a]b]x : [¬[x!a]b⇒ [x :a]¬b] =λ [[x :a]¬b⇒ ¬[x!a]b]
Truth and falsehood can now be defined as follows:
ff := [x : τ ]x tt := ¬ff
Note that falsehood is just a new convenient notation for type role of the identity
(ff = I). The expected properties follow almost directly:
⊢ [x : τ ][y : ff ](y x) : [x : τ ][ff⇒x]
⊢ [x
.
=τ, τ : ¬x] : tt
In the proof of tt note that tt =λ [x!τ ]¬x and τ : τ =λ ¬τ =λ (¬x)[τ/x].
Equivalence rules for negation obviously do not yield all logical properties
of negation, e.g. they are not sufficient to prove [a+ ¬a]. Therefore one has to
assume additional axioms. Similarly, due to the limited strength of d, additional
axioms must also be added for the mathematical structures whose deductions
are to be formalized (for both see Section 3).
As this completes the overview of d, one may ask for its general advantages
w.r.t. PTS. While essentially equivalent expressive means could probably also
be defined in a semantic setting using different domains for functions and types,
the purely functional setting of d can be considered as conceptually more simple.
Independently from the semantic setting the use of common logical quantifiers
and propositional connectors including a classical negation with rich equivalence
laws seems more suitable for describing mathematical deductions than encoded
operators or operators with constructive interpretation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: A formal definition of
d is presented in Section 2 and several application examples are shown in Sec-
tion 3. Readers with less focus on the theoretical results can well read Section 3
before Section 2. The main part of the paper is Section 4 containing proofs of
confluence, subject reduction, uniqueness of types, strong normalization, and
consistency.
1.3 Core concepts
In this section, we motivate and present the core concepts of d in a semi-formal
property-oriented style. To understand the starting point of d, consider the
rules of pure type systems (PTS) summarized in Table 1.4 which are the basis
for a large class of typed systems which can be used to formalize deductions (see
e.g. [4]). As usual we use the notation Γ⊢A : B where Γ = (x1 : A1, · · · , xn : An)
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to formalize type assumptions. As usual, A =λ B denotes equality modulo β-
reduction. The substitution of free occurrences of x in A by B is denoted by
A[B/x]. In the rules of Table 1.4, A, the set of axioms, is a set of pairs (s1, s2),
where si are from a set of sort S; and R, the set of rules, is a set of pairs
(s1, s2, s3) where si ∈ S. Many instances of these typing systems allow for
(axioms)
() ⊢ s1 : s2
where (s1, s2) ∈ A
(start)
Γ ⊢ A : s
Γ, x : A ⊢ x : A
(weakening)
Γ ⊢ A : B Γ ⊢ C : s
Γ, x : C ⊢ A : B
(product)
Γ ⊢ A : s1 Γ, x : A ⊢ B : s2
Γ ⊢ (Πx : A.B) : s3
where (s1, s2, s3) ∈ R
(application)
Γ ⊢ F : (Πx : A.B) Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ (F a) : B[a/x]
(abstraction)
Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B Γ ⊢ (Πx : A.B) : s
Γ ⊢ (λx : A.b) : (Πx : A.B)
(conversion)
Γ ⊢ A : B Γ ⊢ B′ : s B =λ B′
Γ ⊢ A : B′
Table 1.4: Rules of pure type systems
representing deductions as well-sorted λ-expressions which reduce to a unique
normal form with respect to β-reduction, e.g. [4]. Depending on their axioms
and rules, these systems allow to represent logical propositions as types and to
identify sorting of terms and typing of formulae.
A well-known example of these systems is the calculus of constructions
(CoC) [10] which can essentially be seen as a PTS with the following configu-
ration (as usual, for R, we write (s1, s2) for (s1, s2, s2)):
S = {Prop, type}
A = {(Prop, type)}
R = {(Prop,Prop), (Prop, type), (type,Prop), (type, type)}
We will now discuss the differences of the system λλ [18]5 to PTS.
The first deviation from PTS that is characteristic for the system λλ is to
use a single abstraction mechanism for propositions and expressions on all levels
which we will denote as universal abstraction and write as [x : A]B. Some of the
resulting types of systems have been studied as ♭-cubes in [22]. Semantically, a
universal abstractions can be seen as a function specified by a λ-expression6. As
5which is itself a reconstruction of [32] which is a variation of Automath system Λ [13]
6Nevertheless, we use the term universal abstraction to emphasize their logical roles as
functional abstraction and universal quantification
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a consequence, typing does not correspond to set inclusion anymore but becomes
a relation between functions and types become roles that functions can play in
this relation. Consequently, β-equality can now be applied also to expressions
playing the role of types. Merging the abstraction mechanisms would lead to
the following adapted typing rules, replacing the rules product, application, and
abstraction.
(product ′)
Γ ⊢ a : s1 Γ, x : a ⊢ b : s2
Γ ⊢ [x : a]b : s3
where (s1, s2, s3) ∈ R
(application ′)
Γ ⊢ a : [x : b]c Γ ⊢ d : b
Γ ⊢ (a d) : c[d/x]
(abstraction ′)
Γ, x : a⊢b : c Γ⊢ [x : a]c : s
Γ ⊢ [x : a]b : [x : a]c
Note that to emphasize the difference to PTS we use a, b, c, etc. to denote
expressions using a single binding mechanism. An important reason that this
unification works smoothly is that abstraction works as introduction operator
for itself. We will see later how this becomes more complex when existential
operators are introduced.
Note also that product ′ and abstraction ′ together would violate uniqueness
of types [22]:
Γ ⊢ a : b Γ ⊢ a : c
b =λ c
For example if ∗, ∈ S, (∗,) ∈ A, and (∗,) ∈ R we would have
⊢ [x : ∗]x :  and ⊢ [x : ∗]x : [x : ∗]
This motivates the second difference of λλ w.r.t. PTS which is to reject the rule
product ′ in order to ensure uniqueness of types.
The third and final difference to PTS that is characteristic for λλ is to
strengthen the rule abstraction ′ to allow using any typable universal abstraction.
The rules weakening, conversion, and start are adapted accordingly.
(abstraction ′′)
Γ, x : a ⊢ b : c
Γ ⊢ [x : a]b : [x : a]c
(weakening ′)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ, x : c⊢a : b
(conversion ′)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d b =λ c
Γ⊢a : c
(start ′)
Γ⊢a : b
Γ, x : a⊢x : a
Similar kind of choices are included in the system λδ [19].
d deviates from λλ by setting S = {τ} and A = {(τ, τ)} instead of S = {τ, κ}
and A = {(τ, κ)}.. It is well know that systems with τ : τ can lead to paradoxes,
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e.g. [9][21], see also [4](Section 5.5). It will turn out that rejection of the rule
product ′ is the key reason for avoiding these paradoxes7.
These adaptations result in a system that correponds to the system λλ,
modified by τ : τ , in inference rule notation and which will be used as backbone
of d. The basic properties of this system are summarized in Table 1.5.
As usual we use the notation a→∗ b for reduction, the reflexive and transitive
closure of single-step reduction a → b. We require two more properties for
Syntax: τ primitive constant
x, y, z, . . . ∈ V variables
[x : a]b universal abstraction
(a b) application
Reduction:
reflexive, transitive relation →∗
(β1) ([x : a]b c) → b[c/x]
([ : ] )
a→∗ c b→∗ d
[x : a]b→∗ [x : c]d
( )
a→∗ c b→∗ d
(a b)→∗ (c d)
Typing:
context sequence Γ = (x1 : a1, · · · , xn : an), xi 6= xj
(ax )
⊢τ : τ
(start)
Γ⊢a : b
Γ, x : a⊢x : a
(weak)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ, x : c⊢a : b
(conv)
Γ⊢a : b b =λ c Γ⊢c : d
Γ⊢a : c
(absU )
Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢ [x : a]b : [x : a]c
(appl)
Γ⊢a : [x : b]c Γ⊢d : b
Γ⊢(a d) : c[d/x]
Table 1.5: Properties of the core of d
its meaningful use as a typing systems. First, the typing relation should be
decidable in the sense that there is an algorithm which takes an expression a
and either fails or delivers an expression b with () ⊢ a : b. Second, the calculus
should be consistent in the sense that there is an expression which is not the
type of any other expression. In d, [x : τ ]x is such an expression:
there is no a with () ⊢ a : [x : τ ]x
Due to the properties of confluence and strong normalisation we can define
the unique normal forms of a typable expression. In the core of d, we have the
7Note that the system does do have formation rules that yield e.g. ([x : τ ]τ) : τ
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following such normal forms.
N = {τ} ∪ {[x : a]b | a, b ∈ N} ∪ D
D = {x | x ∈ V} ∪ {(a b) | a ∈ D, b ∈ N}
Here the set D denotes the set of dead ends (of reduction).
1.4 Why additional operators?
In λλ, common encodings of logical operators can be used (where [a⇒b] abbre-
viates [x : a]b if x is not free in b):
false := [x : τ ]x
true := [x : τ ][y : x]y
implies := [x : τ ][y : τ ][x⇒y]
not := [x : τ ][x⇒ false]
and := [x : τ ][y : τ ][z : τ ][[x⇒ [y⇒z]]⇒z]
or := [x : τ ][y : τ ][z : τ ][[x⇒z]⇒ [[y⇒z]⇒z]]
forall := [x : τ ][y : [x⇒τ ]][z : x](y z)
exists := [x : τ ][y : [x⇒τ ][[z : x][(y z)⇒x]⇒x]
Given these definitions, one can derive further logical properties, for example
the following one (where (a1 a2 . . . an) abbreviates (. . . (a1 a2) . . . an)):
x1, x2 : τ ⊢ [y : (and x1 x2)](y x1 [z1 : x1][z2 : x2]z1) : [(and x1 x2)⇒x1]
Hence one could argue that no further logical operators (apart from the law of
the excluded middle) seem necessary. We do not follow this argument because
as we have already argued in Section 1.2, due to the typing rules of the core of
d, declarations such as x : τ cannnot be instantiated to functions [x : a]b. This
limitation of expressive power is a drawback of such encodings.
To overcome this limitation, we could introduce abbreviations for expression
schemas, e.g.
and(a, b) := [z : τ ][[a⇒ [b⇒z]]⇒z]
However, regardless of the use of schemas we do not adopt the encoding approach
in d because of properties such as
c : a d : b
[z : P ][w : [x : a][y : b]z]((w c) d) : andP (a, b)
which we consider less intuitive for deductions involving conjunction as com-
pared to the approach in d which is to introduce additional logical operators
with their specific typing and congruence laws. This will lead to the law:
c : a d : b
[c, d] : [a, b]
14
1.5 Existential abstraction
The restricted structuring means of the core of d become apparent when model-
ing the assumption of some variable x of type a and with a constraining property
Px depending on x. In the core of d one is forced to use two consecutive decla-
rations as assumption and consequently a nested application as resolution.
Γ ⊢ b : [x1 : a][x2 : Px1 ]Qx1,x2 Γ ⊢ c1 : a Γ ⊢ c2 : Pc1
Γ ⊢ ((b c1) c2) : Qc1,c2
A key mechanism of d is to extend this system by existential abstraction, written
as [x!a]b, and left and right projection, written as a.1 and a.2. Using these
operators, the two assumptions and the two applications can be merged.
Γ⊢b : [x : [y!a]Py]Qx.1,x.2 Γ⊢c : [y!a]Py
Γ⊢(b c) : Qc.1,c.2
We now turn to the intended additional typing laws. The elimination laws are
relatively straightforward and similar to common laws for Σ types, e.g. [26].
(chI )
Γ⊢a : [x!b]c
Γ⊢a.1 : b
(chB )
Γ⊢a : [x!b]c
Γ⊢a.2 : c[a.1/x]
Note that the type of a.2 contains a projection a.1, i.e. a.1 is used on both sides
of the elimination rules of [x!b]c8. Note that logically left projection has simi-
larities to a skolem function and right projection can be seen as a skolemisation
operator9.
Next, we define the introduction law for existential abstraction, which turns
out to be somewhat more complicated. As for universal abstractions, some sort
of unique introduction operation for existential abstraction seems necessary10.
A first approximation of the corresponding typing rule would be to use a tuple
to introduce existential abstractions:
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d[a/x]
Γ⊢ [a, c] : [x!b]d
However, this rule is inappropriate in our setting as it allows for many incom-
patible types of the same expression and thus violates uniqueness of types, for
example:
Γ⊢a : b c : [d⇒d]
Γ⊢ [a, c] : [x!b][x⇒d]
Γ⊢a : b c : [d⇒d]
Γ⊢ [a, c] : [x!b][d⇒x]
A solution to this issue is to specify the intended type explicitly in the pro-
tected definition. Instead of using a notation such as [a, c][x!b]d we can omit the
expression b by introducing an operator called protected definition, written as
8This is related to the remark about existential quantification in §12 of [20].
9Left projection has also similarities with Hilberts ǫ-operator, see Section 5.1
10Otherwise expressions would have types of very different structures at the same time.
This is not investigated further in this context.
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[x
.
= a, c : d] where we allow d, but not c to use the variable x. The second
attempt for the typing rule then becomes
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d[a/x]
Γ⊢ [x
.
=a, c : d] : [x!b]d
There is a logical issue with this naive characterization of existential quantifi-
cation: In the expression d[a/x] in the rule-antecedent it would be possible to
unfold x to a at arbitrary places in d. This may lead to problematic instantia-
tion of the rules which leads to expressions that cannot be typed. For example,
we can instantiate the proposed rule to obtain (with τ˙ abbreviating [τ⇒τ ]):
Γ⊢ τ˙ : τ˙ Γ⊢ [x : τ˙ ][(x τ)⇒τ ] : ([x : y][(x τ)⇒τ ])[τ˙ /y]
[y
.
= τ˙ , [x : τ˙ ][(x τ)⇒τ ] : [x : y][(x τ)⇒τ ]] : [y!τ˙ ][x : y][(x τ)⇒τ ]
and therefore, since both antecedents of the rule are true, i.e.
Γ⊢ τ˙ : τ˙ [x : τ˙ ][(x τ)⇒τ ] : [x : τ˙ ][(x τ)⇒τ ]
the consequence of this rule would be true as well. Note however, that in the
type expression in the rule-consequence the expression (x τ) is not typable. The
cause of this issue is that the unfolding of the definition of x, which is necessary
to ensure that (x τ) is typable, has been lost in the typing step. We therefore
need to add a condition to this rule requiring typability of the intended type.
This leads to the final form
(def )
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d[a/x] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [x
.
=a, c : d] : [x!b]d
Furthermore, protected definitions are subject to the following reduction axioms:
(π1 ) [x
.
=a, b : c].1→ a (π2 ) [x
.
=a, b : c].2→ b
Finally, we need to define a typing law for existential abstraction itself,
in order to define well-defined existential abtractions. With respect to type
elimination, an expression of type [x!a]b embodies a proof of b for some concrete
expression a0. However, with respect to type introduction, i.e. when playing
the role of a proof, an expression [x!a]b has the logical strength identical to a
universal abstraction: it is a function which given some x : a it produces a b : c,
hence we use the rule:
(absE )
Γ⊢a : d Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢ [x!a]b : [x : a]c
It is important to note that this law has the effect that existential abstrac-
tions can now be instantiated as elements in the elimination rule for universal
abstraction, i.e.
Γ⊢ [x!a]b : [x : a]c Γ⊢d : a
Γ⊢([x!a]b d) : c[d/x]
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Hence, we extend the law of β-equality to existential abstractions as well
(β2) ([x!a]b c)→ b[c/x]
Note that this does not lead to logical inconsistency because from x : [y!a]b and
z : a one cannot conclude (x z) : ([y!a]b z).
One might ask why not type an existential abstraction [x!a]b to an existential
abstraction [x!a]c (assuming x : a ⊢ b : c). This would logically be invalid
since we could prove existential statements by magic, i.e. without providing an
instance expressions. Actually it is quite easy to see such a rule would lead to
inconsistency. First, the type [x : τ ][y!x]τ has an element, namely itself!
⊢ [x : τ ][y!x]τ : [x : τ ][y!x]τ
However from a declaration of this type one can extract a proof of [z : τ ]z as
follows
y : [x1 : τ ][x2!x1]τ ⊢ [z : τ ](y z).1 : [z : τ ]z
The discussion about the typing rules for abstractions can be summarized as
follows:
• From the point of view of reduction, universal abstraction and existential
abstraction both share the properties of λ-abstraction.
• From the point of view of typing, when playing the role of a type, universal
abstraction is its own introducer and existential abstraction requires a
proof of a concrete instance in its introduction rule, however when playing
the role of an element, universal abstraction and existential abstraction
have the same contraction and typing rules.
The set of normal forms N is extended as follows::
N = {τ} ∪ {[x : a]b, [x!a]b, [x
.
=a, b : c] | a, b, c ∈ N} ∪ D
D = {x | x ∈ V} ∪ {(a b), a.2, a.1 | a ∈ D, b ∈ N}
The basic properties of existential abstraction are summarized in Table 1.6.
1.6 Products and sums
While quantifiers now have a direct intuitive correspondence as the type roles
of operators of d.
[x : a]b ∼ ∀x : a.b
[x!a]b ∼ ∃x : a.b
this is not yet the case for propositional operators. One could introduce the
notational convention
and(a, b) := [x!a]b
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Syntax: [x!a]c existential abstraction
[x
.
=a, b : c] protected definition (x may be used in c)
a.1, a.2 left projection, right projection
Reduction:
(π1 ) [x
.
=a, b : c].1→ a (π2 ) [x
.
=a, b : c].2→ b
(β2) ([x!a]b c)→ b[c/x]
( .1)
a→∗ b
a.1→∗ b.1
( .2)
a→∗ b
a.2→∗ b.2
([x! ] )
a→∗ c b→∗ d
[x!a]b→∗ [x!c]d
([x
.
= , : ])
a1 →∗ a2 b1 →∗ b2 c1 →∗ c2
[x
.
=a1, b1 : c1]→∗ [x
.
=a2, b2 : c2]
Typing:
(chI )
Γ⊢a : [x!b]c
Γ⊢a.1 : b
(chB )
Γ⊢a : [x!b]c
Γ⊢a.2 : c[a.1/x]
(absE )
Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢ [x!a]b : [x : a]c
(def )
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d[a/x] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [x
.
=a, c : d] : [x!b]d
Table 1.6: Properties of existential abstraction.
where x may not occur free in b. However we would then obtain the property
Γ ⊢ a : b Γ ⊢ c : d
Γ ⊢ and(a, c) : [x : a]d
which we consider an unintuitive (c.f. discussion in Section 1.4).
In this section, we therefore introduce explicit propositional operators. First,
we introduce binary products [a, b] as a finite version of universal abstractions.
(prd)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [a, b] : [c, d]
Furthermore, the left and right projection operators .1 and .2 are extended to
products:
(prL)
Γ⊢a : [b, c]
Γ⊢a.1 : b
(prR)
Γ⊢a : [b, c]
Γ⊢a.2 : c
(π3 ) [a, b].1→ a (π4 ) [a, b].2→ b
Analogously to binary products, we introduce binary sums [a + b] as a finite
version of existential abstractions. Together with binary sums, we introduce left-
and right-injections [a, :b], [:a, b] of expressions into sums and a case distinction
operator [a ? b]. The notations with sharp brackets are used to emphasize the
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fact these constructs are related to universal and existential abstraction in the
sense that they represent finite variations of these constructs. These constructs
have the following typing and rules:
(injL)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ⊢ [a, :c] : [b+ c]
(injR)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [:b, a] : [b+ c]
(case)
Γ⊢a : [x : c1]d Γ⊢b : [y : c2]d Γ⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [a ? b] : [z : [c1 + c2]]d
Note that left-injection [a, :c] carries a type tag c, similar to the tag in [x
.
=a, b :
c]. Similar for right-injections. Note that the third condition in the typing rule
for case distinction implies that x does not appear free in d.
Analogously to the extension of projection to products, application is ex-
tended to case distinctions:
(β3 ) ([a ? b] [c, :d])→ (a c) (β4 ) ([a ? b] [:c, d])→ (b d)
Concerning typing and reduction of sums, since a sum can be seen as a finite
variant of an existential abstraction we use finite variants of the rules motivated
in Section 1.5: The typing of sums is analogous to that of existential abstraction:
(sum)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [a+ b] : [c, d]
Obviously, there should be similar treatment for the finite variants [a + b].1
and [a + b].2 of the expression ([x!a]b d). Hence we also include the following
equivalences:
(π5 ) [a+ b].1→ a (π6 ) [a+ b].2→ b
As a simple example of the use of these rules consider the following expression
(Ca,b) proving commutativity of sums:
[x : [a+ b]]([[y : a][:b, y] ? [y : b][y, :a]]x) : [[a+ b]⇒ [b + a]] (Ca,b)
The set of normal forms N now looks as follows:
N = {τ} ∪ {[x : a]b, [x!a]b, [x
.
=a, b : c] | a, b, c ∈ N}
∪ {[a, b], [a+ b], [a, :b], [:a, b], [a ? b] | a, b ∈ N} ∪ D
D = {x | x ∈ V} ∪ {(a b), a.2, a.1, ([b ? c] a) | a ∈ D, b, c ∈ N}
The basic properties of products and sum are summarized in Table 1.7.
1.7 Negation
The rules given sofar allow, within the paradigm of natural deduction, for defin-
ing negation as described in Section 1.4:
not(a) := [a⇒ff ]
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Syntax: [a, b] product
[a+ b] sum
[a, :b], [:a, b] left injection, right injection
[a ? b] case distinction
Reduction:
(π3 ) [a, b].1→ a (π4 ) [a, b].2→ b
(π5 ) [a+ b].1→ a (π6 ) [a+ b].2→ b
(β3 ) ([a ? b] [c, :d])→ (a c) (β4 ) ([a ? b] [:c, d])→ (b d)
([ , ])
a→∗ c b =λ d
[a, b]→∗ [c, d]
([ + ])
a→∗ c b→∗ d
[a+ b]→∗ [c+ d]
([ , : ])
a→∗ c b→∗ d
[a, :b]→∗ [c, :d]
([: , ])
a→∗ c b→∗ d
[:a, b]→∗ [:c, d]
([ ? ])
a→∗ c b→∗ d
[a ? b]→∗ [c ? d]
Typing:
(prd)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [a, b] : [c, d]
(sum)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [a+ b] : [c, d]
(prL)
Γ⊢a : [b, c]
Γ⊢a.1 : b
(prR)
Γ⊢a : [b, c]
Γ⊢a.2 : c
(injL)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ⊢ [a, :c] : [b + c]
(injR)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [:b, a] : [b+ c]
(case)
Γ⊢a : [x : c1]d Γ⊢b : [y : c2]d Γ⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [a ? b] : [z : [c1 + c2]]d
Table 1.7: Properties of product and sum.
where ff is shorthand for [x : τ ]x, and then to derive the laws of intuitionistic
logic, e.g. by the following typing
⊢ [y : a][z : not(a)](z y) : [a⇒not(not(a))]
Similarly it is for example easy to define expressions ba,b, and ca,b where
⊢ba,b : [[not(a), not(b)]⇒not([a+ b])]
⊢ca,b : [[not(a) + not(b)]⇒not([a, b])]
The remaining laws of classical logic could then be obtained assuming the law
of the excluded middle
tnda : [a+ not(a)]
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d is following a different approach and introduces negation as an explicit oper-
ator ¬a that is neutral with respect to typing
(neg)
Γ⊢a : b
Γ⊢¬a : b
In order to simplify deductions involving negated formulas, d is encoding into
its contraction relation some logical equivalence laws involving negation, thus
defining a negation normal form. Technically this is possible since in d proofs
and formulas are treated uniformly as functional expressions.
In particular, we postulate that negation reduces according to the laws of
double negation and the De Morgan laws:
(ν1 ) ¬¬a→ a (ν2 ) ¬[a, b]→ [¬a+ ¬b] (ν3 ) ¬[a+ b]→ [¬a,¬b]
These laws are extended to infinite sums and products as follows:
(ν4 ) ¬[x : a]b→ [x!a]¬b (ν5 ) ¬[x!a]b→ [x : a]¬b
This defines a procedure of normalization with respect to negation.
These normalization rules define many negated formulas as equivalent which
helps to eliminate many routine applications of logical equivalences in deduc-
tions. For example it suffices to prove an instance of a negated proposition in
order to prove a negated universal abstraction:
Γ ⊢ a : b Γ ⊢ c : ¬d[a/x]
Γ ⊢ [x
.
=a, c : d] : ¬[x : b]d (=λ [x!b]¬d)
Conversely, it is sufficient to prove a negated proposition assuming an arbitrary
variable to prove a negated existential abstraction over that variable:
Γ, x : a ⊢ b : ¬c
Γ ⊢ [x : a]b : ¬[x!a]c (=λ [x : a]¬c)
In order to avoid many uninteresting variations of normal forms we also add
the properties that the application of negation to any constructor other than
the above one does not yield any effect. These properties (ν6) to (ν10) are
non-logical in the sense that they cannot be derived as equivalences from the
negation mechanism for sequent calculus.
(ν6 ) ¬τ → τ (ν7 ) ¬[x
.
=a, b : c]→ [x
.
=a, b : c]
(ν8 ) ¬[a, :b]→ [a, :b] (ν9 ) ¬[:a, b]→ [:a, b] (ν10 ) ¬[a ? b]→ [a ? b]
These reduction rules have the consequence that the direct encoding of the
negation of a as [a⇒ ff ], where ff abbreviates [x : τ ]x, becomes problematic,
since, for example, the axiom ν1 would then imply that
[[a⇒ff ]⇒ff ]→∗ a
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and hence we could derive the following two reductions obviously violating the
confluence property of reduction.
([x : [y : a]ff ]ff b)→ ff [b/x] = ff ([x : [y : a]ff ]ff b)→ (a b)
The negation axioms do not yield all desired properties of negation, e.g. it is
not possible to produce an expression of type [a⇒ [¬a⇒b]]. Therefore one has
to assume additional axioms 11. In principle many different axioms schemes are
possible. For example, one could be inspired by the rules for negation in sequent
calculus (A stands for a sequence of formulas A1, . . ., An):
A⊢B,C
A,¬B⊢C
(L¬)
A,B⊢C
A⊢¬B,C
(R¬)
This can be reformulated as the following axiom schemes:
¬+a,b : [[a+ b]⇒ [¬a⇒b]] ¬
−
a,b : [¬a⇒b]⇒ [a+ b]]
Formally such axiom schemes can be defined as an appropriate context Γ′ pre-
fixing a context Γ to yield a typing Γ′,Γ ⊢ a : b (see Appendix A). The basic
properties of negation by negation normalization are summarized in Table 1.8.
Syntax: ¬a negation
Reduction:
(ν1 ) ¬¬a→ a (ν2 ) ¬[a, b]→ [¬a+ ¬b]
(ν3 ) ¬[a+ b]→ [¬a,¬b]
(ν4 ) ¬[x : a]b→ [x!a]¬b (ν5 ) ¬[x!a]b→ [x : a]¬b
(ν6 ) ¬τ → τ (ν7 ) ¬[x
.
=a, b : c]→ [x
.
=a, b : c]
(ν8 ) ¬[a, :b]→ [a, :b] (ν9 ) ¬[:a, b]→ [:a, b]
(ν10 ) ¬[a ? b]→ [a ? b]
(¬ )
a→∗ b
¬a→∗ ¬b
Typing:
(neg)
Γ⊢a : b
Γ⊢¬a : b
Table 1.8: Properties of negation.
Note that the above axioms scheme allows for deriving mutual implication of
the left-hand sides and right-hand sides of axioms ν1 to ν5, without of course
11In Section 5.2 we discuss the problems of internalizing the complete properties of negation
into d.
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using these axioms. For example to prove [¬¬a⇒ a] we can use the following
expression (see Section 1.6 for Ca,b):
(¬+
¬a,a (Ca,¬a (¬
−
a,¬a [x : ¬a]x))) : [¬¬a⇒a]
Note however, that, due to the use of λ-structured types, this does not mean
the axioms ν1 to ν5 are logically redundant if we assume additional axioms. For
example when assuming Γ = (x : [τ ⇒ τ ], y : τ), it is only with the use of ν1
that we can establish the following typing:
[z : (x¬¬y)]z : [(x¬¬y)⇒(x y)]
Through negation operators, the set of normal forms N is extended as follows:
N = {τ} ∪ {[x : a]b, [x!a]b, [x
.
=a, b : c] | a, b, c ∈ N}
∪ {[a, b], [a+ b], [a, :b], [:a, b], [a ? b] | a, b ∈ N} ∪ D
D = {x | x ∈ V} ∪ {(a b), a.1, a.2, ([b ? c] a) | a ∈ D, b, c ∈ N}
∪ {¬a | a ∈ D, a is not a negation}
1.8 Casting types to τ
A restriction of λλ is related to its type formation rules. In particular if (x :
b) ⊢ a : τ we may not conclude ⊢ [x : b]a : τ but only ⊢ [x : b]a : [x : b]τ .
Therefore in an abstraction [x : τ ]b, x is restricted in the sense that, i.e. it does
not abstract over expressions of type [y : τ ]τ or even more complicated ones.
One possibility to resolve this restriction would be to introduce an inclusion
relation 6. The idea would then be to extend the type extension property to
subsumptive subtyping (e.g. [29]):
Γ ⊢ a : b b 6 c Γ ⊢ c : d
Γ ⊢ a : c
and to use inclusion laws including the axiom
a 6 τ
However it turns out (see Section 5.3) this would lead to a calculus essentially
satisfying the laws of the system λ∗ ([4], Section 5.5) which is known to be
inconsistent in the sense that every type has at least on expression typing to it.
Moreover λ∗ does not have the strong normalization property.
An alternative approach is to use a very specific form of explicit type casting.
This can be done by an axiom scheme ()a to cast an expression a of any type
to the type τ .
()a : [a⇒τ ]
Furthermore, similarly to negation, there are axioms schemes ()+a and ()
−
a to
add and remove τ -casts:
()+a : [x : a][x⇒(()a x)] ()
−
a : [x : a][(()a x)⇒x]
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As for negation, such axiom schemes can be defined as an appropriate context
Γ′ prefixing a context Γ to yield a typing Γ′,Γ⊢a : b (see Appendix A). As an
example of the use of these axioms, consider a function z parametrized over a
type x of type τ .
Γ = (z : [x : τ ][y : x]x)
Using the casting axioms, it can now be instantiated with arguments of a more
complex type structure (with τ˙ abbreviating [τ⇒τ ]).
Γ, x : τ˙ ⊢ (()−τ˙ τ˙ (z (()τ˙ τ˙ ) (()
+
τ˙ τ˙ x))) : τ˙
When instantiating z by the identity function [x : τ ][y : x]y in the above example
we obtain
x : τ˙ ⊢ (()−τ˙ τ˙ (z (()τ˙ τ˙ ) (()
+
τ˙ τ˙ x)))
→∗ (()−τ˙ τ˙ (()
+
τ˙ τ˙ z))
Using the casting axioms, the gist of the rules product, application, and abstrac-
tion from PTS can be reconstructed as follows.
(product∗)
Γ⊢a : τ Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢(()[x:a]c [x : a]b) : τ
(application∗)
Γ⊢c : ()[x:a]b′([x :a]b) Γ⊢d : a
Γ⊢(()−[x:a]b′ [x :a]b c d) : b[d/x]
where Γ, x : a⊢b : b′
(abstraction∗)
Γ, x : a⊢b : c Γ⊢(()[x:a]c′ [x : a]c) : τ
Γ⊢(()+[x:a]c′ [x :a]c [x :a]b) : (()[x:a]c′ [x :a]c)
where Γ, x : a⊢c : c′
This motivates a mapping δΓ from PTS-expressions into d:
δΓ(∗) = τ
δΓ(x) = x
δΓ(Πx : A.B) = (()[x:δΓ(A)]c [x : δΓ(A)]δΓ,x:A(B))
where δ(Γ, x : A)⊢δΓ,x:A(B) : c
δΓ(λx : A.B) = (()
+
[x:δΓ(A)]d
[x : δΓ(A)]c [x : δΓ(A)]δΓ,x:A(B))
where δ(Γ, x : A)⊢δΓ,x:A(B) : c, δ(Γ, x : A)⊢c : d
δΓ((AB)) = (()
−
d c δΓ(A) δΓ(B))
where δ(Γ)⊢δΓ(A) : (()d c), δ(Γ)⊢c : d
Here, the mapping δ(Γ) from PTS-contexts to contexts in d is recursively defined
as follows:
δ(Γ) = δ()(Γ)
δΓ(()) = ()
δΓ(x : A,Γ
′) = (x : δΓ(A), δΓ,x:A(Γ
′))
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This mapping illustrates that the operators of d together with the axioms for
casting are, informally speaking, on a more elementary level than the operators
of PTS, in the sense that PTS operators can be reconstructed using basic d-
operators and casting axioms.
However, the casting axioms are obviously not able to reconstruct β-equality
in PTS. A simple analysis of the above mapping shows that in order to recon-
struct β-equality in PTS the successive application of ()+a and ()
−
a must cancel
each other out. This effect can be partially by the following scheme of substi-
tution axioms:
()++a,b : [x : a; y : [x⇒b]; z : x][(y z)⇒(y (()
−
a x (()
+
a x z)))]
()−−a,b : [x : a; y : [x⇒b]; z : x][(y (()
−
a x (()
+
a x z)))⇒(y z)]
One might as why not add (), ()+, and ()− as direct operators do d and add
the reduction axiom
(()− (()+ a))→ a
It turns out (see Section 5.4) this would also lead to a calculus essentially sat-
isfying the laws of the system λ∗ ([4], Section 5.5).
1.9 Summary
The various operations can be conceptually organized by means of two typing
sequences:
• There is the typing sequence of finite aggregations: Expressions may be
injected into sums, sums type to products, products type to products, and
so on.
Γ ⊢ a1 : b1 : c1 : d1 : . . . Γ ⊢ a2 : b2 : c2 : d2 : . . .
Γ ⊢ [a1, :b2], [:b1, a2] : [b1 + b2] : [c1, c2] : [d1, d2] : . . .
Elimination goes via projection from a product, or case distinction from
a sum.
• There is the typing sequence of infinite aggregations: Index and body may
be injected into existential abstractions, existential abstractions type to
universal abstractions, universal abstractions type to universal abstrac-
tions, and so on.
Γ ⊢ ai : a Γ ⊢ bi : b[ai/x] Γ ⊢ b : c : d : . . .
Γ ⊢ [x
.
=ai, bi : b] : [x!a]b : [x : a]c : [x : a]d : . . .
Operations are projections from an existential abstractions a.2, a.1 and
projection to a member of a universal abstractions using (a b).
• Negation normalizes expressions on each level and, when assuming addi-
tional axioms, embeds the system into classical logic.
This completes an informal motivation of d. The following sections contain a
more rigorous presentation.
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Chapter 2
Definition of d
In this chapter, we will propose a formal definition of d: First we summarize the
syntax (which has been motivated in Section 1.2) and define some basic notions
such as free occurrences of variables. We then define the congruence relation
a =λ b as transitive and symmetric closure of a reduction relation a →∗ b.
Finally we define contexts Γ and the type relation Γ⊢a : b.
2.1 Basic definitions
Definition 1 (Expression). Let V = {x, y, z, · · · } be an infinite set of variables.
The set of expressions E is generated by the following rules
E ::= {τ} | V
| [V : E ]E | (E E)
| [V !E ]E | [V
.
=E , E : E ] | E .1 | E .2
| [E , E ] | [E + E ] | [E , :E ] | [:E , E ] | [E ? E ] | ¬E
Expressions will be denoted by a, b, c, d, · · · ,
• τ is the primitive constant, x, y, z, . . . ∈ V are variables,
• [x : a]b is a universal abstraction, (a b) is an application,
• [x!a]b is an existential abstraction, [x
.
=a, b : c] is a protected definition, a.1
and a.2 are left- and right-projection,
• [a, b] is a product, [a + b] is a sum, [a, : b] and [: a, b] are left- and right-
injection, [a ? b] is a case distinction, ¬a is negation, and
We use additional brackets to disambiguate expressions, e.g. ([x : τ ]x)(τ).
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For the sake of succinctness and homogenity in the following definitions we
are using some additional notations for groups of operations:
[a⊕ b] stands for [a, b] or [a+ b]
⊕(a1, . . . , an) stands for


a1.1, a1.2, or ¬a1 if n = 1
(a1 a2), [a1 ⊕ a2],
[a1, :a2], [:a1, a2], or [a1 ? a2] if n = 2
⊕x(a1, . . . , an) stands for
{
[x : a1]a2 or [x!a1]a2 if n = 2
[x
.
=a1, a2 : a3] if n = 3
If one of these notations is used more than once in an equation or inference rule
it always denotes the same concrete notation of d.
Definition 2 (Free variables). Identifiers occurring in a expression which do
not occur in the range of a binding occur free in the expression. FV (a) which
denotes the set of free variables of an expression a is defined as follows:
FV (τ) = {}
FV (x) = {x}
FV (⊕(a1, . . . , an)) = FV (a1) ∪ . . . ∪ FV (an)
FV (⊕x(a1, . . . , an) = FV (a1) ∪ . . . ∪ FV (an−1) ∪ (FV (an)\{x})
Note that in a protected definition [x
.
=a, b : c] the binding of x is for c only.
Definition 3 (Substitution of free variables). The substitution a[b/x] of all free
occurrences of variable x in expression a by expression b is defined as follows:
τ [b/x] = τ
y[b/x] =
{
b if x = y
y otherwise
⊕(a1, . . . , an)[b/x] = ⊕(a1[b/x], . . . , an[b/x])
⊕y(a1, . . . , an)[b/x] =


⊕y(a1[b/x], . . . , an−1[b/x], an)
if x = y
⊕y(a1[b/x], . . . , an[b/x])
otherwise
A substitution a[b/x] may lead to name clashes in case a variable y occurring free
in the inserted expression b comes into the range of a binding of y in the original
expression. These name clashes can be avoided by renaming of variables.
Definition 4 (α-conversion, renaming of bound variables). The renaming re-
lation on bound variables is usually called α-conversion and induced by the
following axiom (using the notation =α).
y /∈ FV (an)
⊕x(a1, . . . , an−1, an) =α ⊕y(a1, . . . , an−1, an[y/x])
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Remark (Implicit renamings, name-independent representations). In order not
to clutter the presentation, we will write variables as strings but always assume
appropriate renaming of bound variables in order to avoid name clashes. This
assumption is justified because one could also use a less-readable but name-
independent presentation of expressions using e.g. de Bruijn indexes [12] which
would avoid the necessity of renaming all together.
2.2 Reduction and congruence
The most basic semantic concept defines the reduction of a expression into a
more basic expression. We will later show that reduction, if it terminates, always
leads to a unique result.
Definition 5 (Single-step reduction). Single-step reduction a→ b is the small-
est relation satisfying the axioms and inference rules of Table 2.1.
(β1 ) ([x : a]b c) → b[c/x] (β2 ) ([x!a]b c) → b[c/x]
(β3 ) ([a ? b] [c, :d]) → (a c) (β4 ) ([a ? b] [:c, d]) → (b d)
(π1 ) [x
.
=a, b : c].1 → a (π2 ) [x
.
=a, b : c].2 → b
(π3 ) [a, b].1 → a (π4 ) [a, b].2 → b
(π5 ) [a+ b].1 → a (π6 ) [a+ b].2 → b
(ν1 ) ¬¬a → a
(ν2 ) ¬[a, b] → [¬a+ ¬b] (ν3 ) ¬[a+ b] → [¬a,¬b]
(ν4 ) ¬[x : a]b → [x!a]¬b (ν5 ) ¬[x!a]b → [x : a]¬b
(ν6 ) ¬τ → τ (ν7 ) ¬[x
.
=a, b : c] → [x
.
=a, b : c]
(ν8 ) ¬[a, :b] → [a, :b] (ν9 ) ¬[:a, b] → [:a, b]
(ν10 ) ¬[a ? b] → [a ? b]
(⊕
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i)
ai → bi
⊕(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an)→ ⊕(a1, . . . , bi, . . . , an)
(⊕x
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i)
ai → bi
⊕x(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an)→ ⊕x(a1, . . . , bi, . . . , an)
Table 2.1: Axioms and rules for single-step reduction.
Definition 6 (Reduction). Reduction a→∗ b of an expression a to b is defined
as the reflexive and transitive closure of single-step reduction a→ b. We use the
notation a →∗ b →∗ c . . . to indicate reduction sequences. To show argument
sequences in arguments about reduction we use the notation a1 = . . . = an →∗
b1 = . . . = bm →∗ c1 = . . . = ck . . . to indicate equality of expressions in
reduction sequences. This will also be used for sequences of n-step reductions
→n and accordingly for sequences containing both notations.
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Definition 7 (Congruence). Congruence of expressions, denoted by a =λ b, is
defined as the symmetric and transitive closure of reduction. The notations for
reduction sequences are extended to contain congruences as well.
Definition 8 (Reduction to common expressions). If two expressions reduce to
a common expression we write a∇b.
The following simple examples illustrate reduction and congruence (where x /∈
FV (a) ∪ FV (b))
(([y2 : a][y : (P y2)](Q y2) x.1) x.2) →(β1) ([y : (P x.1)](Q x.1) x.2)
→(β1) (Q x.1)
[[x
.
=a, b : c], d].1.2 →(pi3) [x
.
=a, b : c].2
→(pi2) b
[x : ¬[y : τ ]τ ]¬[a, b] →(ν4) [x : [y!τ ]¬τ ]¬[a, b]
→(ν6) [x : [y!τ ]τ ]¬[a, b]
→(ν2) [x : [y!τ ]τ ][¬a + ¬b]
[x : ¬[a+ b]][¬a,¬b] =λ [x : [¬a,¬b]]¬[a+ b]
2.3 Typing and Validity
Definition 9 (Context). Contexts, denoted by Γ, are finite sequences of dec-
larations (x1 : a1, . . . , xn : an), where xi are variables with xi 6= xj and ai
are expressions. The assumption about name-free representation of bound vari-
ables justifies the uniqueness assumption. The lookup of an variable in a context
Γ(x) is a partial function defined by Γ(xi) = ai. dom(Γ) = {x1, . . . , xn} and
ran(Γ) = {a1, . . . , an} denote the domain and range of a context Γ. Γ, x : a
denotes the extension of Γ on the right by a binding x : a where x is an vari-
able not yet declared in Γ. Γ1,Γ2 denotes the concatenation of two contexts
declaring disjoint variables. The empty context is written as () or all together
omitted. [Γ]a = [x1 : a1] · · · [x1 : an]a denotes the abstraction of a context over
an expression.
Definition 10 (Typing). Typing Γ⊢a : b of a to b, the type of a, under a context
Γ is the smallest ternary relation on contexts and two expressions satisfying the
inference rules of Table 2.2. We use the notation Γ ⊢ a1 = . . . = an : b1 =
. . . = bm to indicate arguments about equality of expressions in proofs about
the typing relation. Sometimes we also mix the use of =λ and = in this notation.
Similarly we use the notation Γ1 = . . . = Γn⊢a : b and combinations of both.
As a simple example consider the introduction and elimination laws for existen-
tial quantification (see Section 1.2). The type determination of the first law can
be seen as follows: With Γ1 = (P : [y : a]b, x : a, z : (P x))) where y /∈ FV (b)
and since (P y)[x/y] = P (x) by the rules start, weak, and appl we obtain
Γ1 ⊢ x : a Γ1 ⊢ z : (P y)[x/y] Γ1 ⊢ (P y) : b
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(ax ) ⊢τ : τ (start)
Γ⊢a : b
Γ, x : a⊢x : a
(weak)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ, x : c⊢a : b
(conv)
Γ⊢a : b b =λ c Γ⊢c : d
Γ⊢a : c
(absU )
Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢ [x : a]b : [x : a]c
(absE )
Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢ [x!a]b : [x : a]c
(appl)
Γ⊢a : [x : c]d Γ⊢b : c
Γ⊢(a b) : d[b/x]
(def )
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d[a/x] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [x
.
=a, c : d] : [x!b]d
(chI )
Γ⊢a : [x!b]c
Γ⊢a.1 : b
(chB )
Γ⊢a : [x!b]c
Γ⊢a.2 : c[a.1/x]
(prd)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [a, b] : [c, d]
(sum)
Γ⊢a : c Γ⊢b : d
Γ⊢ [a+ b] : [c, d]
(prL)
Γ⊢a : [b, c]
Γ⊢a.1 : b
(prR)
Γ⊢a : [b, c]
Γ⊢a.2 : c
(injL)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ⊢ [a, :c] : [b+ c]
(injR)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d
Γ⊢ [:c, a] : [c+ b]
(case)
Γ⊢a : [x : c1]d Γ⊢b : [y : c2]d Γ⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [a ? b] : [z : [c1 + c2]]d
(neg)
Γ⊢a : b
Γ⊢¬a : b
Table 2.2: Axiom and rules for typing.
which due to the rule def implies that
Γ1 ⊢ [y
.
=x, z : (P y)] : [y!a](P y)
The type relation in Section 1.2 follows from rule absU . The type determination
of the second law can be seen as follows, let
Γ2 = (P : [y : a]b,Q : [y : a]b, x : [y1!a](P y1), z : [y2 :a][y : (P y2)](Qy2))
By rules start, weak, and appl we obtain:
Γ2 ⊢ (z x.1) : [u : (P x.1)](Qx.1)
From this, by the same rules we obtain:
Γ2 ⊢ ((z x.1) x.2) : (Qx.1) = (Qy3)[x.1/y3]
Similarly to the first law, by rule def this implies
Γ2 ⊢ [y3
.
=x.1, ((z x.1) x.2) : (Qy3)] : [y3!a](Qy3)
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Basic Rules (start),(weak),(conv)
Neutral Rules (neg)
Operator Rules Introduction Elimination
primitive constant (ax)
universal abstraction (absU ), (absE ) (appl)
existential abstraction (def) (chI ),(chB )
product (prd),(sum) (prL),(prR)
sum (injL),(injR) (case)
Table 2.3: Classification of typing rules.
A classification of the typing rules is shown in Table 2.3. One may differentiate
between axioms, basic rules and operator-specific rules. Note that while each
operation of d has its own typing rule, only abstractions, products, and sums,
can be introduced-to as well as eliminated-from type-level.
Definition 11 (Validity). Validity Γ⊢ a of an expression a under a context Γ
is defined as the existence of a type:
Γ ⊢ a ≡ there is a b such that Γ⊢a : b
Similarly to typing we use the notation Γ1 = . . . = Γn ⊢ a1 = . . . = an to
indicate arguments about equality of contexts and expressions in proofs about
validity. We also use the notation Γ⊢ a1, . . . , an as an abbreviation for Γ⊢ a1,
. . ., Γ⊢an. As for typing, we also omit writing the empty context.
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Chapter 3
Examples
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the basic style of axiomatizing the-
ories and describing deductions when using d. Note that the example are pre-
sented with fully explicit expressions of d, i.e. we do not omit any subexpressions
which could be inferred from other other parts using pattern matching or proof
tactics and we do not use a module concept for theories. Such features should
of course be part of deduction languages and support systems based on d.
Remark (Notational conventions). For convenience, in the examples we write
[x1 : a1] · · · [xn : an]a as [x1 : a1; · · · ;xn : an]a and [x1 : a] · · · [xn : a]b as
[x1, · · · , xn : a]b and similar for existential abstractions. We also use combi-
nations of these abbreviations such that e.g. [x : a; y1, y2!b]c is shorthand for
[x : a][y1!b][y2!b]c. As in section 1.3, we write [a ⇒ b] to denote [x : a]b if
x /∈ FV (b). Similarly, we write [a1⇒ · · · [an⇒ a] · · · ] as [a1; · · · ; an⇒ a]. We
write nested applications (· · · ((a a1) a2) · · · an), where a is not an application,
as a(a1, · · · , an). We also write Γ⊢a : b as a : b if Γ is empty or clear from the
context. When writing a : b (name) we introduce name as abbreviation for a
of type b.
3.1 Basic logical properties
The operators [a⇒ b], [a, b], [a + b], and ¬a, show many properties of logical
implication, conjunction, disjunction, and negation. For example, the following
laws can be derived for arbitrary well-typed expressions a, b. We begin with
laws whose deduction is trivial because they are directly built into the type
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introduction rules and/or the reduction relation:
[x : a]x : [a⇒a]
[x : a; y : b][x, y] : [a; b⇒ [a, b]]
[[x : a][x, :b]], [x : a][:b, x]] : [[a⇒ [a+ b]], [a⇒ [b+ a]]]
[x : a]x : [¬¬a⇒a]
[x : a]x : [a⇒¬¬a]
[x : ¬[a, b]]x : [¬[a, b]⇒ [¬a+ ¬b]]
[x : ¬[a, b]]x : [[¬a+ ¬b]⇒¬[a, b]]
[x : ¬[a+ b]]x : [¬[a+ b]⇒ [¬a,¬b]]
[x : ¬[a+ b]]x : [[¬a,¬b]⇒¬[a+ b]]
Note that [x : a]x types to [a ⇒ a], [a ⇒ ¬¬a], [¬¬a ⇒ a] etc., as all these
expressions are equivalent. Next we present some laws which follow directly
from using an elimination rule:
[x : a; y : [a⇒b]]y(x) : [a; [a⇒b]⇒b]
[[x : [a, b]]x.1, [x : [a, b]]x.2] : [[[a, b]⇒a], [[a, b]⇒b]]
[x : [a, b]][x.2, x.1] : [[a, b]⇒ [b, a]]
[x : [a+ b]][[y : a][:b, y] ? [y : b][y, :b]]](x) : [[a+ b]⇒ [b+ a]] (syma,b)
We continue with some properties involving the use of a negation axiom. We
assume the following axiom scheme:
¬+a,b : [[a+ b]⇒ [¬a⇒b]]
¬−a,b : [[¬a⇒b]⇒ [a+ b]]
Formally such axiom schemes can be defined as an appropriate context Γ′ pre-
fixing a context Γ to yield a typing Γ′,Γ⊢a : b (see Appendix A). We can now
show the following properties:
¬−a,¬a([x : ¬a]x) : [a+ ¬a] (tnda)
¬+[¬a+a],b([tnda, :b]) : [[a,¬a]⇒b]
[x : [a⇒b]]¬+b,¬a(sym¬a,b(¬
−
¬a,b(x))) : [[a⇒b]⇒ [¬b⇒¬a]] (cpa,b)
The operators [x : a]b and [x!a]b show the properties of universal and existen-
tial quantification. We begin with two properties which relate the existential
abstraction operator with its propositional counterpart.
[y : [x!a]b][y.1, y.2] : [[x!a]b⇒ [a, b]]
[y : [a, b]]cp[a⇒¬b],[¬a+¬b]([z : [x : a]¬b][:¬a, z(y.1)], y) : [[a, b]⇒ [x!a]b]
For the derivation of the second rule note that
cp[a⇒¬b],[¬a+¬b] : [[[x : a]¬b⇒ [¬a+ ¬b]]⇒ [[a, b]⇒ [x!a]b]]
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The corresponding equivalence for universal abstractions is given by the axiom
schemes ¬+a,b and ¬
−
a,b.
We can define logical falsehood as follows:
ff := [x : τ ]x
Note that we cannot generalize in the definition of ff from τ to arbitrary a as
such some of the resulting formulas are not necessarily false. This is discussed
in a remark on page 127. The expected property of ff can be deduced:
[x : τ ][y : ff ]y(x) : [x : τ ][ff⇒x]
We can define logical truth as follows:
tt := ¬ff
tt can then be proven as follows:
[x
.
=τ, τ : ¬x] : tt
In the proof of tt note that tt =λ [x!τ ]¬x and τ =λ ¬τ =λ (¬x)[τ/x].
For universal quantification the general introduction and elimination rules
can be almost trivially derived under the context P : [a⇒b].
[x : [y : a]P (y)]x : [[y : a]P (y)⇒ [y : a]P (y)]
[x : a; z : [y : a]P (y)]z(x) : [x : a][[y : a]P (y)⇒P (x)]
For existential quantification the derivation of the introduction and elimination
rules looks as follows (assuming (P,Q : [a⇒b])).
[x :a; z :P (x)][y
.
=x, z : P (y)] : [x : a][P (x)⇒ [y!a]P (y)]
[x : [y1!a]P (y1); z : [y2 :a][P (y2)⇒Q(y2)]]
[y3
.
=x.1, z(x.1, x.2) : Q(y3)] : [[y1!a]P (y1); [y2 :a][P (y2)⇒Q(y2)]
⇒ [y3!a]Q(y3)]
The derivation of the first rule can be seen as follows: We have
P : [a⇒b], x : a, z : P (x) ⊢ z
: P (x)
= P (y)[x/y]
which due to the typing rule for protected definitions implies that
P : [a⇒b], x : a, z : P (x) ⊢ [y
.
=x, z : P (y)]
: [y!a]P (y)
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which then due to the typing rule for universal abstraction implies that
P : [a⇒b] ⊢ [x : a; z : P (x)][y
.
=x, z : P (y)]
: [x : a][P (x)⇒ [y!a]P (y)]
The derivation of the second rule can be seen as follows, let
Γ = (P,Q : [a⇒b]), x : [y1!a]P (y1), z : [y2 : a;P (y2)]Q(y2)
then the following typing statement is true:
Γ ⊢ z(x.1, x.2)
: [y2 : a;P (y2)]Q(y2)](x.1, x.2)
=λ [P (x.1)⇒Q(x.1)](x.2)
=λ Q(x.1)
= Q(y3)[x.1/y3]
Therefore the following statements is true:
Γ ⊢ [y3
.
=x.1, z(x.1, x.2) : Q(y3)]
: [y3!a]Q(y3)
The initial proposition then follows by applying the typing rules for abstraction.
3.2 Type casting
In many cases the of free variables to be of primitive type, i.e. x : τ , can be
relaxed to arbitrary well typed expressions a : b using τ -casting. For this reason
we introduce an axiom scheme for a τ -casting operator1:
()a(.) : [a⇒τ ]
Note that, for better readability, we use the prefix notation ()ab abbreviating
the expression ()a(b). We also assume the following axioms schemes essentially
stating equivalence between casted and uncasted types:
()+a : [x : a][x⇒()ax]
()−a : [x : a][()ax⇒x]
As an application, we can generalize the property of ff in Section 3 to arbitrary
well-typed a:
x : a ⊢ ()−a (x, [y : ff ]y(()ax)) : [ff⇒x]
This motivates an alternative axiom-scheme for negation
¬′+a : [[a⇒ff ]⇒¬a] ¬
′−
a : [¬a⇒ [a⇒ff ]]
It is an easy exercise to show the equivalence between the two axiom schemes.
1See also Appendix A
35
3.3 Minimal logic
In d, minimal logic can be axiomatized by the context Min.
Min := (
F : τ,
t, f : F,
I : [F ;F⇒F ],
i : [p, q : F ][[p⇒q]⇒I(p, q)],
o : [p, q : F ][I(p, q)⇒ [p⇒q]]
)
Here are two deductions of logical properties under the context (Min, (p, q : F )).
i(p, I(q, p), [x : p]i(q, p, [y : q]x)) : I(p, I(q, p))
i(p, I(I(p, q), q), [x :p]i(I(p, q), q, [f :I(p, q)]o(p, q, f, x))) : I(p, I(I(p, q), q))
3.4 Equality
Basic axioms about an equality congruence relation on expressions of equal type
can be formalized as context Equality:
Equality := (
(.) =(.) (.) : [S : τ ][S;S⇒S]
E1 : [S : τ ;x : S]x =S x
E2 : [S : τ ;x, y : S][x =S y ⇒ y =S x]
E3 : [S : τ ;x, y, z : S][x =S y; y =S z ⇒ x =S z]
E4 : [S1, S2 : τ ;x, y : S1;F : [S1⇒S2]][x =S1 y ⇒ F (x) =S2 F (y)]
)
Here S is an variable used to abstract over the type (or sort) of the expressions
to be equal. Note that, for better readability, we use the infix notation x =S y,
introduced by a declaration (.) =(.) (.) : [S : τ ][S;S⇒S]. Equivalently we could
have written ((.) =(.) (.))(S, x, y).
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3.5 Cartesian products
Using equality one can axiomatize basic datatypes such as cartesian products.
CartesianProduct := (
(.)×(.) : [τ ; τ⇒τ ]
<(.),(.)>(.)×(.) : [S, T : τ ][S;T⇒S × T ]
L : [S, T : τ ][S × T⇒S]
R : [S, T : τ ][S × T⇒T ]
Eq : [S, T :τ ;x, y :S;z, w :T ]
[x =S y; z =S w ⇒ <x,z>S×T =S×T <y,w>S×T ]
PL : [S, T : τ ;x : S; y : T ]L(S, T,<x,y>S×T ) =S x
PR : [S, T : τ ;x : S; y : T ]R(S, T,<x,y>S×T ) =T y
)
Note that, for better readability, we use infix notations S×T and <x,y>S×T
abbreviating the expressions ((.)×(.))(S, T ) and <(.),(.)>(.)×(.) (S, T, x, y).
3.6 Natural Numbers
Under the context Equality, well-known axioms about naturals numbers can be
formalized as context Naturals:
Naturals := (
N : τ
0 : N
s : [N⇒N ]
(.) + (.), (.) ∗ (.) : [N ;N⇒N ]
S1 : [n : N ]¬(s(n) =N 0)
S2 : [n,m : N ][s(n) =N s(m) ⇒ n =N m]
A1 : [n : N ]0 + n =N n
A2 : [n,m : N ]s(n) +m =N s(n+m)
M1 : [n : N ]0 ∗ n =N 0
M2 : [n,m : N ]s(n) ∗m =N m+ (n ∗m)
)
Note that, for better readability, we use infix notations n + m and n ∗ m ab-
breviating the expressions +(n,m) and ∗(n,m) and we have used the common
operator priorities to reduce bracketing. As an example, a simple property can
be (tediously) deduced under the context (Equality,Naturals, n : N) where
1 := s(0):
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E3(N, 1 + n, s(0 + n), s(n),
A2(0, n), E4(N,N, 0 + n, n, [k : N ]s(k), A1(n))) : 1 + n =N s(n)
We give two examples of predicates defined on natural numbers as follows (where
2 := s(1)):
(.) ≥ (.) := [n,m : N ; k!N ]n =N m+ k
even := [n : N ;m!N ]n = 2 ∗m
The property [n : N ][even(n)⇒even(2+n)] about even numbers can be deduced
based on the following typing
(n :N, x :even(n))
⊢ [m
.
=1 + x.1, law(n, x.1, x.2) : 2 + n =N 2 ∗m] : even(2 + n)
Here law is an abbreviation for a proof of the following property
law : [n,m : N ][n =N 2∗m⇒ 2+n =N 2∗(1+m)]
An definition of law can be derived from the axioms in a style similar (and even
more tedious) to the above deduction. This deduction of the property about
even numbers is correct since
law(n, x.1, x.2) : 2 + n =N 2 ∗ (1 + x.1)
= (2 + n =N 2 ∗m)[1 + x.1/m]
Finally, an induction principle can be added to the context as follows:
ind : [P : [N⇒τ ]][P (0); [n : N ][P (n)⇒P (s(n))]⇒ [n : N ]P (n)]
Note that, assuming one already has axiomatized the more general theory of
integers, e.g. with type Int, a constant 0I , and the usual relation ≥, one could
instantiate the declarations of the context N as follows:
N := ()[n!Int]τ [n!Int ](n ≥ 0I)
0 := 0I .1
· · ·
3.7 Formalizing partial functions
One can go on and prove properties about natural number based on the above
axioms. One may use the application operator in d to model function application
in mathematics. However, the above example was simple as it was dealing with
total functions. As an example of a partial function consider the predecessor
function on natural numbers. To introduce this function in d, several approaches
come to mind:
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• The predecessor function can be axiomatized as a total function over the
type N .
p : [N⇒N ]
P : [n : N ]p(s(n)) =N n
The (potential) problem of this approach is the interpretation of p(0)
which may lead to unintuitive or harmful consequences. Furthermore, if
additional axioms are to be avoided, the declaration of p must eventually
by instantiated by some (total) function which defines a value for 0.
• The predecessor function can be defined with an additional argument for-
malizing the condition.
nonZero := [i : N ; j!N ]i =N s(j)
p := [n : N ; q : nonZero(n)]q.1
While mathematically clean, this definition requires to always provide an
additional argument c when using the predecessor function.
• As a variant of the previous approach, the additional argument can be
hidden into an adapted type of the predecessor function.
N>0 := [i, j!N ]i =N s(j)
p := [n : N>0]n.2.1
While mathematically clean, this approach requires to always provide an
more complex argument n : N>0 when using the predecessor function.
Which of these (or other) approaches is best to use seems to depend on the
organization and the goals of the formalization at hand.
3.8 Defining functions from deductions
Note that while the predecessor function can be directly defined, more complex
functions and their (algorithmic) properties can be derived from the proofs
of properties. As a sketch of an example consider the following well-known
property
GCD := [x, y : N ; k!N ]gcd(k, x, y)
where gcd(k, x, y) denotes the property that k is the greatest common divisor of
x and y. Given a (not necessarily constructive) deduction PGCD of type GCD,
one can then define the greatest common divisor x ↓ y and define deductions d1
and d2 proving the well-known algorithmic properties.
(.) ↓ (.) := [x, y : N ](PGCD(x, y)).1
d1 : [x, y : N ](x+ y) ↓ x =N y ↓ x
d2 : [x, y : N ]x ↓ (x + y) =N x ↓ y
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3.9 Sets
When formalizing mathematical deductions, one needs formal systems for var-
ious basic theories of mathematics. For examples, sets can be axiomatized by
the following context using a formalized set comprehension principle.
Sets := (
P : [τ⇒τ ],
(.) ∈(.) (.) : [S : τ ][S;P(S)⇒τ ],
setof : [S : τ ][[S⇒τ ]⇒P(S)],
I : [S : τ ;x : S;P : [S⇒τ ]][P (x)⇒x ∈S setof (S, [y : S]P (y))],
O : [S : τ ;x : S;P : [S⇒τ ]][x ∈S setof (S, [y : S]P (y))⇒P (x)]
)
Note that, for better readability, we use the infix notation x ∈S y abbreviating
the expression (.) ∈(.) (.)(S, x, y). One can now define various sets using set
comprehension. Note the use of the cast operator to ensure the set-defining
properties are of type τ .
∅ := [S : τ ]setof (S, [x : S⇒()[τ⇒τ ]ff ])
: [S : τ ]P(S)
Union := [S : τ, A,B : P(S)]setof (S, [x : S]()[τ,τ ][x ∈S A+ x ∈S B])
: [S : τ ][P(S);P(S)⇒P(S)]
Even := setof (N, [x : N ]()[y!N ]τ (even(x)))
: P(N)
Properties of individual elements can be deduced based on the axiom O, for
example with
Γ = (x : N, asm : x ∈N Even)
we can extract the property of x using the cast-removal axiom.
Γ ⊢ ()−[n!N ]τ ([n!N ]x =N 2 ∗ n,O(N, x, [x : N ]()[y!N ]τ (even(x)), asm))
: [n!N ]x =N 2 ∗ n
Note that in this formalization of sets the axiom of choice can be immediately
derived as follows: We assume the usual assumptions
X, I : τ, A : [I⇒P(X)], u : [x : I; y!X ]y ∈X A(i)
and deduce
AoC := [F
.
=[i : I]u(i).1, [i : I]u(i).2 : [i : I]F (i) ∈X A(i)]
: [F ![I⇒X ]; i : I]F (i) ∈X A(i)
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Note also that a alternative definition of naturals from integers can be given
with sets as follows:
N := ()P(Int)(set(Int , [n : Int ]()τ (n ≥ 0I)))
0 := 0I .1 : Int
3.10 Use of substitution axioms for casting
Cartesian products have been axiomatized in Section 3.5. Using the on-board
means of d, there is a intuitive notion of cartesian product.
S × T =λ ()[S, T ]
<x,y>S×T =λ ()
+
[τ,τ ]([S, T ], [x, y])
L(x) =λ x.1
R(y) =λ y.2
Casting is necessary since the equality notion used in Section 3.5 works over
expressions only whose type is of type τ . The type constructor, the pairing
function, and the projection function declarations can be instantiated as follows:
(.)× (.) := [S;T : τ⇒()[τ,τ ]([S, T ])]
: [τ ; τ⇒τ ]
P := [S, T : τ ;x : S; y : T ]()+[τ,τ ]([S, T ], [x, y])
: [S, T : τ ][S;T⇒S × T ]
L := [S, T : τ ;x : S × T ](()−[τ,τ ]([S, T ], x)).1
: [S, T : τ ][S × T⇒S]
R := [S, T : τ ;x : S × T ](()−[τ,τ ]([S, T ], x)).2
: [S, T : τ ][S × T⇒T ]
Based on these definitions, the equality law can be proven under the context
(S, T :τ ;x, y :S; z, w :T ) as follows
[p : x =S y; q : z =t w]
E4(T, S×T, z, w, [u : T ]()
+
[τ,τ ]([S, T ], [x, u]) =S×T ()
+
[τ,τ ]([S, T ], [y, u]), q,
E4(S, S×T, x, y, [u : S]()
+
[τ,τ ]([S, T ], [u, z]) =S×T ()
+
[τ,τ ]([S, T ], [u, z]), p,
E1(()[τ,τ ]([S, T ]), ()
+
[τ,τ ]([S, T ], [x, z]))))
: [x =S y; z =S w⇒ <x,z >S×T =S×T <y,w>S×T ]
If we want to show the projection properties, e.g. in case of left projection we
need to show the following property
[S, T : τ ;x : S; y : T ](()−[τ,τ ]([S, T ], ()
+
[τ,τ ]([S, T ], [x, y]))).1 =S x
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In order to show this law we need to use the substitution axioms for successive
addition and removal of casts in types
()++a,b : [x : a; y : [x⇒b]; z : x][y(z)⇒y(()
−
a (x, ()
+
a (x, z)))]
()−−a,b : [x : a; y : [x⇒b]; z : x][y(()
−
a (x, ()
+
a (x, z)))⇒y(z)]
The first axiom can be instantiated in two steps as follows:
()++[τ,τ ],τ : [x : [τ, τ ]; y : [x⇒τ ]; z : x][y(z)⇒y(()
−
[τ,τ ](x, ()
+
[τ,τ ](x, z)))]
()++[τ,τ ],τ([S, T ]) : [y : [[S, T ]⇒τ ]; z : [S, T ]]]
[y(z)⇒y(()−[τ,τ ]([S, T ], ()
+
[τ,τ ]([S, T ], z)))]
Note that we cannot avoid the use of this kind of axiom since we cannot include
a generic law into the reduction rules of d as this would lead to inconsistencies
(Section 5.4). The left projection law can now be shown as follows:
PL := [S, T : τ ;x : S; y : T ]
()++[τ,τ ],τ([S, T ], [p : [S, T ]]p.1 =S x, [x, y], E1(S, [x, y].1))
: [S, T : τ ;x : S; y : T ]L(S, T,<x,y>S×T ) =S x
The proof of the right projection law runs analogously.
3.11 Proof structuring
To illustrate some proof structuring issues, we formalize the property of being
a group as follows (writing [a1, a2, · · · ] for [a1, [a2, · · · ]]):
Group := [S : τ, (.)∗ (.)![S;S⇒S], e!S] [ [x, y, z : S](x ∗ y) ∗ z =S x ∗ (y ∗ z)
, [x : S]e ∗ x =S x
, [x : S, x′!S]x′ ∗ x =S e
]
As an example, we can show that +, −, and 0 form a group. Obviously, we can
construct a deduction ded with
Equality , Integers ⊢ ded : Pg
where Integers is the context Naturals extended with a subtraction operator
a − b (to create elements inverse of addition) with corresponding axioms and
where Pg describes the group laws:
Pg := [ [x, y, z : N ] (x+ y) + z =N x+ (y + z)
, [x : N ] 0 + x =N x
, [x : N, x′!N ]x′ + x =N 0
]
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pr can be turned into a proof of Group(N) as follows:
isGroup := [∗
.
=+, [e
.
=0, ded : Pg[e/0]] : Pg[e/0][∗/+]]
Equality , Integers ⊢ isGroup : Group(N)
In group theory one can show that the left-neutral element is also right-neutral,
this means, when assuming g to be a group over S there is a proof p such that
Equality, S : τ, g : Group(S) ⊢ p : [x : S](g.1)(x, g.2.1) =S x
Here g.1 is the ∗ function of g and g.2.1 is the neutral element of g. Note that
the use of existential declarations is supporting the proof structuring as it hides
∗ and e in the assumptions inside the g : Group(S) assumption. On the other
hand, one has to explicitly access the operators using .1 and .2.
p can be extended to a proof p′ of an implication about properties as follows:
p′ := [S : τ, g : Group(S)]p
Equality ⊢ p′ : [S : τ ;Group(S);x : S] (g.1)(x, g.2.1) =S x
Hence we can instantiate p′ to obtain the right-neutrality property of 0 for
integers.
Equality, Integers ⊢ p′(N, isGroup) : [x : N ]x+ 0 =N x
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Chapter 4
Properties of d
4.1 Overview
The following main properties will be shown.
Property (Church-Rosser property). a =λ b implies a∇b.
Property (Subject reduction). Γ⊢a : c and a→∗ b imply Γ⊢b : c.
Property (Uniqueness of types). Γ⊢a : b and Γ⊢a : c imply b =λ c.
Property (Strong normalization). Γ ⊢ a implies that all one-step reduction
sequences beginning with a end in an irreducible expression b.
Due to the Church-Rosser property, the irreducible normal form of a valid ex-
pression is unique. An immediate consequence of strong normalization and
confluence is the decidability of the typing relation.
Property (Decidability of typing relation). For expressions a and b and context
Γ the proposition Γ⊢a : b is decidable.
Finally, we show logical consistency of d, in the sense that there is an empty
type.
Property (Logical consistency). There is no expression a such that ⊢ a and
a : [x : τ ]x.
4.2 Notations and conventions used in proofs
Besides structural induction on the definition of E , we will mainly use structural
induction on expression with context when showing properties of expressions.
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Definition 12 (Structural induction with context). A property P (Γ, a) about
an context Γ and expression a is shown by structural induction with context
if it is shown by structural induction on a with context Γ, where in case a =
⊕x(a1, . . . , an) we decompose using the rule
P (Γ, a1) P (Γ, an)
P (Γ,⊕(a1, . . . , an))
and where in case a = ⊕x(a1, . . . , an) we decompose using the rule:
P (Γ, a1) P (Γ, an−1) P ((Γ, x : a1), an)
P (Γ,⊕x(a1, . . . , an))
We frequently show properties about reduction relations by induction on the
definition of single-step reduction.
Definition 13 (Induction on the definition of single-step reduction). Properties
P (a, b) which are proven for all a and b where a→ b can be shown by induction
on the definition of single-step reduction if the inductive base corresponds to
the reduction axioms and the inductive step corresponds to the inference rules
of reduction.
Remark (Renaming of variables in axioms or rules). Typically when we prove a
property using some axiom, inference rule, or derived property, we just mention
the identifier or this axiom, rule or, property and then use it with an instantia-
tion renaming its variables so as to avoid name clashes with the proposition to
be shown. In order not to clutter the presentation, these renamings are usually
not explicitly indicated.
Remark (Introduction of auxiliary identifiers). We usually explicitly introduce
all auxiliary identifiers appearing in deduction steps. However, there are two
important exceptions.
• In structural inductions, if we consider a specific operator and decompose
an expression a by a = ⊕(a1, , . . . , an) we usually implicitly introduce the
new auxiliary identifier a1.
• In inductions on the definition of reduction, if we consider a specific axiom
or structural rule which requires a syntactic pattern we usually implicitly
introduce the new auxiliary identifiers necessary for this pattern.
Remark (Display of reduction relations). While we state all proofs involving
reduction textually, we sometimes in addition illustrate reduction relations using
diagrams:
a b
c d
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Remark (Display of deductive trees). While we state all profs textually, we
sometimes in addition illustrate the deductive trees in the following style.
rule
premise1
I.H.
premise2 premise3
conclusion1
conclusion2
In inductive proofs we use I.H. to denote the inductive hypothesis. We some-
times stack multiple arguments (indicated by ARGi) vertically as follows.
rule1
rule2
premise1 premise2
conclusion2
ARG1
rule3
premise3 premise4
conclusion3
ARG2
conclusion1
4.3 Basic properties of reduction
We begin with some basic properties of substitution and its relation to reduction.
Law 1 (Basic properties of substitution). For all a, b, c and x, y:
i: If x /∈ FV (a) then a[b/x] = a.
ii: If x 6= y and x /∈ FV (c) then a[b/x][c/y] = a[c/y][b[c/y]/x].
iii: If x 6= y, x /∈ FV (c), y /∈ FV (b) then a[b/x][c/y] = a[c/y][b/x].
Proof.
i: Property follows by structural induction on a.
ii: Property follows by structural induction on a using the definition of substi-
tution: For a = τ the property is obvious. If a = z we have to distinguish
three cases:
– z = x. Then obviously
z[b/z][c/y]
= b[c/y]
= z[b[c/y]/z]
= z[c/y][b[c/y]/z]
– z = y. Then obviously
z[b/x][c/z]
= z[c/z]
= c
= c[b[c/z]/x] (by part i since x /∈ FV (c))
= z[c/z][b[c/z]/x]
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– z 6= x, y. Then obviously
z[b/x][c/y]
= z[c/y]
= z
= z[b[c/z]/x]
= z[c/y][b[c/y]/x]
If a = ⊕(a1, . . . an) then the property follows from the definition of sub-
stitution and the inductive hypothesis. Finally if a = ⊕z(a1, . . . , an) then
thanks to our assumption in Section 2.1 about appropriate renaming in
order to avoid name clashes during substitutions, we may assume that
z 6= x, y and therefore the property follows from the definition of substi-
tution and the inductive hypothesis.
iii: We can argue as follows:
a[b/x][c/y]
= (by ii)
a[c/y][b[c/y]/x]
= (since y /∈ FV (b))
a[c/y][b/x]
Law 2 (Substitution and reduction). For all a, b, c and x:
i: a→∗ b implies a[c/x]→∗ b[c/x]
ii: a→∗ b implies c[a/x]→∗ c[b/x]
iii: a→∗ b implies FV (b) ⊆ FV (a)
Proof.
i: It is obviously sufficient to show the property for single-step reduction.
The proof is by induction on the definition of single-step reduction. Both
for the inductive base and the inductive steps it follows directly from the
definition of substitution, for example in case of the axiom β1 we have
([y : a1]a2 a3)[c/x]
= ([y : a1[c/x]]a2[c/x] a3[c/x])
→ a2[c/x][a3[c/x]/y]
= a2[a3/y][c/x] (by Law 1(ii) since y /∈ FV (c))
Note that thanks to our assumption in Section 2.1 about avoidance of
name clashes due to renaming we can assume y 6= x. A similar reasoning
applies for the other axioms and the structural rules.
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ii: Property follows by structural induction on c. If c = τ the property is
obvious. If c = x then
c[a/x] = a→∗ b = c[b/x],
if c = y 6= x then c[a/x] = c = c[b/x]. If c = ⊕(c1, . . . cn) then obviously
⊕(c1, . . . cn)[a/x]
= ⊕(c1[a/x], . . . cn[a/x])
→∗ ⊕(c1[b/x], . . . cn[b/x]) (inductive hyp., definition of →
∗)
= ⊕(c1, . . . cn)[b/x]
A similar can be made for the case c = ⊕y(c1, . . . , cn).
iii: The proof is by a straightforward induction on the definition of reduction.
Next we show basic decomposition properties of reduction. The first three
properties are (strong) decomposition properties of the operators which are con-
structors, in the sense that they do not work on other operators. The remaining
properties are (weak) decomposition properties of the other operators.
Law 3 (Reduction decomposition). For all a1, . . . , an, b, b1, . . . , bn and x:
i: ⊕(a1, a2)→∗ b, where ⊕(a1, a2) is not an application implies b = ⊕(b1, b2)
where a1 →∗ b1 and a2 →∗ b2.
ii: ⊕x(a1, . . . , an)→∗ b implies b = ⊕x(b1, . . . , bn), ai →∗ bi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
iii: a.i→∗ ⊕x(b1, . . . , bn), i = 1, 2, implies a→∗ [c1 ⊕ c2] or a→∗ [y
.
=c1, c2 :
c3], for some c1, c2, c3 with ci →
∗ ⊕x(b1, . . . , bn).
iv: a.i →∗ ⊕(a1, a2), i = 1, 2, where ⊕(a1, a2) is a sum, product or injection
implies a →∗ [c1 ⊕ c2] or a →
∗ [y
.
= c1, c2 : c3], for some c1, c2, c3 with
ci →∗ ⊕(a1, a2).
v: ¬a→∗ [x : b1]b2 implies a→
∗ [x!c1]c2 for some c1, c2 where c1 →
∗ b1 and
¬c2 →∗ b2.
¬a→∗ [b1, b2] implies a→∗ [c1 + c2] for some c1, c2 where ¬c1 →∗ b1 and
¬c2 →∗ b2.
¬a→∗ [x!b1]b2 implies a→∗ [x : c1]c2 for some c1, c2 where c1 →∗ b1 and
¬c2 →
∗ b2.
¬a→∗ [b1 + b2] implies a→
∗ [c1, c2] for some c1, c2 where ¬c1 →
∗ b1 and
¬c2 →∗ b2.
¬a→∗ [x
.
=b1, b2 : b3] implies a→∗ [x
.
=b1, b2 : b3].
¬a→∗ [b1 ? b2] implies a→∗ [b1 ? b2].
¬a→∗ [b1, :b2] implies a→∗ [b1, :b2].
¬a→∗ [:b1, b2] implies a→∗ [:b1, b2].
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vi: a1(a2)→∗ ⊕x(b1, . . . , bn) implies, for some c1, c2, c3, c4, one of the follow-
ing cases
– a1 →∗ ⊕′y(c1, c2), a2 →
∗ c3 and c2[c3/y]→∗ ⊕x(b1, . . . , bn), or
– a1 →
∗ [c1 ? c2] and we have that either a2 →
∗ [c3, :c4] and (c1 c3)→
∗
⊕x(b1, . . . , bn) or a2 →∗ [:c3, c4] and (c2 c4)→∗ ⊕x(b1, . . . , bn).
vii: a1(a2)→∗ ⊕(b1, . . . , bn) where ⊕(b1, . . . , bn) is not an application implies,
for some c1, c2, c3, c4, one of the following cases
– a1 →∗ ⊕′y(c1, c2), a2 →
∗ c3, and c2[c3/x]→∗ ⊕(b1, . . . , bn), or
– a1 →∗ [c1 ? c2] and either a2 →∗ [c3, :c4] and (c1 c3)→∗ ⊕(b1, . . . , bn)
or a2 →∗ [:c3, c4] and (c2 c4)→∗ ⊕(b1, . . . , bn).
Proof.
i,ii: Obvious, as none of the reduction axioms has any of these unary,
binary, or ternary operators in outermost position.
iii,iv: These properties are true since the only way to remove a projection
is via a projection axiom.
v: The only way to remove an outer negation is by one of the negation
axioms νi. We consider these cases in turn;
• If axiom ν1 is applied we have a = ¬a′ and ¬¬a′ → a′ →∗
⊕x(b1, b2) or a′ →∗ [b1⊕ b2]. In case of a′ →∗ [x : b1]b2 we then
know that a = ¬a′ →∗ ¬[x : b1]b2 → [x!b1]¬b2 which implies
the proposition. Similar for the other cases.
• The property follows directly if one of the axioms ν2 to ν5 is
applied.
• Application of one of the axioms ν6 to ν10 yields the remaining
cases.
vi,vii: These properties are true since the only way to remove the outer
application is via one of the axioms βi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4.
4.4 Confluence properties
4.4.1 Overview of the confluence proof
Well-known confluence proofs for untyped λ-calculus could be used, e.g. [4]
could be adapted to include the operators of d. Due to the significant number
of reduction axioms of d, we use an alternative approach using explicit substitu-
tions and an auxiliary relation of reduction with explicit substitution which has
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detailed substitution steps on the basis of a definitional environment (this ap-
proach was basically already adopted in the Automath project [13]) and which
comprises sequences of negation-related reduction-steps into single steps. The
underlying idea is that reduction with explicit substitution can be shown to be
directly confluent which implies its confluence. We then show that this implies
confluence of reduction a→∗ b. There are several approaches to reduction with
explicit substitutions, e.g. [1][2]. Furthermore, there is a significant body of
recent recent work in this context, however, as explicit substitution is not the
main focus of this article we do not give an overview here. The approach in-
troduced below introduces a definitional environment as part of the reduction
relation to explicitly unfold single substitution instances and then discard sub-
stitution expressions when all instances are unfolded. This approach, as far as
basic lambda calculus operators are concerned, is essentially equivalent to the
system Λsub which has been defined using substitution [30] or placeholders [24]
to indicate particular occurrences to be substituted. Both approaches slightly
differ from ours as as they duplicate the substituted expression on the right-hand
side of the β-rule thus violating direct confluence.
4.4.2 Explicit substitution, negation-reduction, reduction
with explicit substitution
We first define explicit substitutions.
Definition 14 (Expressions with substitution). The set E˙ of expressions with
substitution is an extension of the set E of expressions adding a substitution
operator.
E˙ ::= {τ} | · · · | ¬E˙︸ ︷︷ ︸
(see Definition 1)
| [V := E˙ ]E˙
Expressions with substitution will be denoted by a,b, c,d, . . .. [x := a]b is an
internalized substitution. As indicated by its name, the purpose of [x := a]b is
to internalize the substitution function.
The function computing free variables (Definition 2) is extended so as to treat
internalized substitutions identical to abstractions.
FV ([x :=a]b) = FV (a) ∪ (FV (b)\{x})
Similar for α-conversion (Definition 4).
y /∈ FV (b)
[x :=a]b =α [y :=a]b[y/x]
As for expressions we will write variables as strings but always assume appro-
priate renaming of bound variables in order to avoid name clashes.
In order to define the →:= ∗-reduction relation we need an auxiliary reduc-
tion relation which comprises application sequences of axioms ν1, . . ., ν5 in a
restricted context.
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Definition 15 (Negation reduction). Single-step negation-reduction a →¬ b
is the smallest relation on expressions with explicit substitution satisfying the
axiom and the inference rules of Table 4.1. n-step negation-reduction a →¬n
(ν1 ) ¬¬a→
¬ a
(ν2 ) ¬[a,b]→¬ [¬a + ¬b] (ν3 ) ¬[a+ b]→¬ [¬a,¬b]
(ν4 ) ¬[x : a]b→¬ [x!a]¬b (ν5 ) ¬[x!a]b →¬ [x : a]¬b
([ ⊕ ]1)
a1 →¬ a2
[a1 ⊕ b]→¬ [a2 ⊕ b]
([ ⊕ ]2)
b1 →¬ b2
[a⊕ b1]→¬ [a⊕ b2]
(⊕ ( , )2)
b1 →¬ b2
⊕x(a,b1)→¬ ⊕x(a,b2)
(¬ 1)
a1 →¬ a2
¬a1 →¬ ¬a2
Table 4.1: Axioms and rules for →¬∗-reduction.
b (n ≥ 0), negation-reduction a →¬∗ b, and non-empty negation-reduction
a→¬+ b are defined as follows:
a→¬n b := ∃b1, · · ·bn−1 : a→
¬ b1, . . . ,bn−1 →
¬ b.
a→¬∗ b := ∃k ≥ 0 : a→¬ k b
a→¬+ b := ∃k > 0 : a→¬ k b
a→¬ 01 b := a = b or a→¬ b
In order to define the →:= ∗-reduction relation on expression with substitution
we need to introduce the notion of environments, which are used to record the
definitions which are currently valid for a →:= ∗-reduction step.
Definition 16 (Environment). Environments, denoted by E, E1, E2, etc. are
finite sequences of definitions (x1 := a1, . . . , xn := an), where xi are variables,
xi 6= xj . The lookup of an variable in an Environment is defined by E(x) = ai.
E, x :=a denotes the extension of E on the right by a definition x :=a. E1, E2
denotes the concatenation of two environments. The empty environment is
written as (). Similar to induction with context we will use induction with
environment.
Definition 17 (Single-step reduction with explicit substitution). Single-step
reduction reduction with explicit substitution E⊢a→:= b is the smallest relation
on expressions with explicit substitution satisfying the axiom and the inference
rules of Table 4.2. Compared to (conventional) reduction, the axiom β has been
decomposed into three axioms:
• βµ1 and β
µ
2 are reformulation of β1 and β2 using internalized substitution
• use is unfolding single usages of definitions
• rem is removing a definition without usage
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(βµ1 ) E⊢([x : a]bc)→
:= [x:=c]b (βµ2 ) E⊢([x!a]bc)→
:= [x :=c]b
(β3 ) E⊢([a?b] [c, :d])→:= (a c) (β4 )E⊢([a?b] [:c,d])→:= (bd)
(use) E⊢x→:= a if E(x) = a
(rem) E⊢ [x :=a]b→:= b if x /∈ FV (b)
(π1 ) E⊢ [x
.
=a,b :c].1→:= a (π2 )E⊢ [x
.
=a,b :c].2→:= b
(π3 ) E⊢ [a,b].1→:= a (π4 ) E⊢ [a,b].2→:= b
(π5 ) E⊢ [a+ b].1→:= a (π6 ) E⊢ [a+ b].2→:= b
(ν6 ) E⊢¬τ →:= τ (ν7 ) E⊢¬[x
.
=a,b :c]→:= [x
.
=a,b :c]
(ν8 ) E⊢¬[a, :b]→:= [a, :b] (ν9 ) E⊢¬[:a,b]→:= [:a,b]
(ν10 ) E⊢¬[a ?b]→:= [a ?b]
(ν)
a→¬+ b
E ⊢ a→:= b
(⊕
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i)
E ⊢ ai →:= bi
E ⊢ ⊕(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an)→:= ⊕(a1, . . . ,bi, . . . , an)
(⊕x
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i)
E ⊢ ai →:= bi
E ⊢ ⊕x(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an)→:= ⊕x(a1, . . . ,bi, . . . , an)
(L:=)
E ⊢ a→:= b
E ⊢ [x :=a]c→:= [x :=b]c
(R:=)
E, x :=a ⊢ b→:= c
E ⊢ [x :=a]b→:= [x :=a]c
Table 4.2: Axioms and rules for single-step reduction with explicit substitution.
The axioms ν1, . . . , ν5, which are not directly confluent e.g. for ¬¬[a, b], have
been removed and replaced by the rule ν. Furthermore there are two more
structural rules (L:=) and (R:=) related to substitutions. Note that the rule
(R:=) is pushing a definition onto the environment E when evaluating the body
of a definition.
Definition 18 (Reduction with explicit substitution). reduction with explicit
substitution E ⊢ a →:= ∗ b of a to b is defined as the reflexive and transitive
closure of E ⊢ a →:= b. If two expressions with definitions →:= ∗-reduce to a
common expression we write E⊢a∇:=b.
Definition 19 (→:= ∗-Reduction notations). Zero-or-one-step reduction with
explicit substitution and n-step reduction with explicit substitution are defined
as follows
E⊢a→:= 01 b := E⊢a→:= b ∨ a = b
E⊢a→:=n b := ∃b1, · · ·bn−1 : E⊢a→
:= b1, . . . , E⊢bn−1 →
:= b.
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Remark (Avoidance of name clashes through appropriate renaming). Note that
renaming is necessary to prepare use of the axiom use: For example when
reducing y := x ⊢ [x : τ ][y, x] using →:= ∗, [x : τ ][y, x] needs to be renamed to
[z : τ ][y, z] before substituting y by x.
We end this subsection with two straightforward properties of reduction with
explicit substitution.
Law 4 (Reduction implies reduction with explicit substitution). For all a, b:
a→∗ b implies ()⊢a→:= ∗ b.
Proof. Proof is by induction on the definition of a→∗ b.
• Use of the axiom β1 and β2: In case of β1 we can show that
() ⊢ ([x : c]b a)
→:= (by βµ1 )
[x :=a]b
→:=n (by induction; with n of free occurrences of x in b)
[x :=a](b[a/x])
→:= (by rem)
b[a/x]
Similar for the axiom β2.
• The axioms β3, β4, π1 to π6, and ν6 to ν10 also exist for →:= ∗-reduction.
• The other axioms of →∗ are implied by the rule ν.
• The structural rules of →∗ are included in the corresponding rules for
→:= ∗ (always taking E = ()).
4.4.3 Confluence of reduction with explicit substitution
Remark (Sketch of confluence proof). First we show that negation-reduction is
confluent and commutes with reduction with explicit substitution. Based on
these results, by induction on expressions with substitution one can establish
direct confluence of reduction with explicit substitution, i.e. E ⊢ a →:= b and
E ⊢ a →:= c imply E ⊢b →:= 01 d and E ⊢ c →:= 01 d for some d. Confluence
follows by two subsequent inductions.
As a first property we show confluence of negation-reduction. We begin with
elementary properties of negation-reduction.
Law 5 (Elementary properties of negation-reduction). For all a, a1, a2,b,b1,b2
and x, the following properties are satisfied:
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i: [a1 ⊕ a2] →¬ b implies b = [c1 ⊕ c2], a1 →¬ 01 c1, and a2 →¬ 01 c2, for
some c1, c2.
ii: ⊕x(a1, a2)→¬ b implies b = ⊕x(a1, c2), a2 →¬ c2 for some c2.
iii: ¬a →¬ [b1,b2] implies a = [c1 + c2], ¬c1 →¬ 01 b1, ¬c2 →¬ 01 b2 for
some c1, c2.
iv: ¬a →¬ [b1 + b2] implies a = [c1, c2], ¬c1 →¬ 01 b1, ¬c2 →¬ 01 b2 for
some c1, c2.
v: ¬a→¬ [x : b1]b2 implies a = [x!b1]c2, ¬c2 →¬ b2 for some c2.
vi: ¬a→¬ [x!b1]b2 implies a = [x : b1]c2, ¬c2 →¬ b2 for some c2.
vii: ¬a→¬ ¬b implies a→¬ b.
Proof. Parts i, ii, iii, iv, v, and vi are direct consequences of the definition
of negation-reduction. They can be shown by induction on the definition of
negation-reduction. Part vii is slightly more complex as there are two cases for
¬a→¬ ¬b:
• Use of the axiom ν1, i.e. a = ¬¬b. The proposition follows since a→¬ b.
• Use of structural rule ¬ 1, i.e. a→¬ b. which also means we are done.
Law 6 (Strong normalisation of negation-reduction). There is no infinite se-
quence a1 →¬ a2 →¬ . . ..
Proof. One way to see this is to define a weight W¬(a) such that
a→¬ b implies W¬(b) <W¬(a)
A possible definition is given below:
W¬(τ) = 1
W¬(x) = 1
W¬(⊕(a1, . . . , an)) =


(W¬(a1) + 1)
2 if n = 1,
⊕(a1, . . . , an) = ¬a1
W¬(a1) + . . .+W¬(an) + 1
otherwise
W¬(⊕x(a1, . . . , an)) = W¬(a1) + . . .+W¬(an) + 1
For the confluence proof of negation-reduction we will use induction on the size
of expressions.
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Definition 20 (Size of expression). The size of an expression is defined as
follows:
S (τ) = 1
S (x) = 1
S (⊕(a1, . . . , an)) = S (a1) + . . .+ S (an) + 1
S (⊕x(a1, . . . , an)) = S (a1) + . . .+ S (an) + 1
Obviously S (a) > 0 for all expressions a.
Law 7 (Confluence of negation-reduction). For all a,b, c: a→¬ ∗ b and a→¬∗
c imply b→¬∗ d, and c→¬∗ d for some d.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the size of expressions and systematic in-
vestigation of critical pairs: The case S (a) = 1 is obviously true. Consider an
expression a with S (a) = n > 0 and assume confluence for all expressions b
with S (b) < S (a).
First we establish local confluence from a, i.e. a →¬ b and a →¬ c imply
b→¬∗ d, and c→¬∗ d for some d. The following cases can be distinguished:
• a = [a1 ⊕ a2]: Proposition follows from Law 5(i) and the inductive hy-
pothesis.
• a = ⊕x(a1, a2): Proposition follows from Law 5(ii) and the inductive
hypothesis.
• a = ¬a1: We have E⊢¬a1 →¬ b and E⊢¬a1 →¬ c. A somewhat clumsy
but technically straightforward proof goes by systematic cases distinction
on b and c:
– b = ¬b1, c = [c2, c3].
By Law 5(vii) we know that a1 →¬ b1. By Law 5(iii) we know that
a1 = [a2 + a3] for some a2, a3 where ¬a2 →
¬+ c2 and ¬a3 →
¬+ c3.
By inductive hypothesis applied to a1, there is a e such that b1 →¬∗
e and [a2 + a3] →¬ ∗ e. Hence e = [e2 + e3] for some e2, e3 where
a2 →¬∗ e2 and a3 →¬∗ e3. This can be summarized graphically as
follows:
a1 = [a2, a3] b1
e = [e2, e3]
¬
¬∗
¬∗
Hence ¬a2 →¬∗ ¬e2 and ¬a3 →¬∗ ¬e3. By inductive hypothesis
applied to ¬a2 and ¬a3 (note that S (¬a2), S (¬a3) < S (a)) there are
d2 and d3 where ¬e2 →¬ ∗ d2 and c2 →¬∗ d2 as well as ¬e3 →¬∗ d3
and c3 →¬∗ d3. This can be summarized graphically as follows:
¬a2 c2
¬e2 d2
¬∗
¬∗ ¬ ∗
¬ ∗
¬a3 c3
¬e3 d3
¬∗
¬∗ ¬ ∗
¬ ∗
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Hence we can define d = [d2,d3] where c = [c2, c3] →¬∗ d and
b = ¬b1 →¬∗ ¬e = ¬[e2 + e3] →¬∗ [¬e2,¬e3] →¬∗ [d2,d3] = d.
This can be summarized graphically as follows:
a = ¬a1 = ¬[a2 + a3] b = ¬b1
c = [c2, c3] d = [d2,d3]
¬
¬ ¬∗
¬∗
– b = ¬b1, c = [c2 + c3]. Symmetric to c = [c2, c3] using Law 5(iv)
– b = ¬b1, c = [x : c2]c3. By Law 5(vii) we know that a1 →
¬∗ b1. By
Law 5(v) we know that a1 = [x!a2]a3 for some a2, a3 where a2 = c2
and ¬a3 →¬∗ c3. By inductive hypothesis applied to a1, there is an
e such that b1 →¬∗ e and [x!a2]a3 →¬∗ e. Hence e = [x!a2]e3 for
some e3 where a3 →¬∗ e3. This can be summarized graphically as
follows:
a1 = [x!a2]a3 b1
e = [x!a2]e3
¬
¬∗
¬∗
Hence also ¬a3 →¬∗ ¬e3. By inductive hypothesis applied to ¬a3
(note that S (¬a3) < S (a)) there is a d3 where ¬e3 →¬∗ d3 and
c3 →¬∗ d3.
Hence we can define d = [x : a2]d3 where c = [x : a2]c3 →¬ ∗ d and
b = ¬b1 →
¬∗ ¬e = ¬[x!a2]e3 →
¬∗ [x : a2]¬e3 →
¬ ∗ d
This can be summarized graphically as follows:
a = ¬a1 = ¬[x!a2]a3 b = ¬b1
c = [x : a2]c3 d = [x : a2]d3
¬
¬ ¬∗
¬∗
– b = ¬b1, c = [x!c2]c3. Symmetric to case c = [x : c2]c3 using
Law5(vi).
– b = ¬b1, c = ¬c1. By Law 5(vii) we know that a1 →¬∗ b1 and
a1 →¬∗ c1. By inductive hypothesis applied to a1, there is a d such
that b1 →¬∗ d and c1 →¬∗ d. Hence obviously b →¬∗ ¬d and
c→¬ ∗ ¬d.
– c = ¬c1, b is not a negation. Symmetric to previous cases where b
was a negation and c was not a negation.
– b and c are both not negations. Obviously both b and c must be
both either a product, a sum, or an abstraction.
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∗ In case b = [b2,b3] and c = [c2, c3], by Law 5(iii) we know
that a1 = [a2 + a3] for some a2, a3 where ¬a2 →¬∗ b2 and
¬a3 →¬∗ b3 and also ¬a2 →¬∗ c2 and ¬a3 →¬ ∗ c3. By induc-
tive hypothesis applied to ¬a2 and ¬a3 (note that S (¬a2) < S (a)
and S (¬a3) < S (a)), we know that b2 →
¬∗ d2 and c2 →
¬ ∗ d2
as well as b3 →¬∗ d3 and c3 →¬∗ d3 for some d2 and d3.
Hence we can define d = [d2,d3] where obviously b →¬∗ d and
c→¬∗ d. This can be summarized graphically as follows:
a = ¬a1 = ¬[a2 + a3] b = [b2,b3]
c = [c2, c3] d = [d2,d3]
¬
¬ ¬∗
¬∗
∗ The case b = [b2 + b3], c = [c2 + c3] is symmetric to the case
b = [b2,b3], c = [c2, c3] using Law 5(iv).
∗ In case b = [x : b2]b3 and c = [x : c2]c3, by Law 5(v) we
know that a1 = [x!a2]a3 for some a2, a3 where a2 →¬∗ b2 and
¬a3 →¬∗ b3 and a2 →¬∗ c2 and ¬a3 →¬∗ c3. By inductive
hypothesis applied to a2 and ¬a3 (note that S (¬a3) < S (a)),
we know b2 →¬∗ d2 and c2 →¬∗ d2 as well as b3 →¬∗ d3 and
c3 →¬ ∗ d3 for some d2 and d3. Hence we can define d = [x :
d2]d3 where b →¬∗ d and c →¬∗ d. This can be summarized
graphically as follows:
a = ¬a1 = ¬[x!a2]a3 b = [x : b2]b3
c = [x : c2]c3 d = [x : d2]d3
¬
¬ ¬∗
¬∗
∗ The case b = [x!b2]b3 and c = [x!c2]c3 is symmetric to the case
b = [x : b2]b3 and c = [x : c2]c3 using Law 5(vi).
• In all other cases no axiom or structural rule of →¬∗ is matching.
This completes the argument of local confluence. Since →¬∗ is terminating,
it is obviously also terminating for expressions b with S (b) ≤ n. Hence one
can apply the diamond lemma [33] to obtain confluence of →¬∗ for a, which
completes the inductive step.
Law 8 (Commutation of single-step reduction with explicit substitution and
negation-reduction). For all a, b and c: E ⊢ a →:= b and a →¬∗ c imply
b→¬∗ d and E⊢c→:= 01 d for some d.
Proof. First we prove by induction on a with environment E that for all b and
c, E⊢a→:= b and a→¬ c imply b→¬∗ d and E⊢c→:= 01 d for some d.
Obviously we only have to consider those cases in which there exists a c such
that a→¬ c:
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• a = [a1 ⊕ a2]: a →¬ c obviously implies that c = [c1 ⊕ c2] where either
a1 →¬ c1 and a2 = c2 or a2 →¬ c2 and a1 = c1. Similarly, E ⊢a →:= b
obviously implies that b = [b1 ⊕ b2] where either E ⊢ a1 →:= b1 and
a2 = b2 or E ⊢a2 →:= b2 and a1 = b1. Thus, there are four cases where
in two of the cases the property follows directly and in the other two it
follows from the inductive hypothesis.
• a = ⊕x(a1, a2): The proof is similar to the case a = [a1 ⊕ a2].
• a = ¬a1: If E⊢¬a1 →:= b, due to the definition of →:= ∗-reduction, only
the following two cases are possible:
The first case is the use of the rule ν on top-level, i.e. ¬a1 →¬+ b. By
confluence of negation-reduction (Law 7) we know that there is a d such
that c →¬∗ d and b →¬∗ d. We have c = d or c →¬+ d, and therefore
obviously E⊢c→:= 01 d.
The only other possible case is b = ¬b1 where E ⊢ a1 →:= b1, for some
b1. From a = ¬a1 →¬ c, by definition of→¬∗-reduction we know that at
least one of the following cases must be true:
ν1: a1 = ¬a2, c = a2. Hence E⊢¬a2 →:= b1. As argued above, there
are two cases: If ¬a2 →¬+ b1 then obviously also ¬a1 →¬+ b.
This case has already been considered above. Therefore b1 = ¬d
where E⊢a2 →
:= d, for some d. Obviously also b = ¬¬d→¬∗ d.
ν2: a1 = [a2, a3], c = [¬a2 + ¬a3] for some a2, a3. Hence obviously
b1 = [b2,b3] where E⊢a2 →:= b2 and a3 = b3 or vice versa.
In the first case we have d = [¬b2 + ¬a3] where E ⊢ c = [¬a2 +
¬a3] →:= d and b = ¬b1 →¬ d. The second case runs analo-
gously.
ν3: a1 = [a2 + a3], c = [¬a2,¬a3] for some a2, a3. This case is
symmetric to the previous one.
ν4: a1 = [x : a2]a3, c = [x!a2]¬a3 for some a2, a3. Hence obviously
b1 = [x!b2]b3 where E ⊢a2 →:= b2 and a3 = b3 or a2 = b2 and
E, x :=a2⊢a3 →:= b3.
In the first case we can infer that d = [x!b2]¬b3 with E ⊢ c =
[x!a2]¬a3 →:= d and b = ¬b1 →¬ d. The second case runs
analogously.
ν5: a1 = [x!a2]a3, c = [x : a2]¬a3 for some a2, a3. This case is
symmetric to the previous one.
(¬ )1: c = ¬c1 where a1 →¬ c1 for some c. By inductive hypothesis
there is a d such that b1 →
¬∗ d and E ⊢ c1 →
:= 01 d. Hence
obviously b→¬∗ ¬d and E⊢c = ¬c1 →:= 01 ¬d.
The next step is to prove the main property by induction on the length n of
→¬∗-reduction a→¬n c.
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• In case of n = 0 the property is trivial.
• Let E ⊢a →:= b and a →¬n c′ →¬ c. By inductive hypothesis we know
there is a d′ such that E⊢c′ →:= 01 d′ and b→¬∗ d′. This situation can
be graphically summarized as follows (leaving out the environment E):
a c′ c
b d′
¬,n
:=
¬
:= 01
¬∗
If c′ = d′, we know that b →¬∗ c′ and hence b →¬∗ c. Hence d = c
where b →¬∗ d and E ⊢ c →:= 01 d. This situation can be graphically
summarized as follows (leaving out the environment E):
a d′ = c′ d = c
b
¬n
:=
¬
¬∗
Otherwise E ⊢ c′ →:= d′ and c′ →¬ c. By the argument above we know
there is a d such that d′ →¬∗ d and E ⊢ c →:= 01 d. Hence b →¬∗
d′ →¬∗ d and E ⊢ c →:= 01 d which completes the proof. This situation
can be graphically summarized as follows (leaving out the environment
E):
a c′ c
b d′ d
¬n
:=
¬ 1
:= := 01
¬ ∗ ¬ ∗
Law 9 (Direct confluence of reduction with explicit substitution). For all E, a,
b, c: E ⊢ a →:= b and E ⊢ a →:= c imply E ⊢b →:= 01 d, and E ⊢ c →:= 01 d
for some d.
Proof. Proof is by induction on a with environment E with a systematic inves-
tigation of critical pairs.
Due to the definition of →:=, critical pairs of E ⊢a→:= b and E ⊢a→:= c
where where at least one of the steps is using axiom ν, on top-level, i.e. where
E ⊢a →¬+ b or E ⊢a →¬+ c, can be resolved thanks to Laws 7 and 8, hence
they are excluded in the following case distinctions.
• a = τ : Cannot be the case, since there is no matching left-hand side
• a = x: The only matching axiom is use, the property follows since E(x)
is a function, i.e. c = b.
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• a = [x : a1]a2: Basically the property follows since there are no critical
pairs. More formally, the only matching rules are ([x : ] )1 and ([x : ] )2.
Therefore, the following four cases must be considered:
– b = [x : b1]a2, c = [x : c1]a2, where E ⊢a1 →:= b1 and E ⊢a1 →:=
c1: By inductive hypothesis there is a d such that E ⊢b1 →:= 01 d
and E ⊢ c1 →
:= 01 d, hence obviously E ⊢ b →:= 01 [x : d]a2 and
E⊢c→:= 01 [x : d]a2.
– b = [x : a1]b2, c = [x : a1]c2, where E ⊢a2 →:= b2 and E ⊢a2 →:=
c2: By the inductive hypothesis there is a d such that E⊢b2 →:= 01 d
and E ⊢ c2 →:= 01 d, hence obviously E ⊢ b →:= 01 [x : a1]d and
E⊢c→:= 01 [x : a1]d.
– b = [x : b1]a2, c = [x : a1]c2, where E ⊢a1 →:= b1 and E ⊢a2 →:=
c2. Obviously the common single-step reduct is [x : b1]c2.
– b = [x : a1]c2, x = [x : b1]a2, where E ⊢a1 →:= b1 and E ⊢a2 →:=
c2. Obviously the common single-step reduct is [x : b1]c2.
• a = [x!a1]a2: Similar to [x : a1]a2 as there are no critical pairs.
• a = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a3]: Similar to [x : a1]a2 as there are no critical pairs.
• a = [x := a1]a2: The matching axiom and rules are rem, L:=, and R:=.
The use of L:= versus R:= can be argued as in the previous three cases.
The interesting cases are the use of rem, versus L:= or R:=: Hence we may
assume that x /∈ FV (a2) and need to consider the following cases:
– b = a2 and c = [x :=b1]a2 where E ⊢ a1 →:= b1. We have d = a2
since x /∈ FV (a2) and c reduces in one-step to a2. This situation can
be graphically summarized as follows (leaving out the environment
E):
a = [x :=a1]a2 d = b = a2
c = [x :=b1]a2
:=
:=
:=
– b = a2 and c = [x :=a1]c2 where E, x :=a1 ⊢a2 →:= c2: Similar to
Law 2(iii), by structural induction on expressions with internalized
substitutions one can show that x /∈ FV (a2) implies that x /∈ FV (c2)
and therefore E ⊢a2 →:= c2. Therefore d = c2 where E ⊢ c →:= c2
and E ⊢b →:= c2. This situation can be graphically summarized as
follows (leaving out the environment E):
a = [x :=a1]a2 b = a2
c = [x :=a1]c2 d = c2
:=
:= :=
:=
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– The other two cases are symmetric.
• a = (a1 a2): The four matching axiom and two matching rules are β
µ
1 ,
βµ2 , β3, β4, ( )1, and ( )2. Several cases have to be considered: The use
of ( )1 versus ( )2 can be argued similar as in the case of (universal)
abstraction. The simultaneous application of two different axioms on top-
level is obviously not possible. The interesting remaining cases are the
usage of one of the four axioms versus one of the rules.
The first case is the use of βµ1 , i.e. a1 = [x : a3]a4 and b = [x := a2]a4,
versus one of the rules ( )1, and ( )2. Two cases need to be considered:
– Use of rule ( )1, i.e. c = (c1 a2) where E ⊢ a1 = [x : a3]a4 →:= c1:
By definition of →:=, there are two cases:
∗ c1 = [x : c3]a4 where E⊢a3 →:= c3: This means that E⊢c→:=
[x := a2]a4 = b, i.e. d = b is a single-step reduct of c. This
situation can be graphically summarized as follows (leaving out
the environment E):
a = (a1 a2) = ([x : a3]a4 a2) d = b = [x :=a2]a4
c = (c1 a2) = ([x : c3]a4 a2)
:=
:=
:=
∗ c1 = [x : a3]c4 where E ⊢ a4 →:= c4: By definition of →:= we
know that also E ⊢ [x := a2]a4 →
:= [x := a2]c4. Hence d =
[x := a2]c4 with E ⊢ b = [x := a2]a4 →:= [x := a2]c4 = d and
E ⊢ c = (c1 a2) = ([x : a3]c4 a2) →:= [x := a2]c4 = d. This
situation can be graphically summarized as follows (leaving out
the environment E):
a = (a1 a2) = ([x : a3]a4 a2) b = [x :=a2]a4
c = (c1 a2) = ([x : a3]c4 a2) d = [x :=a2]c4
:=
:= :=
:=
– Use of rule ( )2, i.e. c = (a1 c2) where E ⊢ a2 →:= c2: It follows
that d = [x := c2]a4 since E ⊢ (a1 c2) →:= d and d is a single-step
reduct of b. This situation can be graphically summarized as follows
(leaving out the environment E):
a = (a1 a2) = ([x : a3]a4 a2) b = [x :=a2]a4
c = (a1 c2) = ([x : a3]a4 c2) d = [x :=c2]a4
:=
:= :=
:=
The second case is the use of βµ2 , i.e. a1 = [x!a3]a4 and b = [x := a2]a4,
versus one of the rules ( )1, and ( )2. It can be argued in the same way
as the first case.
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The third case is the use of β3, i.e. a1 = [a3 ?a4], a2 = [a5, : a6] and
b = (a3 a5), versus one of the rules ( )1, and ( )2. The property follows
by an obvious case distinction on whether E ⊢ [a3 ?a4] →:= c is reducing
in a3 or a4, and similarly for E⊢ [a5, :a6]→:= c.
The fourth case is symmetric to the third one.
• a = [a1 ⊕ a2]: As there are no critical pairs, these cases are shown similar
to the cases of universal abstraction.
• a = a1.1: The interesting cases are the use of one of the axioms π1, π3, or
π5 versus the rule ( .1)1.
In case of π1 we have a1 = [x!a2]a3, b = a2, and c = c1.1 where E ⊢
[x!a2]a3 →
:= c1. Obviously c1 = [x!c2]c3 where either E⊢a2 →
:= c2 and
c3 = a3 or c2 = a2 and E ⊢ a3 →:= c3. In the first case d = c2, in the
second case d = a2.
The cases π3 and π5 can be argued in a similar style.
• a = a1.2: Similar to .1 considering the use of one of the axioms π2, π4, or
π6 versus the rule ( .1)2.
• a = [a1, : a2], a = [: a1, a2], a = [a1 ?a2]: As there are no critical pairs,
these cases are shown similar to the cases of universal abstraction.
• a = ¬a1: Matching are the axioms νi with i ∈ {6, . . . , 10} and the rule
(¬ )1 . There are obviously no critical pairs among the axioms. Parallel
use of (¬ )1 and any one of the axioms obviously implies direct confluence.
Law 10 (Confluence of →:= ∗-reduction). For all E, a,b, c: E ⊢a→:= ∗ b and
E⊢a→:= ∗ c implies E⊢b∇:=c.
Proof. Based on Law 9, by structural induction on the number n of transition
steps one can show that E ⊢ a = b0 →:=n bn = b and E ⊢ a →:= c implies
E⊢b→:= 01 d, and E⊢c→:=n
′
d where n′ ≤ n for some d. This situation can
be graphically summarized as follows (leaving out the environment E):
a = b0 b1 · · · bn = b
c = d0 d1 · · · dn = d
:= 1
:= 1
:= 1
:= 1
:= 1
:= 01
:= 01 := 01 := 01
Using this intermediate result, by structural induction on the number of tran-
sition steps n one can show for any m that E ⊢ a →:=n b and E ⊢ a →:=m c
implies E ⊢ b →:=m
′
d and E ⊢ c →:=n
′
d where n′ ≤ n,m′ ≤ m for some
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d. This proves confluence of→:= ∗-reduction. This situation can be graphically
summarized as follows (leaving out the environment E):
a = b0 b1 · · · bn = b
c = d0 d1 · · · dn = d
:=
:=m=k0
:=
:= k1
:=
:=m′=kn
:= 01 := 01 := 01
4.4.4 Confluence of reduction
By Law 4 we know that reduction implies reduction with explicit substitution.
The reverse direction is obviously not true. However we can show that E ⊢
a →:= ∗ b implies a′ →∗ b′ where a′ and b′ result from a and b by maximal
evaluation of definitions, i.e. by maximal application of the axioms use and rem.
First, we introduce the relation E⊢a→= b of definition evaluation
Definition 21 (Single-step definition-evaluation). Single-step definition- eval-
uation E ⊢ a →= b is defined just like single-step reduction with explicit sub-
stitution E ⊢ a →:= b but without the rule ν and without any axioms except
(rem) and (use).
Law 11 (Confluence of definition-evaluation). For all E, a,b: The reflexive and
transitive closure of E⊢a→= b is confluent.
Proof. By removing all the axiom cases except (rem) and (use) and the rule ν in
the proof of Law 9 (where these axioms only interacted with the structural rules
for internalized substitution) it can be turned into a proof of direct confluence of
E⊢a→= b. The confluence of the reflexive and transitive closure of E⊢a→= b
then follows as in the proof of Law 10.
Law 12 (Strong normalization of definition-evaluation). There are no infinite
chains E⊢a1 →= a2 →= a3 →= · · ·
Proof. Since all definitions are non-recursive the property is straightforward.
One way to see this is to define a weight W (E, a) such that
E ⊢ a→= b implies W (E,b) < W (E, a)
A possible definition is given below:
W (E, τ) = 1
W (E, x) =
{
W (E,E(x)) + 1 if x ∈ dom(E)
1 otherwise
W (E,⊕(a1, . . . , an)) = W (E, a1) + . . .+W (E, an)
W (E,⊕x(a1, . . . , an)) = W (E, a1) + . . .+W (E, an)
W (E, [x :=a]b) == W (E, a) +W ((E, x := a),b) + 1
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Definition 22 (Definitional normal form). For any a, let N=E (a) ∈ E denote
the definitional normal form, i.e. the expression resulting from a by maximal
application of definition evaluation steps under environment E. This definition
is sound since due to Law 12 the evaluation of definitions always terminates and
by Law 11 the maximal evaluation of definitions delivers a unique result. We
abbreviate N=() a as N
=(a).
Law 13 (Decomposition properties of N=E (a)). For all E, x, a1, . . . an:
i: N=E (⊕(a1, . . . , an)) = ⊕(N
=
E (a1), . . . ,N
=
E (an))
ii: N=E (⊕x(a1, . . . , an)) = ⊕x(N
=
E (a1), . . . ,N
=
E (an))
Proof. The proof of i and ii is by induction on the length of an arbitrary defi-
nition evaluation E ⊢⊕(a1, . . . , an) →= N=E (⊕(a1, . . . , an)). It is obvious since
the outer operation is never affected by definition evaluation.
Law 14 (Substitution properties of N=E (a)). For all E, x, a,b:
i: N=E ([x :=a]b) = N
=
E (a[b/x])
ii: N=E (b[a/x]) = N
=
E (b)[N
=
E (a)/x]
iii: N=E,x:=a(b) = N
=
E (b)[N
=
E (a)/x]
Proof.
i: As stated in the proof of Law 4 we have E ⊢ [x :=a]b →:= ∗ b[a/x]. The
proposition follows from confluence of definition evaluation (Law11) since
E ⊢ [x := a]b →= · · · →= N=E ([x := a]b) and E ⊢ b[a/x] →
= · · · →=
N=E (b[a/x]).
ii: Induction on the definition of substitution using the Law 13.
iii: Proof by induction on b.
– b = y.
∗ If x = y then N=E (b) = N
=
E (y) = N
=
E (x) = x and therefore
N=E,x:=a(b) = N
=
E,x:=a(x)
= N=E,x:=a(a)
= N=E (a)
= x[N=E (a)/x]
= N=E (b)[N
=
E (a)/x]
∗ If x 6= y then
N=E,x:=a(b) = N
=
E,x:=a(y)
= N=E (y)
= N=E (y)[N
=
E (a)/x]
= N=E (b)[N
=
E (a)/x]
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– b = ⊕(a1, . . . , an) or b = ⊕x(a1, . . . , an). In these cases the property
follows from the inductive hypothesis and the Law 13.
– b = [y :=c]d. In this case, one can argue as follows:
N=E,x:=a([y := c]d)
= (by i and ii)
N=E,x:=a(d)[N
=
E,x:=a(c)/y]
= (inductive hypothesis)
N=E (d)[N
=
E (a)/x][N
=
E,x:=a(c)/y]
= (inductive hypothesis)
N=E (d)[N
=
E (a)/x][N
=
E (c)[a/x]/y]
= (Law 1(ii) since y /∈ FV (N=E (a)))
N=E (d)[N
=
E (c)/y][N
=
E (a)/x]
= (by i and ii)
N=E ([y := c]d)[N
=
E (a)/x]
Law 15 (Embedding law for negation reduction). For all a,b, E: a →¬n b
implies N=E (a)→
∗ N=E (b).
Proof. Intuitively, due to Law 13, the effect of N=E is to replace some variables
by expressions, which does not affect the reduction N=E (a)→
∗ N=E (b). Further-
more, no axiom of negation reduction has a free variable as its left-hand side.
Since the axioms and inference rules of →¬∗-reduction are a subset of those of
reduction, the property follows by a straightforward induction on the definition
of a→¬n b.
Law 16 (Embedding law for reduction with explicit substitution). For all
E, a,b: E ⊢ a →:= ∗ b implies N=E (a) →
∗ N=E (b). As a consequence, for
all a, b, ()⊢a∇:=b implies a∇b.
Proof. First we show by induction on single-step reduction with explicit substi-
tution that E ⊢ a →:= b implies N=E (a) →
∗ N=E (b). The following cases have
to be considered:
• The axioms use or rem were used: Obviously N=E (a) = N
=
E (b).
• The axiom βµ1 was used, i.e. a = ([x : a1]a2 a3) and b = [x := a3]a2 We
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can argue as follows:
N=E (([x :a1]a2 a3))
= (Law 13(i))
([x :N=E (a1)]N
=
E (a2)N
=
E (a3))
→ (axiom β1)
N=E (a2)[N
=
E (a3)/x]
= (Law 14(ii))
N=E (a2[a3/x])
• The axiom βµ2 was used, i.e. a = ([x!a1]a2 a3) and b = [x :=a3]a2 . This
case can be shown similar to case βµ1 .
• Any other axiom was used to reduce E⊢a→:= b: In these cases obviously
N=E (a)→ N
=
E (b).
• The rule ν was used to reduce E ⊢ a →:= b, i.e. a →¬+ b. By Law 15,
N=E (a)→
∗ N=E (b).
• A structural rule (⊕
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i) was used, i.e. a = ⊕(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an),
b = ⊕(a1, . . . ,bi, . . . , an) where E ⊢ ai → bi. By inductive hypothe-
sis we know that N=E (ai) → N
=
E (bi). Furthermore, by Law 13(i), we
know that N=E (a) = ⊕(N
=
E (a1), . . . ,N
=
E (ai), . . . ,N
=
E (an)) and N
=
E (b) =
⊕(N=E (a1), . . . ,N
=
E (bi), . . . ,N
=
E (an)). Hence we know that N
=
E (a) →
∗
N=E (b).
• A structural rule (⊕x
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i) was used. This case can be shown like
the previous one using Law 13(ii).
• The rule (L:=) was used, i.e. a = [x := a1]a2 and b = [x :=b1]a2, where
E ⊢ a1 →:= b1. By inductive hypothesis N=E (a1) →
∗ N=E (b1). Hence,
we can argue as follows:
N=E ([x :=a1]a2)
= (Law 14(i, ii))
N=E (a2)[N
=
E (a1)/x]
→∗ (inductive hypothesis and Law 2(ii))
N=E (a2)[N
=
E (b1)/x]
= (Law 14(i, ii))
N=E ([x :=b1]a2)
• The rule (R:=) was used, i.e. a = [x := a1]a2 and b = [x := a1]b2,
where E, x :=a1 ⊢ a2 →:= b2. By inductive hypothesis N=E,x:=a1(a2) →
∗
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N=E,x:=a1(a2). Hence, we can argue as follows:
N=E ([x :=a1]a2)
= (Law 14(iii))
N=E,x:=a1(a2)
→∗ (inductive hypothesis)
N=E,x:=a1(b2)
= (Law 14(iii))
N=E,x:=a1(b2)
Now we turn to the main proposition. Obviously, we have E ⊢ a →:=n
b for some n. The proof is by induction on n. For n = 0 the property is
trivial. For n > 0 assume E ⊢ a →:= c →:=n−1 b. By inductive hypothesis
N=E (c) →
∗ N=E (b). By the previous property we know that N
=
E (a) →
∗ N=E (c)
which implies the proposition.
For the immediate consequence, for any a, b, assume there is a c such that
()⊢a→:= ∗ c and ()⊢b→:= ∗ c. We have just shown that also N=(a)→∗ N=(c)
and N=(b) →∗ N=(c). The property follows since obviously a = N=(a) and
b = N=(b). Hence a∇b.
Law 17 (Confluence of reduction). For all a, b, c: a →∗ b and a →∗ c implies
b∇c.
Proof. By Law 4 we know that⊢a→:= ∗ b and⊢a→:= ∗ c. Due to confluence of
→:= ∗-reduction (Law 10) we know that⊢b∇:=c. By Law 16 we obtain b∇c.
Law 18 (Common reduct preserved by reduction). For all a, b, c, d: a∇b, a→∗
c, and b→∗ d implies c∇d.
Proof. Direct consequence of Law 17.
We can now show the well-known Church-Rosser property which allows us to
consider a =λ b and a∇b as equivalent.
Law 19 (Church-Rosser property). For all a, b: a =λ b implies a∇b
Proof. Induction on the definition of congruence as the symmetric and transitive
closure of reduction. In the base case and the inductive symmetry case the
property is straightforward. In the inductive transitive case we have transitivity
of a∇b due to Law 17.
As an immediate consequence of confluence we show some basic properties of
congruence.
Law 20 (Substitution and congruence). For all x, a, b, c:
i: a =λ b implies a[c/x] =λ b[c/x]
ii: a =λ b implies c[a/x] =λ c[b/x]
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Proof.
i: By Law 19 we know that a→∗ d and b→∗ d for some d. By Law 2(i) we
know that a[c/x]→∗ d[c/x] and b[c/x]→∗ d[c/x]. This implies a[c/x] =λ
b[c/x].
ii: Similar to part i.
Law 21 (Basic properties of congruence). For all x, a, b, c, d:
i: ⊕x(a1, . . . , an) =λ ⊕y(b1, . . . , bn) iff x = y and ai =λ bi for i = 1, . . . , n.
ii: [a⊕ b] =λ [c⊕ d]iff a =λ c and b =λ d.
Proof.
i: Follows from Laws 19 and 3(ii).
ii: Follows from Laws 19 and 3(i).
4.5 Basic properties of typing
We frequently show properties about typing relations by induction on the defi-
nition of typing.
Definition 23 (Induction on the definition of typing). Properties which are
proven for all Γ, a, and b such that Γ ⊢ a : b (denoted here by P (Γ, a, b)) can
be shown by shown by induction on the definition of typing if the inductive
base corresponds to the typing axiom and the inductive step corresponds to the
inference rules of typing.
We begin by a generalization of the weakening rule for typing.
Law 22 (Context weakening). For all Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b, c: (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a : b and Γ1⊢c
imply (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a : b.
Proof. Proof by induction on the definition of (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a : b.
ax: This case is not possible.
start: If Γ2 = () then we have Γ1 = (Γ
′
1, y : b) and Γ
′
1, y : b ⊢ y : b, for some
Γ′1, where y = a and Γ
′
1 ⊢ b. Since Γ1 ⊢ c, by rule weak we obtain
(Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a : b. This can be graphically illustrated as follows:
weak
Γ′1, y : b⊢y : b Γ
′
1, y : b⊢c
Γ′1, y : b, x : c ⊢ y : b
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If Γ2 = (Γ
′
2, y : d) for some Γ
′
2, y, and d, then we have Γ1,Γ
′
2, y : d⊢
y : d where y = a, d = b, and (Γ1,Γ
′
2)⊢d. Since Γ1⊢c, by inductive
hypothesis (Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2) ⊢ d. Hence by rule weak (Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2, y :
d) ⊢ y : d which is the same as (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a : b. This can be
graphically illustrated as follows:
weak
Γ1,Γ
′
2, y : d⊢y : d
I.H.
Γ1,Γ
′
2⊢d Γ1⊢c
Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2⊢d
Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2, y : d ⊢ y : d
weak: If Γ2 = () then we have Γ1 ⊢ a : b. Since Γ1 ⊢ c, by rule weak also
(Γ1, x : c)⊢a : b which is the same as (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a : b. This can
be graphically illustrated as follows:
weak
Γ1⊢a : b Γ1⊢c
Γ1, x : c ⊢ a : b
If Γ2 = (Γ
′
2, y : d) for some Γ
′
2, y, and d then we have (Γ1,Γ
′
2)⊢a : b
and (Γ1,Γ
′
2)⊢d. Since Γ1⊢c, by inductive hypothesis (Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2)⊢
a : b as well as (Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2)⊢d. Hence by rule weak (Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2, y :
d) ⊢ a : b which is the same as (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a : b. This can be
graphically illustrated as follows:
weak
I.H.
Γ1,Γ
′
2⊢a : b Γ1⊢c
Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2 ⊢ a : b
I.H.
Γ1,Γ
′
2⊢d Γ1⊢c
Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2 ⊢ d
Γ1, x : c,Γ
′
2, y : d ⊢ a : b
conv: We have (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ a : b where (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ b, (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ a : b′ for some
b′ with b′ =λ b. Since Γ1 ⊢ c, by inductive hypothesis we know
that (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ b and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a : b′. Hence by rule
conv (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a : b. This can be graphically illustrated as
follows:
conv
I.H.
Γ1,Γ2⊢a : b
′ Γ1⊢c
Γ1, x : c,Γ2 ⊢ a : b
′ b′ =λ b
I.H.
Γ1,Γ2⊢b Γ1⊢c
Γ1, x : c,Γ2 ⊢ b
Γ1, x : c,Γ2 ⊢ a : b
absU : We have a = [y : a1]a2 and b = [y : a1]b2 for some a1, a2, and b2,
where (Γ1,Γ2, y : a1) ⊢ a2 : b2. Since Γ1 ⊢ c, by inductive hypoth-
esis we know that (Γ1, x : c,Γ2, y : a1) ⊢ a2 : b2. Hence by rule
absU (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a : b. This can be graphically illustrated as
follows:
absU
I.H.
Γ1,Γ2, y : a1⊢a2 : b2 Γ1⊢c
Γ1, x : c,Γ2, y : a1 ⊢ a2 : b2
Γ1, x : c,Γ2 ⊢ [y : a1]a2 : [y : a1]b2
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absE ,def: Analogous to case absU .
. . . All remaining cases run analogous to case conv.
In a similar style we show a generalization property about extraction of a typing
from a context.
Law 23 (Context extraction). For all Γ1,Γ2, a, b: (Γ1, x : a,Γ2) ⊢ b implies
Γ1⊢a
Proof. (Γ1, x : a,Γ2)⊢b means that there is a c where (Γ1, x : a,Γ2)⊢b : c. The
property that (Γ1, x : a,Γ2)⊢ b : c implies Γ1⊢a will be shown by induction on
the definition of (Γ1, x : a,Γ2)⊢b : c:
ax: This case is clearly not applicable.
start: We either have Γ2 = () in which case b = x and c = a and obviously
Γ1⊢a : c or we have Γ2 = (Γ′2, y : c) for some Γ
′
2 and y where y = b and
(Γ1, x : a,Γ
′
2)⊢c : d for some d. By inductive hypothesis Γ1⊢a.
weak: We either have Γ2 = () in which case Γ1⊢a or we have Γ2 = (Γ′2, y : d)
for some Γ′2, y, and d where (Γ1, x : a,Γ
′
2)⊢d. By inductive hypothesis
Γ1⊢a.
absU : For the rule absU we have b = [y : b1]b2, c = [y : b1]c2 for some b1, b2,
and c2 where (Γ1, x : a,Γ2, y : b1) ⊢ b2 : c2. By inductive hypothesis
(Γ1, x : a,Γ2, y : b1)⊢ c2 : d2 for some d2. Hence by rule absU we have
(Γ1, x : a,Γ2)⊢c : [y : b1]d2 which means (Γ1, x : a,Γ2)⊢c.
absE : This case can be shown in a similar way.
. . . All other rules have at least on precondition not altering the context
of the conclusion. The property follows directly from the inductive
hypothesis applied to this precondition as in the previous case.
Next, we note a generalization of the start rule of typing.
Law 24 (Start property). For all Γ, x, a, b: Γ, x : a⊢x : b implies a =λ b.
Proof. The proof is by induction on Γ, x : a ⊢ x : b. Obviously only the laws
start and conv are applicable. In case of start, we directly obtain a = b. In case
of conv, we know that Γ, x : a ⊢ x : c for some c where c =λ b. By inductive
hypothesis a =λ c hence obviously a =λ b.
Next we show several decomposition properties of typing.
Law 25 (Typing decomposition). For all Γ, x, a1, a2, a3, b:
70
i: Γ⊢⊕x(a1, a2) : b implies b =λ [x : a1]c for some c where (Γ, x : a1)⊢a2 : c.
ii: Γ⊢⊕x(a1, a2) : [x : a1]b implies b =λ c for some c where (Γ, x : a1)⊢a2 : c
(easy consequence of i and Law 19).
iii: Γ⊢ [a1, :a2] : b implies b =λ [c, a2] for some c where Γ⊢ a1 : c and Γ⊢ a2.
Γ⊢ [:a1, a2] : b implies b =λ [a1, c] for some c where Γ⊢a2 : c and Γ⊢a1.
iv: Γ⊢ [a1 ⊕ a2] : b implies b =λ [c1, c2] for some c1, c2 where Γ⊢ a1 : c1 and
Γ⊢a2 : c2.
v: Γ⊢¬a1 : b implies b =λ c for some c where Γ⊢a1 : c.
vi: ⊢τ : b implies b =λ τ .
vii: Γ⊢ (a1 a2) : b implies b =λ c2[a2/x] where Γ⊢a1 : [x : c1]c2 and Γ⊢a2 : c1
for some c1, c2.
viii: Γ ⊢ a1.1 : b implies b =λ c1 where Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!c1]c2 or Γ ⊢ a1 : [c1, c2] for
some c1, c2.
ix: Γ⊢a1.2 : b implies, for some c1, c2, that either b =λ c2 where Γ⊢a1 : [c1, c2]
or b =λ c2[a1.1/x] where Γ⊢a1 : [x!c1]c2.
x: Γ ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] : b implies b =λ [x!c]a3 for some c where Γ ⊢ a1 : c,
Γ⊢a2 : a3[a1/x], and (Γ, x : c)⊢a3.
xi: Γ ⊢ [a1 ? a2] : b implies b =λ [x : [c1 + c2]]c for some c1, c2, and c where
Γ⊢a1 : [x : c1]c, Γ⊢a2 : [x : c2]c and Γ⊢c.
Proof.
i: Proof by induction on the definition of Γ⊢⊕x(a1, a2) : b. Only the rules
weak, conv, absU , and absE are relevant as all other rules in their conclusion
type to an expression that cannot be equivalent to an abstraction.
– For the rule weak we have Γ = (Γ′, y : d), for some Γ′, y, and d
where Γ′ ⊢⊕x(a1, a2) : b as well as Γ
′ ⊢ d. By inductive hypothesis
(Γ′, x : a1) ⊢ a2 : c for some c where b =λ [x : a1]c. By Law 22 we
can infer that (Γ′, y : d, x : a1) ⊢ a2 : c which can be rewritten as
(Γ, x : a1)⊢a2 : c. This can be graphically illustrated as follows:
22
I.H.
Γ′⊢⊕x(a1, a2) : b
Γ′, x : a1⊢a2 : c where b =λ [x : a1]c Γ
′⊢d
Γ′, y : d, x : a1 ⊢ a2 : c
– For the rule conv we have Γ⊢⊕x(a1, a2) : d for some d where d =λ b
and Γ ⊢ d. By inductive hypothesis (Γ, x : a1) ⊢ a2 : c for some c
where d =λ [x : a1]c. By symmetry and transitivity of =λ we obtain
c =λ [x : a1]c.
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– The typing rules for abstractions absU and absE directly imply b =
[x : a1]c for some c where (Γ, x : a1)⊢a2 : c.
ii: By part i we obtain [x : a1]b =λ [x : a1]c for some c. By Law 19 this
implies [x : a1]b∇[x : a1]c. By Law 3(ii) this implies b∇c which implies
the proposition.
iii: Similar to part i, replacing the uses of absU or absE by injL or injR.
iv: Similar to part i, replacing the uses of absU or absE by prd or sum.
v: Similar to part i, replacing the uses of absU or absE by neg.
vi: Proof by induction on the definition of ⊢ τ : b. Only the rule conv and
the axiom ax are relevant as all other rules use a non-empty context in
their conclusion or type to an expression that cannot be equivalent to the
primitive constant.
– The case of the axiom ax is trivial.
– For the rule conv we have ⊢ τ : a for some a where a =λ b and ⊢ a.
By inductive hypothesis a =λ τ hence also b =λ τ .
vii: Similar to part i, replacing the uses of absU or absE by appl.
viii: Similar to part i, replacing the uses of absU or absE by prL or chI .
ix: Similar to part i, replacing the uses of absU or absE by prR or chB . In
case of prR, one obtains a2 =λ c2 where Γ⊢a : [c1, c2] for some c1, c2. In
case of chB , one obtains a2 =λ c2[a1.1/x] where Γ⊢ a : [x!c1]c2 for some
c1, c2.
x: Similar to part i, replacing the uses of absU or absE by def.
xi: Similar to part i, replacing the uses of absU or absE by case.
We conclude this section with some basic decomposition properties of validity.
Law 26 (Validity decomposition). For all Γ, x, a1, . . . , an:
i: Γ⊢⊕x(a1, a2) implies Γ⊢a1 and (Γ, x : a1)⊢a2
ii: Γ⊢⊕(a1, , . . . an) implies Γ⊢a1, . . ., Γ⊢an.
iii: Γ ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] implies Γ ⊢ a2 and Γ ⊢ a1 : b for some b where
(Γ, x : b)⊢a3
Proof.
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i: Proof by induction on the definition of Γ⊢⊕x(a1, a2) : b. Only the rules
weak, conv, and absU or absE are relevant as all other rules in their con-
clusion type to an expression that cannot be an abstraction. For the rules
weak and conv the proposition follows from the inductive hypothesis. The
typing rules for abstractions absU or absE directly imply (Γ, x : a) ⊢ b.
Γ⊢a then follows from Law 23.
ii: For any operation ⊕(a1, , . . . an) only the rules weak, conv and the corre-
sponding unique rule introducing ⊕(a1, , . . . an) are relevant. For the rules
weak and conv the proposition follows from the inductive hypothesis. For
the rule introducing ⊕(a1, , . . . an) the property is directly provided by one
of the antecedents.
iii: Similar argument as for part i, using the rule def instead of absU or absE .
4.6 Substitution properties of typing
A central prerequisite to the proof of closure of reduction and typing against
validity is the following substitution property of typing. In order to state the
property, we need the following auxiliary definition.
Definition 24 (Context substitution). The substitution function (Definition 3)
is extended to contexts Γ[a/x], where a is an expression, as follows:
()[a/x] = ()
(y : b,Γ)[a/x] =
{
(y : b[a/x],Γ) if x = y
(y : b[a/x],Γ[a/x]) otherwise
Law 27 (Substitution and typing). Assume that Γa = (Γ1, x : a,Γ2) and Γb =
(Γ1,Γ2[b/x]) for some Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b where Γ1 ⊢ b : a. For all c, d: If Γa ⊢ c : d
then Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x].
Proof. Let Γa and Γb as defined above and assume Γ1 ⊢ b : a. The proof that
Γa⊢c : d implies Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x] is by induction on the definition of Γa⊢c : d.
We take a look at each typing rule:
ax: Trivial since Γa = () is impossible.
start: We have c = y and Γa = Γ
′
a, y : d for some Γ
′
a, y, and d where (Γ
′
a, y :
d) = (Γ1, x : a,Γ2). There are two cases:
• Γ2 = () and therefore Γ1 = Γ′a, y = x and d = a: We can therefore
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argue as follows:
Γb = Γ
′
a ⊢ c[b/x]
= x[b/x]
= b
: a (Γ1⊢b : a is assumed)
= a[b/x]
= d[b/x]
• Γ2 = (Γ
′
2, y : d): Hence x 6= y and Γ2[b/x](y) = d[b/x]. We can
therefore argue as follows:
Γb = (Γ1,Γ2[b/x]) ⊢ c[b/x]
= y[b/x]
= y
: Γ2[b/x](y)
= d[b/x]
weak: We have Γa = (Γ
′
a, y : e) for some Γ
′
a, y, and e where Γ
′
a ⊢ c : d and
Γ′a⊢e : f for some f . There are two cases:
• Γ2 = () and therefore x = y: Hence Γb = Γ′a = Γ1 and x /∈
FV (c)∪FV (d) which means that c = c[b/x] and d = d[b/x]. Hence
Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x].
• Γ2 = (Γ′2, y : e) for some Γ
′
2. Hence x 6= y, Γ
′
a = (Γ1,Γ
′
2), and Γb =
(Γ1,Γ
′
2[b/x], y : e[b/x]). By inductive hypothesis we know that
(Γ1,Γ
′
2[b/x]) ⊢ c[b/x] : d[b/x] and (Γ1,Γ
′
2[b/x]) ⊢ e[b/x] : f [b/x].
Hence by rule weak we know that (Γ1,Γ
′
2[b/x], y : e[b/x])⊢ c[b/x] :
d[b/x] which means that Γb ⊢ c[b/x] : d[b/x]. This can be graphi-
cally illustrated as follows:
weak
I.H.
Γ1,Γ
′
2⊢c : d
Γ1,Γ
′
2[b/x] ⊢ c[b/x] : d[b/x]
arg1
I.H.
Γ1,Γ
′
2⊢e : f
Γ1,Γ
′
2[b/x] ⊢ e[b/x] : f [b/x]
arg2
Γ1,Γ
′
2[b/x], y : e[b/x] ⊢ c[b/x] : d[b/x]
conv: We have Γa⊢c : d′ for some d′ where d′ =λ d and Γa⊢d′ : e for some e.
By inductive hypothesis Γb⊢c[b/x] : d′[b/x] and Γa⊢d′[b/x] : e[b/x]. By
Law 20(i) we can infer that d′[b/x] =λ d[b/x]. Therefore we can apply
the rule conv to obtain Γb ⊢ c[b/x] : d[b/x]. This can be graphically
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illustrated as follows:
conv
20(i)
d′ =λ d
d′[b/x] =λ d[b/x]
I.H.
Γa⊢c : d
′
Γb⊢c[b/x] : d
′[b/x]
I.H.
Γa⊢d
′ : e
Γa⊢d
′[b/x] : e[b/x]
Γb ⊢ c[b/x] : d[b/x]
absU : We have c = [y : c1]c2 and d = [y : c1]d2 for some y, c1, c2, and d2
where (Γa, y : c1) ⊢ c2 : d2. By inductive hypothesis it follows that
(Γb, y : c1[b/x]) ⊢ c2[b/x] : d2[b/x]. Hence by absU we obtain Γb ⊢ [y :
c1[b/x]]c2[b/x] : [y : c1[b/x]]d2[b/x]. By definition of substitution it
follows that Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x].
absE : Similar to case absU .
appl: We have c = (c1 c2), d = d2[c2/y] for some y, c1, c2, and d2 where Γa⊢
(c1 c2) : d, Γa⊢c1 : [y : d1]d2, and Γa⊢c2 : d1. Obviously, we can assume
that x 6= y. We need to show that Γb ⊢ (c1 c2)[b/x] : d2[c2/y][b/x]. We
have:
Γb ⊢ c1[b/x]
: (inductive hypothesis)
([y : d1]d2)[b/x]
= (definition of substitution)
[y : d1[b/x]](d2[b/x])
Furthermore, since Γa ⊢ c2 : d1, by inductive hypothesis we know that
Γb⊢c2[b/x] : d1[b/x]. Hence by typing rule appl we obtain
Γb⊢c1[b/x](c2[b/x]) : (d2[b/x])[c2[b/x]/y] (∗)
We can now argue as follows:
Γb ⊢ (c1 c2)[b/x]
= (definition of substitution)
(c1[b/x] c2[b/x])
: (using ∗)
(d2[b/x])[c2[b/x]/y]
= (Law 1(ii))
d2[c2/y][b/x]
def: We have c = [y
.
=c1, c2 : c3] and d = [y!d1]c3 for some y, c1, c2, c3, and
d1 where Γa⊢c1 : d1, Γa⊢c2 : c3[c1/y], and (Γa, y : d1)⊢c3 : d3 for some
d3. We need to show that Γb ⊢ c[b/x] : d[b/x]. In order to apply rule
def, we need to show its premises:
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• By inductive hypothesis we have Γb⊢c1[b/x] : d1[b/x].
• We have
Γb ⊢ c2[b/x]
: (inductive hypothesis)
c3[c1/y][b/x]
= (by Law 1(ii), since y /∈ FV (b))
c3[b/x][c1[b/x]/y]
• By inductive hypothesis (Γb, y : d1[b/x])⊢c3[b/x] : d3[b/x].
Hence we may apply rule def to obtain
Γb⊢ [y
.
=c1[b/x], c2[b/x] : c3[b/x]] : [y!d1[b/x]](c3[b/x])
which by def. of substitution is equivalent to Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x].
chI : We have c = c1.1 and Γa ⊢ c1 : [y!d]d2 for some y, c1, and d2. By in-
ductive hypothesis and definition of substitution we obtain Γb⊢c1[b/x] :
[y!d[b/x]](d2[b/x]). By law chI we can infer that Γb⊢(c1.1)[b/x] : d[b/x].
chB : We have c = c1.2 and d = d2[c1.1/y] for some y, c1, and d2 where
Γa ⊢ c1 : [y!d1]d2 for some d1. Obviously we may assume x 6= y. By
inductive hypothesis and definition of substitution we obtain
Γb⊢c1[b/x] : [y!d1[b/x]](d2[b/x]) (∗)
We can argue as follows:
Γb ⊢ (c1.2)[b/x]
= (definition of substitution)
(c1[b/x]).2
: (typing rule chB using ∗)
d2[b/x][(c1[b/x]).1/y]
= (definition of substitution)
d2[b/x][c1.1[b/x])/y]
= (Law 1(ii))
d2[c1.1/y][b/x]
prd: We have c = [c1, c2] and d = [d1, d2] for some c1, c2, d1, and d2 where
Γa ⊢ c1 : d1 and Γa ⊢ c2 : d2. By inductive hypothesis Γb ⊢ c1[b/x] :
d1[b/x] and Γb ⊢ c2[b/x] : d2[b/x]. Hence by definition of substitution
and by typing rule prd we know that Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x].
sum: Similar to case prd.
76
prL: We have c = c1.1 where Γa⊢c1 : [d, d1] for some c1 and d1. By inductive
hypothesis and definition of substitution Γb ⊢ c1[b/x] : [d[b/x], d1[b/x]].
Hence by definition of substitution and by typing rule prL we know that
Γb⊢(c1.1)[b/x] : d[b/x].
prR: Similar to case prL.
injL: We have c = [c1, : d2] and d = [d1 + d2] for some c1, d1, and d2 where
Γa ⊢ c1 : d1 and Γa ⊢ d2 : e2 for some e2. By inductive hypothesis
Γb ⊢ c1[b/x] : d1[b/x] and Γb ⊢ d2[b/x] : e2[b/x]. Hence by definition of
substitution and by typing rule injL we know that Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x].
injR: Similar to case injL.
case: We have c = [c1 ? c2] and d = [y : [d1 + d2]]e for some c1, c2, y, d1, d2,
and e where Γa⊢c1 : [y : d1]e, Γa⊢c2 : [y : d2]e, and Γa⊢e : f for some
f .
By inductive hypothesis and definition of substitution we obtain Γb ⊢
c1[b/x] : [y : d1[b/x]]e[b/x]. Similarly, Γb ⊢ c2[b/x] : [y : d2[b/x]]e[b/x],
and Γa⊢d[b/x]. This implies Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x].
neg: We have c = ¬c1 where Γa⊢c1 : d for some c1. By inductive hypothesis
we know that Γb ⊢ c1[b/x] : d[b/x]. Hence by definition of typing and
substitution Γb⊢c[b/x] : d[b/x].
Law 28 (Substitution and validity). Assume that Γa = (Γ1, x : a,Γ2) and
Γb = (Γ1, (Γ2[b/x])) for some Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b where Γ1 ⊢ b : a. For all c: Γa ⊢ c
implies Γb⊢c[b/x].
Proof. Assume that Γa ⊢ c : d for some d. Hence by Law 27 we know that
Γb⊢c[b/x] : e for some e. Hence Γb⊢c[b/x].
4.7 Closure properties of validity
We begin with the relatively straightforward property that validity is closed
against typing
Law 29 (Valid expressions have valid types). For all Γ, a, b: If Γ ⊢ a : b then
Γ⊢b.
Proof. By induction on the definition of Γ⊢a : b we show that Γ⊢a : b implies
Γ⊢b. We take a look at each typing rule:
ax: Trivial.
start: We have x = a and Γ = (Γ′, a : b) for some Γ′ where Γ′ ⊢ b : c for some
c. Hence we can apply rule weak to obtain Γ⊢b : c hence Γ⊢b.
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weak: We have Γ = (Γ′, x : c) for some Γ′, x, and c where Γ′⊢a : b and Γ′⊢c : d
for some d. By inductive hypothesis Γ′ ⊢ b. Hence we can apply rule
weak and the definition of validity to obtain Γ = (Γ′, x : c)⊢b.
conv: Obvious since Γ⊢b follows from the rules premise.
absU : We have a = [x : a1]a2 and b = [x : a1]b2 for some x, a1, a2, and
b2 where Γ, x : a1 ⊢ a2 : b2. By inductive hypothesis we know that
(Γ, x : a1)⊢b2 which implies Γ⊢b by definition of validity and typing.
absE : Similar to case absU .
appl: We have a = (a1 a2) and b = b2[a2/x] for some x, a1, a2, and b2 where
Γ ⊢ a1 : [x : b1]b2 for some b1 and Γ ⊢ a2 : b1. From the inductive
hypothesis we know that Γ ⊢ [x : b1]b2. By Law 26(i) this implies
Γ, x : b1⊢ b2. From Γ, x : b1⊢ b2, by validity substitution (Law 28, note
that Γ⊢a2 : b1) we can infer that Γ⊢b2[a2/x] = b.
def: We have a = [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] and b = [x!b1]a3 for some x, a1, a2,
a3, and b1 where Γ ⊢ a1 : b1 and (Γ, x : b1) ⊢ a3 : a4 for some a4. By
inductive hypothesis Γ⊢b1. Hence by typing law absE and the definition
of validity we obtain Γ⊢ b = [x!b1]a3 : [x : b1]a3 which is equivalent to
Γ⊢b.
chI : We have a = a1.1 where Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!b]b1 for some x, a1, and b1. By
inductive hypothesis we know that Γ⊢ [x!b]b1. By Law 26(i) this implies
Γ⊢b.
chB : We have a = a1.2 and b = b2[a1.1/x] for some x, a1, and b2 where
Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!b1]b2 for some b1. By inductive hypothesis we know that
Γ ⊢ [x!b1]b2. By Law 26(i) this implies Γ, x : b1 ⊢ b2. By definition of
typing we have Γ⊢a1.1 : b1. From Γ, x : b1⊢b2, by validity substitution
(Law 28, note that Γ⊢a1.1 : b1) we know that Γ⊢b = b2[a1.1/x].
prd: We have a = [a1, a2] and b = [b1, b2] for some a1, a2, b1, and b2 where
Γ⊢a1 : b1 and Γ⊢a2 : b2. By inductive hypothesis we know that Γ⊢ b1
and Γ⊢b2. Hence Γ⊢b.
sum: Similar to case prd.
prL: We have a = a1.1 where Γ⊢a1 : [b, b2] for some a1 and b2. By inductive
hypothesis we know that Γ⊢ [b, b2]. By Law 26(ii) this implies Γ⊢b.
prR: Similar to case prL.
injL: Similar to case prd.
injR: Similar to case prd.
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case: We have a = [a1 ? a2] and b = [x : [b1+ b2]]b3 for some a1, a2, b1, b2 and
b3 where Γ⊢ a1 : [x : b1]b3, Γ⊢ a2 : [x : b1]b3, and Γ⊢ b3. By inductive
hypothesis Γ⊢ [x : b1]b3 and Γ⊢ [x : b2]b3 hence by Law 26(i) we know
that Γ ⊢ b1] and Γ ⊢ b2. By definition of typing and validity it follows
that Γ⊢b = [x : [b1 + b2]]b3
neg: This case follows directly from the inductive hypothesis and the defini-
tion of typing.
Next we show an auxiliary result about the closure of typing against valid equiv-
alent substitutions in the typing context.
Law 30 (Context equivalence and typing). Let Γa = (Γ1, x : a,Γ2) and Γb =
(Γ1, x : b,Γ2) for some Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b where a =λ b and Γ1 ⊢ b: For all c, d: If
Γa⊢c : d then Γb⊢c : d.
Proof. Let Γa and Γb where a =λ b and Γ1⊢b as defined above : The property
is shown by induction on the definition of (Γ1, x : a,Γ2)⊢ c : d. We take a look
at each typing rule:
ax: Trivial since Γa = () is impossible.
start: We have Γa = (Γ1, x : a,Γ2) = (Γ3, y : d) for some y and Γ3 where
Γ3⊢d. There are two cases:
• If x = y then Γa ⊢ x : a, i.e. c = x, d = a, Γ2 = (), Γ1 = Γ3, and
Γ1 ⊢ a. Since Γ1 ⊢ b, by rule weak it follows that (Γ1, x : b) ⊢ a.
By rule start we obtain (Γ1, x : b) ⊢ x : b. Hence by rule conv it
follows that (Γ1, x : b)⊢x : a. This can be graphically illustrated
as follows:
conv
start
Γ1⊢b
Γ1, x : b ⊢ x : b b =λ a
weak
Γ1⊢a Γ1⊢b
Γ1, x : b⊢a
Γ1, x : b ⊢ x : a
• If x 6= y and then we have Γa(y) = Γb(y) = d which implies the
proposition.
weak: We have Γa = (Γ1, x : a,Γ2) = (Γ3, y : e) for some y and Γ3 where
Γ3⊢c : d and Γ3⊢e. There are two cases:
• If x = y then Γ2 = (), e = a, and Γ1 = Γ3. From Γ1 ⊢ c : d and
Γ1⊢b by rule weak it follows that Γb = (Γ1, x : b)⊢c : d.
• If x 6= y then Γ2 = (Γ4, y : e) for some Γ4. Hence Γ3 = (Γ1, x :
a,Γ4). By inductive hypothesis (Γ1, x : b,Γ4) ⊢ c : d. Similarly
by inductive hypothesis (Γ1, x : b,Γ4) ⊢ e. Hence, by rule weak it
follows that Γb = (Γ1, x : b,Γ2) = (Γ1, x : b,Γd, y : e)⊢c : d.
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conv: We have Γa⊢c : d1 for some d1 where d1 =λ d and Γa⊢d. By inductive
hypothesis Γb⊢ c : d1 and Γb ⊢d. Hence, since d1 =λ d by rule conv we
obtain Γb⊢c : d.
absU : We have c = [y : c1]c2 and d = [y : c1]d2 for some y, c1, c2, and d2 where
(Γa, y : c1) ⊢ c2 : d2. Obviously, we may assume x 6= y. By inductive
hypothesis we obtain (Γb, y : c1)⊢c2 : d2. By typing rule absU we obtain
Γb⊢c = [y : c1]c2 : [y : c1]d2 = d.
absE : Similar to case absU .
appl: We have c = (c1 c2) and d = d2[c2/y] for some y, c1, c2, and d2 for some
x and d2 where Γa ⊢ c1 : [y : d1]d2 and Γa ⊢ c2 : d1 for some d1. By
inductive hypothesis Γb⊢c1 : [y : d1]d2 as well as Γb⊢c2 : d1. By typing
rule appl we obtain Γb⊢c : d.
def: We have c = [y
.
= c1, c2 : c3] and d = [y!d1]c3 for some y, c1, c2, c3,
and d1 where Γa ⊢ c1 : d1, Γa ⊢ c2 : c3[c1/y], and (Γa, y : d1) ⊢ c3.
Obviously, we may assume x 6= y. By inductive hypothesis Γb⊢ c1 : d1,
Γb ⊢ c2 : c3[c1/y], and (Γb, y : d1) ⊢ c3. By typing rule def we obtain
Γb⊢c : [y!d1]c3.
chI : We have c = c1.1 where Γa ⊢ c1 : [y!d]d1 for some y, c1, d1, and d. By
inductive hypothesis Γb ⊢ c1 : [y!d]d1. By typing rule chI we obtain
Γb⊢c = c1.1 : d.
chB : We have c = c1.2 and d = d2[c1.1/y] for some y, c1, and d2 where
Γa ⊢ c1 : [y!d1]d2 for some d1. Obviously, we may assume x 6= y. By
inductive hypothesis Γb ⊢ c1 : [y!d1]d2. By typing rule chI we obtain
Γb⊢c = c1.2 : d2[c1.1/y] = d.
prd: We have c = [c1, c2] and d = [d1, d2] for some c1, c2, d1, and d2 where
Γa ⊢ c1 : d1 and Γa ⊢ c2 : d2. By inductive hypothesis Γb ⊢ c1 : d1 and
Γb ⊢ c2 : d2 which by typing rule prd implies that Γb ⊢ c = [c1, c2] :
[d1, d2] = d.
sum: Similar to case prd.
prL: We have c = c1.1 where Γa⊢c1 : [d, d2] for some c1 and d2. By inductive
hypothesis Γb⊢c1 : [d, d2]. By typing rule prL we obtain Γb⊢c = c.1 : d.
prR: Similar to case prL.
injL: Similar to case prd.
injR: Similar to case prd.
case: We have c = [c1 ? c2] and d = [y : [d1 + d2]]e for some c1, c2, y, d1,
d2, and e where Γa ⊢ c1 : [y : d1]e, Γa ⊢ c2 : [y : d2]e, and Γa ⊢ e. By
inductive hypothesis Γb ⊢ c1 : [y : d1]e, Γb⊢ c2 : [y : d2]e, and Γb⊢e. By
typing rule case we obtain Γb⊢c = [c1 ? c2] : d.
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neg: We have c = ¬c1 and Γa ⊢ c1 : d for some c1. By inductive hypothesis
Γb⊢c1 : d. By typing rule neg we obtain Γb⊢c = ¬c1 : d.
We can now show the preservation of types under a reduction step.
Law 31 (Preservation of types under reduction step). For all Γ, a, b, c: Γ⊢a : c
and a→ b imply Γ⊢b : c.
Proof. Proof by induction on the definition of a → b. We take a look at each
axiom and structural rule of reduction. Note that in all cases, by Law 29, we
have Γ ⊢ c. This means that in order to show Γ⊢ b : c, it is sufficient to show
Γ⊢b : b1 for some b1 where b1 =λ c. Γ⊢b : c then follows by applying rule conv.
β1: We have a = ([x : a1]a2)(a3) and b = a2[a3/x] and Γ ⊢ ([x :
a1]a2)(a3) : c where Γ ⊢ a3 : a1. The following typings can be
derived:
Γ⊢([x : a1]a2 a3) : c
⇒ (Law 25(vii))
Γ⊢ [x : a1]a2 : [x : d]e where c =λ e[a3/x], Γ⊢a3 : d
⇒ (Law 25(i))
(Γ, x : a1)⊢a2 : b2 where [x : d]e =λ [x : a1]b2
⇒ (Law 27, since Γ⊢a3 : a1)
Γ⊢a2[a3/x] : b2[a3/x]
The following equivalences can be derived. From [x : d]e =λ [x :
a1]b2, by Law 21(i) it follows that e =λ b2. We can now argue as
follows:
b2[a3/x]
=λ (by Law 20(i) since e =λ b2)
e[a3/x]
=λ (by Law 25(vii) since Γ⊢([x : a1]a2 a3) : c)
c
Therefore we can apply rule conv to derive Γ⊢ b = a2[a3/x] : c.
This can be graphically illustrated as follows:
conv
Γ⊢a2[a3/x] : b2[a3/x] b2[a3/x] =λ c Γ⊢c
Γ ⊢ a2[a3/x] : c
β2: The proof of this case is similar to the case β1.
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β3: In this case we have a = ([a1 ? a2] [a3, : a4]), b = (a1 a3), and
Γ ⊢ ([a1 ? a2] [a3, : a4]) : c. From the latter, by Law 25(xi) we
know that c =λ d for some d where Γ⊢ d and Γ⊢ a1 : [x : c1]d,
Γ⊢a2 : [x : c2]d, and Γ⊢ [a3, :a4] : [c1 + a4] for some c1 and c2.
From Γ ⊢ [a3, : a4] : [c1 + a4], by Law 25(iii) we know that Γ ⊢
a3 : c1. Hence from Γ ⊢ a1 : [x : c1]d, by rule appl we obtain
Γ ⊢ (a1 a3) : d[a3/x]. Since x /∈ FV (d) this is equivalent to
Γ⊢(a1 a3) : d. Since d =λ c and Γ⊢c, by rule conv we can derive
Γ⊢b = (a1 a3) : c.
β4: The proof of this case is similar to the case β3.
π1: We have a = [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3].1, b = a1, and Γ ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 :
a3].1 : c. From the latter, by Law 25(viii) we know that c =λ b1
for some b1 where Γ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] : [x!b1]b2 for some b2 (the
case Γ ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] : [b1, b2] is obviously impossible). By
Law 25(x) this implies that [x!b1]b2 =λ [x!d]a3 for some d where
Γ ⊢ a1 : d. By basic properties of congruence (Law 21(i)) we
know that b1 =λ d.
Hence, since Γ⊢a1 : d, d =λ b1 =λ c, and Γ⊢c we can apply rule
conv to obtain Γ⊢b = a1 : c
π2: We have a = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a3].2, b = a2, and Γ⊢ [x
.
=a1, a2 : a3].2 :
c. From the latter, by Law 25(ix) we know that c =λ b2[a2/x]
for some b2 where Γ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] : [x!b1]b2 for some b1 (the
case Γ ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] : [b1, b2] is obviously impossible). By
Law 25(x) this implies that [x!b1]b2 =λ [x!d]a3 for some d where
Γ⊢a2 : a3[a1/x].
By basic properties of congruence (Law 21(i)) we have b2 =λ a3.
Hence by Law 20(i) we know that b2[a2/x] =λ a3[a2/x].
Hence, since Γ ⊢ a2 : a3[a1/x], a3[a2/x] =λ b2[a2/x] =λ c, and
Γ⊢c we can apply rule conv to obtain Γ⊢b = a2 : c.
π3: We know that a = [a1, a2].1 and b = a1 where Γ⊢ [a1, a2].1 : c. By
Law 25(viii) we know that c =λ b1 for some b1 where Γ⊢ [a1, a2] :
[b1, b2] for some b2 (the case Γ ⊢ [a1, a2] : [x!b1]b2 is obviously
impossible). By Law 25(iv) this implies that [b1, b2] =λ [d1, d2]
for some d1, d2 where Γ ⊢ a1 : d1 and Γ ⊢ a2 : d2. By basic
properties of congruence (Law 21(ii)) we know that b1 =λ d1.
Hence, since Γ⊢ a1 : d1, d1 =λ b1 =λ c, and Γ⊢ c we can apply
rule conv to obtain Γ⊢a1 : c
π4, π5, π6: Similar to case π3.
ν1: We have a = ¬¬a1 and b = a1 and Γ⊢¬¬a1 : c. By Law 25(v)
(applied twice) we know that c =λ c1 for some c1 where Γ⊢a1 :
c1. Hence we can apply rule conv to infer that Γ⊢b = a1 : c.
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ν2: We have a = ¬[a1, a2], b = [¬a1 + ¬a2], and Γ⊢¬[a1, a2] : c. By
Law 25(v,iv) we know that c =λ [c1, c2] where Γ ⊢ a1 : c1 and
Γ ⊢ a2 : c2. Hence Γ ⊢ ¬a1 : c1 and Γ ⊢ ¬a2 : c2 and therefore
Γ⊢ [¬a1 + ¬a2] : [c1, c2]. Hence we can apply rule conv to infer
that Γ⊢b = [¬a1 + ¬a2] : c.
ν3: Similar (symmetric) to case ν3.
ν4: We have a = ¬[x : a1]a2, b = [x!a1]¬a2, and Γ⊢¬[x : a1]a2 : c.
By Law 25(v) we know that c =λ d for some d where Γ ⊢ [x :
a1]a2 : d. By rule conv we obtain Γ ⊢ [x : a1]a2 : c. From this,
by Law 25(i) we know that Γ ⊢ [x : a1]a2 : [x : a1]c2 for some
c2 where c =λ [x : a1]c2. Hence by Law 25(ii) we know that
(Γ, x : a1)⊢ a2 : c3 for some c3 where c2 =λ c3. Hence c =λ [x :
a1]c2 =λ [x : a1]c3. By definition of typing (Γ, x : a1)⊢¬a2 : c3
and therefore also Γ⊢ [x!a1]¬a2 : [x : a1]c3.
Hence, since [x : a1]c3 =λ [x : a1]c2 =λ c and Γ⊢ c we can apply
rule conv to infer that Γ⊢b = [x!a1]¬a2 : c.
ν5: Similar (symmetric) to case ν4.
ν6: We have a = ¬τ , b = τ , and Γ⊢¬τ : c. By Law 25(v) we know
that c =λ d where Γ ⊢ τ : d. Hence we can apply rule conv to
infer that Γ⊢b = τ : c.
ν7, . . . , ν10: Similar to case ν6.
⊕x( , )1: We have a = ⊕x(a1, a3), b = ⊕x(a2, a3) where a1 → a2, and
Γ ⊢ ⊕x(a1, a3) : c. By Law 25(i), c =λ [x : a1]c3 for some c3
where (Γ, x : a1)⊢a3 : c3. By Law 23 this implies that Γ⊢a1 and
therefore by inductive hypothesis we know that Γ⊢a2. Therefore
we can apply Law 30 which implies that (Γ, x : a2) ⊢ a3 : c3.
By definition of typing Γ ⊢ ⊕x(a2, a3) : [x : a2]c3. Since [x :
a2]c3 =λ c =λ [x : a1]c3, we can apply typing rule conv to derive
Γ⊢b = ⊕x(a2, a3) : c.
⊕x( , )2: We have a = ⊕x(a1, a2), b = ⊕x(a1, a3) where a2 → a3 and
Γ ⊢ ⊕x(a1, a2) : c. By Law 25(i), c =λ [x : a1]c2 for some c2
where (Γ, x : a1)⊢ a2 : c2. By inductive hypothesis, this implies
(Γ, x : a1) ⊢ a3 : c2 and hence by definition of typing we obtain
Γ ⊢⊕x(a1, a3) : [x : a1]c2. Since [x : a1]c2 =λ c, by typing rule
conv it follows that Γ⊢b = ⊕x(a1, a3) : c.
[x
.
= , : ]1: We have a = [x
.
=a1, a3 : a4], b = [x
.
=a2, a3 : a4] where a1 → a2,
and Γ⊢ [x
.
=a2, a3 : a4] : c. By Law 25(x), c =λ [x!c1]a4 for some
c1 where Γ ⊢ a1 : c1, Γ ⊢ a3 : a4[a1/x], and (Γ, x : c1) ⊢ a4. By
inductive hypothesis Γ ⊢ a2 : c1. From a1 → a2, by Law 2(ii)
it follows that a4[a1/x] =λ a4[a2/x]. From (Γ, x : c1) ⊢ a4 and
Γ⊢a2 : c1, by Law 27 it follows that (Γ, x : c1)⊢a4[a2/x].
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Hence from Γ ⊢ a3 : a4[a1/x], a4[a1/x] =λ a4[a2/x], and (Γ, x :
c1) ⊢ a4[a2/x], by rule conv it follows that Γ ⊢ a3 : a4[a2/x].
Therefore, by definition of typing Γ ⊢ [x
.
= a2, a3 : a4] : [x!c1]a4.
Since [x!c1]a4 =λ c, by typing rule conv it follows that Γ ⊢ b =
[x
.
=a2, a3 : a4] : c.
[x
.
= , : ]2: We have a = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a4], b = [x
.
=a1, a3 : a4] where a2 → a3,
and Γ ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a3 : a4] : c. By Law 25(x), c =λ [x!c1]a4 for
some c1 where Γ⊢ a1 : c1, Γ⊢ a2 : a4[a1/x], and (Γ, x : c1)⊢ a4.
By inductive hypothesis Γ⊢a3 : a4[a1/x] and hence by definition
of typing Γ ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a3 : a4] : [x!c1]a4. Since [x!c1]a4 =λ c, by
typing rule conv it follows that Γ⊢b = [x
.
=a1, a3 : a4] : c.
[x
.
= , : ]3: We have a = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a3], b = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a4] where a3 → a4,
and Γ⊢ [x
.
=a1, a2 : a3] : c. By Law 25(x), c =λ [x!c1]a3 for some
c1 where Γ ⊢ a1 : c1, Γ ⊢ a2 : a3[a1/x], and (Γ, x : c1) ⊢ a3. By
inductive hypothesis (Γ, x : c1)⊢a4.
Since Γ ⊢ a1 : c1, by Law 27 we know that Γ ⊢ a4[a1/x]. By
Law 2(i) we have a3[a1/x] →∗ a4[a1/x] hence, from Γ ⊢ a2 :
a3[a1/x] we can apply typing rule conv to infer that Γ ⊢ a2 :
a4[a1/x]. Therefore, by definition of typing Γ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a4] :
[x!c1]a4. Since [x!c1]a4 =λ [x!c1]a3 =λ c, by typing rule conv it
follows that Γ⊢b = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a4] : c.
( )1: We have a = (a1 a3), b = (a2 a3) where a1 → a2. By 25(vii),
c =λ c2[a3/x] for some c2 where Γ⊢a : c2[a3/x], Γ⊢a1 : [x : c1]c2
for some c1, and Γ⊢a3 : c1. By inductive hypothesis Γ⊢a2 : [x :
c1]c2. Hence by definition of typing Γ⊢ (a2 a3) : c2[a3/x]. Since
c2[a3/x] =λ c, by typing rule conv it follows that Γ⊢b = (a2 a3) :
c.
( )2: a = (a1 a2) and b = (a1 a3) where a2 → a3. By Law 25(vii),
c =λ c2[a2/x] for some c2 where Γ⊢a : c2[a2/x], Γ⊢a1 : [x : c1]c2
for some c1, and Γ⊢a2 : c1. By inductive hypothesis Γ⊢a3 : c1.
Hence by definition of typing Γ⊢(a1 a3) : c2[a3/x].
By Law 2(ii) we know that c2[a2/x] =λ c2[a3/x]. Therefore
c2[a3/x] =λ c2[a2/x] =λ c and by typing rule conv it follows that
Γ⊢b = (a1, a3) : c.
( .1)1: We have a = a1.1 and b = a2.1 where a1 → a2. By Law 25(viii),
c =λ c1 for some c1 where either Γ⊢a1 : [x!c1]c2 or Γ⊢a1 : [c1, c2],
for some c2.
In the first case, by inductive hypothesis we know that Γ⊢ a2 :
[x!c1]c2. In the second case, by inductive hypothesis we know
that Γ ⊢ a2 : [c1, c2]. In both cases, by definition of typing Γ ⊢
a2.1 : c1. Since c1 =λ c, by typing rule conv it follows that
Γ⊢b = a2.1 : c.
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( .2)1: We have a = a1.2 and b = a2.2 where a1 → a2.
By Law 25(ix), for some c1, c2 either c =λ c2[a1.1/x] and Γ⊢a1 :
[x!c1]c2 or c =λ c2 and Γ⊢a1 : [c1, c2].
In the first case, by inductive hypothesis we know that Γ⊢ a2 :
[x!c1]c2. Hence, by definition of typing Γ ⊢ a2.2 : c2[a2.1/x].
By Law 2(ii) we know that c2[a1.1/x] =λ c2[a2.1/x]. Since
c2[a2.1/x] =λ c, by typing rule conv it follows that Γ ⊢ b =
a2.2 : c.
In the second case, by inductive hypothesis we know that Γ⊢a2 :
[c1, c2]. By definition of typing Γ ⊢ a2.2 : c2. Since c2 =λ c, by
typing rule conv it follows that Γ⊢b = a2.2 : c.
[ , ]1: We have a = [a1, a3] and b = [a2, a3] where a1 → a2. By
Law 25(iv) we know that c =λ [c1, c3] for some c1, c3 where
Γ ⊢ a1 : c1 and Γ ⊢ a3 : c3. By inductive hypothesis we know
that Γ ⊢ a2 : c1 hence by definition of typing Γ ⊢: [c1, c3]. Since
[c1, c3] =λ c by typing rule conv it follows that Γ⊢b = [a2, a3] : c.
[ , ]2: Similar to case [ , ]1.
[ + ]i: i = 1, 2, similar to case [ , ]1.
[ , : ]1: Similar to case [ , ]1 using Law 25(iii) instead.
[ , : ]2: We have a = [a1, : a2] and b = [a1, : a3] where a2 → a3. By
Law 25(iii) we know that c =λ [c1 + a2] for some c1 where Γ⊢
a1 : c1 and Γ⊢a2.
By inductive hypothesis we know that Γ⊢a3. Hence by definition
of typing Γ ⊢ [a1, : a3] : [c1 + a3]. Since obviously [c1 + a3] =λ
[c1+a2] we have [c1+a3] =λ c and by typing rule conv it follows
that Γ⊢b = [a1, :a3] : c.
[: , ]i: Similar to case [ , : ]i, i = 1, 2.
[ ? ]1: We have a = [a1 ? a3], b = [a2 ? a3] where a1 → a2. By Law 25
(xi) we know that c =λ [x : [c1 + c3]]c4 for some c1, c3, c4 where
Γ ⊢ a1 : [x : c1]c4, Γ ⊢ a3 : [x : c3]c4, and Γ ⊢ c4. By inductive
hypothesis it follows that Γ⊢a2 : [x : c1]c4. Hence by definition
of typing Γ⊢ [a2 ? a3] : [x : [c1+ c3]]c4. Since [x : [c1+ c3]]c4 =λ c
by typing rule conv it follows that Γ⊢b = [a2 ? a3] : c.
[ ? ]2: Similar to case ([ ? ] )1.
(¬ )1: We have a = ¬a1 and b = ¬a2 where a1 → a2. By Law 25(v),
we know that c =λ d for some d where Γ⊢ a1 : d. By inductive
hypothesis we know that Γ⊢a2 : d hence by definition of typing
Γ ⊢ ¬a2 : d Since d =λ c by typing rule conv it follows that
Γ⊢b = ¬a2 : c.
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A simple inductive argument extends this property to general reduction. This
property is often referred to as subject reduction.
Law 32 (Subject reduction: Types are preserved under reduction). For all
Γ, a, b, c: a→∗ b and Γ⊢a : c imply that Γ⊢b : c.
Proof. Proof by induction on the number of reduction steps in a→n b.
• n = 0: We have a = b, and hence the proposition trivially holds.
• n > 0: We have a → a′ →n−1 b for some a
′. By Law 31 (preservation of
type under single reduction step) we know that Γ ⊢ a′ : c. By inductive
hypothesis we know that Γ⊢b : c.
Subject reduction can be reformulated using the validity notation without types.
Law 33 (Valid expressions are closed against reduction). For all Γ, a, b: Γ⊢ a
and a→∗ b implies Γ⊢b
Proof. Direct consequence of Law 32.
A straightforward argument leads to a closure result of validity w.r.t. context
reduction.
Law 34 (Validity is closed against context reduction). For all Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b, c:
If (Γ1, x : b,Γ2)⊢a and b→∗ c then (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a
Proof. From (Γ1, x : b,Γ2) ⊢ a by repeated application of the typing rule for
universal abstraction we can infer (Γ1, x : b)⊢ [Γ2]a. By Law 23, it follows that
Γ⊢b. By Law 33 we know that Γ1⊢c. Obviously b =λ c and hence Law 30 can
be applied which implies (Γ1, x : c)⊢ [Γ2]a. By repeated application of Law 26(i)
we obtain (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a.
We conclude this section with a conjecture about type hierarchies.
Remark (Conjecture about bounded type hierarchy). Repeated application of
Law 29 allows for constructing an infinite sequence of typings. However, we
believe that this typing sequence eventually terminates, in the sense that at
some point the type is congruent to the expression. We do not present a detailed
proof of this property, the idea is to define a type-height of a valid expression,
e.g. with τ having type-height 0 and [x : τ ]x having type-height 1 and so on, and
to show several properties related to type-height most importantly that typing
decreases the type-height and typing of an expression with type-height 0 leads
to a congruent expression.
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4.8 Uniqueness of types
Before we show uniqueness of types, we need a property about the effect of
removing unnecessary variables from a context.
Law 35 (Context contraction). For all Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b, c: (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a : b and
x /∈ FV ([Γ2]a) implies (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a : b′ and b→∗ b′ for some b′.
Note that in this lemma x /∈ FV ([Γ2]a) does not necessarily imply x /∈
FV ([Γ2]b), for example take x : τ ⊢ τ : ([y : τ ]τ x), and hence the reduction of
the type to some expression where x is not free, in the example ([y : τ ]τ x)→∗ τ ,
is necessary.
Proof. Proof by induction on the definition of (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a : b. We look at
each of the typing rules in turn:
ax: Trivial since the axiom is not applicable.
start: We have Γ, y : c1⊢y : c1 for some Γ, y, and c1 where Γ⊢c1 : d for some
d. This means (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) = (Γ, y : c1), y = a, and c1 = b.
If Γ2 = () then x = y and c1 = c. Obviously x ∈ FV (a) which
contradicts the assumption.
If Γ2 6= () then obviously Γ2 = (Γ3, y : c1) for some Γ3 and y 6= x and
(Γ1, x : c,Γ3) ⊢ c1 : d. Assume that x /∈ FV ([Γ2]y). Hence obviously
x /∈ FV ([Γ3]c1). By inductive hypothesis we know that (Γ1,Γ3)⊢c1 : d′
for some d′ (with d→∗ d′). By rule start we obtain (Γ1,Γ3, y : c1)⊢y : c1
which is the same as (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a : b. This can be graphically illustrated
as follows:
start
I.H.
Γ1, x : c,Γ3 ⊢ c1 : d
Γ1,Γ3 ⊢ c1 : d
′
Γ1,Γ3, y : c1 ⊢ y : c1
weak: We have Γ, y : c1⊢a : b for some Γ, y, and c1 where Γ⊢c1 : d, for some
d, and Γ⊢a : b. This means (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) = (Γ, y : c1).
If Γ2 = () then Γ = Γ1, y = x, and c1 = c. The proposition follows
(with b′ = b) since Γ⊢a : b is the same as (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a : b.
If Γ2 6= () then obviously Γ2 = (Γ3, y : c1) for some Γ3 where Γ =
(Γ1, x : c,Γ3). This means we know that (Γ1, x : c,Γ3) ⊢ a : b and
(Γ1, x : c,Γ3) ⊢ c1 : d. Assume that x /∈ FV ([Γ2]a). Hence obviously
x /∈ FV ([Γ3]c1). By inductive hypothesis (Γ1,Γ3) ⊢ a : b′ for some b′
where b →∗ b′. By inductive hypothesis we also know that (Γ1,Γ3) ⊢
c1 : d
′ for some d′ (with d →∗ d′). Hence by rule weak we obtain
(Γ1,Γ3, y : c1) ⊢ a : b′ which is equivalent to (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ a : b′. This can
be graphically illustrated as follows:
weak
I.H.
Γ1, x : c,Γ3 ⊢ a : b
Γ1,Γ3 ⊢ a : b
′
I.H.
Γ1, x : c,Γ3 ⊢ c1 : d
Γ1,Γ3 ⊢ c1 : d
′
Γ1,Γ3, y : c1 ⊢ a : b
′
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conv: We have Γ⊢a : b where Γ⊢a : b1 for some b1 where b1 =λ b and Γ⊢ b.
This means Γ = (Γ1, x : c,Γ2).
Assume that x /∈ FV ([Γ2]a). By inductive hypothesis there is a b
′
1 with
b1 →∗ b′1 and (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ a : b
′
1. Since b1 =λ b, by Law 17 we know that
b1 →∗ b2 and b →∗ b2 for some b2. Since b1 →∗ b′1 and b1 →
∗ b2, by
Law 17 we know that b2 →∗ b′ and b′1 →
∗ b′ for some b′. Obviously
b→∗ b′. We have to show (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a : b′.
From (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a : b′1, by Law 29 we know that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ b
′
1. Since
b′1 →
∗ b′, by Law 33 we know that (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ b′. Since b′1 =λ b
′ we can
apply rule conv to infer that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a : b′. This can be graphically
illustrated as follows:
conv
I.H.
Γ1, x : c,Γ2⊢a : b
Γ1,Γ2⊢a : b
′
1 b
′
1 =λ b
′
33
29
I.H.
Γ1, x : c,Γ2⊢a : b
Γ1,Γ2⊢a : b
′
1
Γ1,Γ2⊢b
′
1
Γ1,Γ2⊢b
′
Γ1,Γ2⊢a : b
′
absU : We have a = [y : a1]a2 , b = [y : a1]b2 for some y, a1, a2, and b2 where
(Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a : b and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2, y : a1)⊢a2 : b2. Since x /∈ FV ([y :
a1]a2), we obviously have x /∈ FV (a2). By inductive hypothesis there is
a b′2 where (Γ1,Γ2, y : a1)⊢a2 : b
′
2 where b2 →
∗ b′2. Hence by definition
of typing (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ a : [y : a1]b′2. Since b →
∗ [y : a1]b
′
2, the proposition
follows with b′ = [y : a1]b
′
2.
absE : Analogous to case absU .
def: We have a = [y
.
=a1, a2 : a3], b = [y!b1]a3 for some y, a1, a2, a3, and b1
where (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a : b and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : b1, (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢
a2 : a3[a1/y], and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2, y : b1)⊢a3 : b3 for some b3.
Since x /∈ FV ([y
.
= a1, a2 : a3]) and y 6= x we know that x /∈ FV (a1) ∪
FV (a2) ∪ FV (a3). Hence by inductive hypothesis (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ a1 : b′1 for
some b′1 where b1 →
∗ b′1, (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a2 : a
′
3 for some a
′
3 where a3[a1/y]→
∗
a′3, and (Γ1,Γ2, y : b1)⊢a3 : b
′
3 for some b
′
3 where b3 →
∗ b′3.
By Law 34 we know that also (Γ1,Γ2, y : b
′
1)⊢ a3 : b
′
3. Since (Γ1,Γ2)⊢
a1 : b
′
1 we can apply Law 27 to infer Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ a3[a1/y] : b
′
3[a1/y]. Since
a′3 =λ a3[a1/x] we can apply typing rule conv to infer that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢
a2 : a3[a1/x]. By definition of typing this implies (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ [y
.
=a1, a2 :
a3] : [y!b
′
1]a3. Since [y!b1]a3 →
∗ [y!b′1]a3, the proposition follows with
b′ = [y!b′1]a3.
appl: We have a = (a1 a2), b = e[a2/y] for some y, a1, a2, and e where
(Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ (a1 a2) : e[a2/x] and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : [y : d]e and
(Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a2 : d for some d.
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Since x /∈ FV ((a1 a2)) we know that x /∈ FV (a1)∪FV (a2). By inductive
hypothesis (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : e′ for some e′ where [y : d]e →∗ e′ and
(Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a2 : d′ for some d′ where d →∗ d′. By Law 3(ii) we know
that e′ = [y : d1]e1 for some d1 ande1 where d →∗ d1 and e →∗ e1. By
Law 17 we therefore know that d′ →∗ d2 and d1 →
∗ d2 for some d2.
We need to show that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ (a1 a2) : e1[a2/x] which according to
rule appl requires to show that a1 has a type which matches the domain
of a2 (both under (Γ1,Γ2)).
By Law 29 we know that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ [y : d1]e1. By Law 33 we know
that also (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ [y : d2]e1. Since (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : e′ = [y : d1]e1,
we can apply rule conv to infer that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : [y : d2]e1. From
(Γ1,Γ2)⊢ [y : d2]e1 by Law 26(i) we know that (Γ1,Γ2)⊢d2. Hence we
can apply rule conv to infer that (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a2 : d2.
Hence by definition of typing (appl) we know that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ (a1 a2) :
e1[a2/x]. Since by Law 2(i) we have e[a2/x] →∗ e1[a2/x], the proposi-
tion follows with b′ = e1[a2/x] .
chI : We have a = a1.1 for some a1 where (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a.1 : b and (Γ1, x :
c,Γ2)⊢a : [y!b]d for some d. By inductive hypothesis we have (Γ1,Γ2)⊢
a : e for some e with [y!b]d→∗ e. By Law 3(ii) we know that e = [y!b′]d′
where b →∗ b′ and d →∗ d′. Hence by definition of typing (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢
a.2 : b′ which implies the proposition.
chB : We have a = a1.2, b = e[a1.1/y] for some y, a1, and e where (Γ1, x :
c,Γ2) ⊢ a1.2 : e[a1.1/y] and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : [y!d]e for some d.
By inductive hypothesis we have (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : f for some f with
[y!d]e→∗ f . By Law 3(ii) we know that f = [y!d′]e′ where d→∗ d′ and
e →∗ e′. Hence by definition of typing (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a1.2 : e′[a1.1/y] By
Law 2(i) we have e[a1.1/y]→∗ e′[a1.1/y] which implies the proposition
with b′ = e′[a1.1/y]
prd: We have a = [a1, a2], b = [b1, b2] for some a1, a2, b1 and b2 where
(Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢ [a1, a2] : [b1, b2] and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢ai : bi for i = 1, 2. By
inductive hypothesis there are b′i where (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ai : b
′
i and bi →
∗ b′i for
i = 1, 2. Hence (Γ1,Γ2)⊢ [a1, a2] : [b′1, b
′
2] and [b1, b2] →
∗ [b′1, b
′
2] which
implies the proposition with b′ = [b′1, b
′
2].
sum: Similar to case prd.
prL: We have a = a1.1 for some a1 where (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a.1 : b and (Γ1, x :
c,Γ2)⊢a : [b, d] for some d. By inductive hypothesis we have (Γ1,Γ2)⊢
a : e for some e with [b, d] →∗ e. By Law 3(i) we know that e = [b′, d′]
for some b′ and d′ where b →∗ b′ and d →∗ d′. Hence by definition of
typing (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a.1 : b
′ which implies the proposition.
prR: Similar to case prL.
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injL: We have a = [a1, : a2], b = [b1 + a2] for some a1, a2, and b1 where
(Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢ [a1, :a2] : [b1 + a2] and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a1 : b1 and (Γ1, x :
c,Γ2)⊢a2. By inductive hypothesis there is a b′1 where (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a1 : b
′
1
and b1 →∗ b′1 and we have (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a2. Hence (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ [a1, : a2] :
[b′1 + a2] where [b1, a2] →
∗ [b′1, a2] which implies the proposition with
b′ = [b′1, a2].
injR: Similar to case injL.
case: We have a = [a1 ? a2], b = [y : [b1 + b2]]d for some a1, a2, y, b1, b2, and
d where (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢ [a1 ? a2] : [y : [b1 + b2]]d, (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a1 : [y :
b1]d, (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢a2 : [y : b2]d, and (Γ1, x : c,Γ2)⊢d.
By inductive hypothesis we have (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : e1 for some e1 where
[y : b1]d →∗ e1 and (Γ1,Γ2)⊢a2 : e2 for some e2 where [y : b2]d →∗ e2.
By Law 3(ii) we know that e1 = [y : b
′
1]d1 for some b
′
1, d1 where b1 →
∗ b′1
and d →∗ d1 and similarly that e2 = [y : b′2]d2 for some b
′
2, d2 where
b2 →∗ b′2 and d→
∗ d2.
By Law 29 we know that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ [y : b′1]d1 and (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ [y : b
′
2]d2.
By Law 17 we know that d1 →∗ d′ and d2 →∗ d′ for some d′. By
Law 33 we know that (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ [x : b′1]d
′ and (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ [x : b′2]d
′. By
definition of typing this implies (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ [a1 ? a2] : [y : [b
′
1 + b
′
2]]d
′.
Since [y : [b1+b2]]d→∗ [y : [b′1+b
′
2]]d
′ thus implies the proposition with
b′ = [y : [b′1 + b
′
2]]d
′.
neg: We have a = ¬a1 for some a1 where (Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ ¬a1 : b and
(Γ1, x : c,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : b. By inductive hypothesis (Γ1,Γ2) ⊢ a1 : b′ where
b →∗ b′. Hence by definition of typing (Γ1,Γ2)⊢¬a1 : b′ which implies
the proposition.
We can now show uniqueness of types. Most cases are straightforward, except
for the weakening rule where we need the context contraction result above.
Law 36 (Uniqueness of types). For all Γ, a, b, c: Γ⊢ a : b and Γ⊢ a : c implies
b =λ c.
Remark (Sketch of proof). Using induction on the definition of Γ ⊢ a : b, the
property is relatively straightforward since, except for the rules weak and conv,
there is exactly one typing rule for each construct.
Proof. Proof by induction on the definition of Γ⊢a : b. We look at each typing
rule of Γ⊢a : b in turn. In each case we have to show that if also Γ⊢a : c then
b =λ c.
ax: This means a = b = τ and Γ = (). Let⊢ τ : c. By Law 25(vi) we know
that c =λ τ hence b =λ c.
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start: We have a = x, Γ = (Γ′, x : b) for some Γ′ and x where (Γ′, x : b)⊢x : b
and Γ′⊢b : d for some d: Let (Γ′, x : b)⊢x : c. By Law 24 we know that
b =λ c.
weak: We have Γ = (Γ′, x : d) for some Γ′ and x where (Γ′, x : d) ⊢ a : b,
Γ′ ⊢ a : b, and Γ′ ⊢ d : e for some e. Let (Γ′, x : d) ⊢ a : c. Since
x /∈ FV (a), by Law 35 we know that Γ′⊢a : c′ for some c′ with c→∗ c′.
By inductive hypothesis b =λ c
′ which implies b =λ c.
conv: We have Γ⊢ a : b and Γ⊢ a : d for some d where d =λ b. Let Γ⊢ a : c.
By inductive hypothesis b =λ d =λ c.
absU : We have a = [x : a1]a2 and b = [x : a1]b2 for some x, a1, a2, and b2 where
Γ⊢ [x : a1]a2 : [y : a1]b2 and (Γ, y : a1)⊢ a2 : b2. Let Γ⊢ [x : a1]a2 : c.
By Law 25(i) we know that c =λ [x : a1]c2 for some c2 where Γ⊢a1 and
(Γ, x : a1)⊢a2 : c2. By inductive hypothesis applied on (Γ, x : a1)⊢a2 :
b2 we obtain b2 =λ c2. Hence b = [x : a1]b2 =λ [x : a1]c2 = c .
absE : Similar to case absU .
appl: We have a = (a1 a2) and b = b2[a2/x] for some x, a1, a2, and b2 where
Γ⊢a1(a2) : b2[a2/x], Γ⊢a1 : [x : b1]b2, and Γ⊢a2 : b1. Let Γ⊢(a1 a2) : c.
By Law 25(vii) we know that c =λ c2[a2/y] for some c1, c2 where
Γ ⊢ a1 : [y : c1]c2 and Γ ⊢ a2 : c1. By inductive hypothesis applied to
Γ⊢a1 : [x : b1]b2 it follows that [x : b1]b2 =λ [y : c1]c2. Hence obviously
x = y and by basic properties of congruence (Law 21(i)) it follows that
b2 =λ c2. Using Law 20(i) we can argue b =λ b2[a2/x] =λ c2[a2/y] =λ c.
def: We have a = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a3] and b = [x!b1]a3 for some x, a1, a2, a3, and
b1 where Γ⊢ [x
.
=a1, a2 : a3] : [x!b1]a3, Γ⊢a1 : b1, Γ⊢a2 : a3[a1/x], and
(Γ, x : b1)⊢ a3. Let Γ⊢ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] : c. By Law 25(x) we can infer
that c =λ [x!c1]a3 for some c1 where Γ ⊢ a1 : c1 and Γ ⊢ a2 : a3[a1/x].
By inductive hypothesis applied to Γ⊢ a1 : b1 we know that b1 =λ c1.
Using Law 21(i) we can argue b = [x!b1]a3 =λ [x!c1]a3 =λ c.
chI : We have a = a1.1 for some a1 where Γ⊢a1.1 : b and Γ⊢a1 : [x!b]b2 for
some x and b2. Let Γ⊢a1.1 : c. By Law 25(viii) we know that c =λ c1
where either Γ⊢a1 : [x!c1]c2 or Γ⊢a1 : [c1, c2] for some c1 and c2.
The case Γ ⊢ a1 : [c1, c2] is not possible since the inductive hypothe-
sis applied to Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!b]b2 would imply [x!b]b2 =λ [c1, c2] which is
obviously false.
Therefore we are left with the case Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!c1]c2. By inductive
hypothesis applied to Γ⊢ a1 : [x!b]b2 we know that [x!b]b2 =λ [x!c1]c2.
Using elementary properties of congruence (Law 21(i)) we can argue
b =λ c1 =λ c.
chB : We have a = a1.2 and b = b2[a1.1/x] for some a1, x, and b2 where
Γ⊢a1.2 : b2[a1.1/x] and Γ⊢a1 : [x!b1]b2. Let Γ⊢a1.2 : c. By Law 25(ix)
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we know that either c =λ c2[a1.1/x] for some c2 where Γ⊢a1 : [x!c1]c2
for some c1 or c =λ [c1, c2] for some c1, c2 where Γ⊢a1 : [c1, c2].
The case Γ ⊢ a1 : [c1, c2] is not possible since the inductive hypothesis
applied to Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!b1]b2 would imply [x!b2]b2 =λ [c1, c2] which is
obviously false.
Therefore we are left with the case Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!c1]c2. By inductive
hypothesis applied to Γ⊢a1 : [x!b1]b2 we know that [x!b1]b2 =λ [x!c1]c2.
By elementary properties of congruence (Law 21(i))we obtain b2 =λ c2.
Using elementary properties of congruence (Law 20(i)) we can argue
b = b2[a1.1/x] =λ c2[a1.1/x] =λ c.
prd: We have a = [a1, a2] and b = [b1, b2] for some a1, a2, b1, and b2 where
Γ⊢ [a1, a2] : [b1, b2], Γ⊢ a1 : b1, and Γ⊢ a2 : b2. Let Γ⊢ [a1, a2] : c. By
Law 25(iv) we know that c =λ [c1, c2] for some c1, c2 where Γ⊢a1 : c1
and Γ ⊢ a2 : c2. By inductive hypothesis applied to Γ ⊢ a1 : b1 and
Γ⊢a2 : b2 we obtain b1 =λ c1 and b2 =λ c2. Using elementary properties
of congruence (Law 21(ii)) we can argue b = [b1, b2] =λ [c1, c2] =λ c.
sum: Similar to case prd.
prL: We have a = a1.1 for some a1 where Γ⊢ a1.1 : b and Γ⊢ a1 : [b, b2] for
some x and b2. Let Γ⊢a1.1 : c. By Law 25(viii) we know that c =λ c1
where Γ⊢a1 : [x!c1]c2 or Γ⊢a1 : [c1, c2] for some c1 and c2.
The case Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!c1]c2 is not possible since the inductive hypoth-
esis applied to Γ ⊢ a1 : [b, b2] would imply [b, c2] =λ [x!c1]c2 which is
obviously false.
Therefore we are left with the case Γ ⊢ a1 : [c1, c2]. By inductive
hypothesis applied to Γ ⊢ a1 : [b, b2] we know that [b, b2] =λ [c1, c2].
Using elementary properties of congruence (Law 21(ii)) we can argue
b =λ c1 =λ c.
prR: Similar to case prL.
injL: We have a = [a1, : a2] and b = [b1 + a2] for some a1, a2, and b1 where
Γ ⊢ [a1, : a2] : [b1 + a2], Γ ⊢ a1 : b1 and Γ⊢ a2. Let Γ ⊢ [a1, : a2] : c. By
Law 25(iii) we know that c =λ [c1 + a2] for some c1 where Γ⊢ a1 : c1.
By inductive hypothesis applied to Γ⊢ a1 : b1 we know that b1 =λ c1.
Using elementary properties of congruence (Law 21(ii)) we obtain b =
[b1 + a2] =λ [c1 + a2] =λ c.
injR: Similar to case injL.
case: We have a = [a1 ? a2] and b = [x : [b1 + b2]]b3 for some b1, b2, and b3
where Γ ⊢ [a1 ? a2] : [x : [b1 + b2]]b3, Γ ⊢ a1 : [x : b1]b3, Γ ⊢ a2 : [x :
b2]b3, and Γ ⊢ b3. Let Γ ⊢ [a1 ? a2] : c. By Law 25(xi) we know that
c =λ [x : [c1 + c2]]b
′
3 for some c1, c2, and b
′
3 where Γ ⊢ a1 : [y : c1]b
′
3
and Γ ⊢ a2 : [y : c2]b′3. By inductive hypothesis applied to Γ ⊢ a1 :
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[x : b1]b3 and Γ ⊢ a2 : [x : b2]b3 we know that [x : b1]b3 =λ [x : c1]b′3
and [x : b2]b3 =λ [x : c2]b
′
3. By elementary properties of congruence
(Law 21(i, ii)) we can obtain b = [x : [b1+b2]]b3 =λ [x : [c1+c2]]b
′
3 =λ c.
neg: We have a = ¬a1 for some a1 where Γ ⊢ ¬a1 : b and Γ ⊢ a1 : b. Let
Γ ⊢ ¬a1 : c. By Law 25(v) we know that c =λ c1 for some c1 where
Γ⊢a1 : c1. By inductive hypothesis b =λ c1 which implies b =λ c.
A direct consequence of congruence of types is commutation of typing and con-
gruence.
Law 37 (Commutation of typing and congruence). For all Γ, a, b, c, d: Γ⊢a : b,
a =λ c, and Γ⊢c : d imply b =λ d.
Proof. By Law 19 we know that a →∗ c′ and c →∗ c′, for some c′. By Law 32
we know that Γ⊢c′ : b and Γ⊢c′ : d. By Law 36 we know that b =λ d.
4.9 Strong normalization
4.9.1 Overview
Due to the Church-Rosser property (Law 19) we know that if a reduction ter-
minates, the result will be unique. In this section we will prove termination of
all reduction sequences of valid expressions, this property is usually referred to
as strong normalization.
The idea for the proof of strong normalization of valid expressions in d is
to classify expressions according to structural properties, in order to make an
inductive argument work. For this purpose we define structural skeletons called
norms as the subset of expressions built from the primitive τ and the product
operation only and we define an partial function assigning norms to expressions.
The domain of this norming function is the set of normable expressions. Norms
are a reconstruction of a concept of simple types, consisting of the atomic types
and product types, within d. Analogously to simple types, norms provide a han-
dle to classify valid expressions into different degrees of structural complexity.
This can be used as a basis for making inductive arguments of strong normal-
ization work. The idea of the strong normalisation argument is first to prove
that all valid expressions are normable and then to prove that all normable
expressions are strongly normalizable.
The good news is that in d we are not dealing with unconstrained parametric
types as for example in System F (see e.g. [16]), and therefore we will be able
to use more elementary methods to show strong normalisation as used for the
simply typed lambda calculus. A common such method is to define a notion of
reducible expressions satisfying certain reducibility conditions suitable for induc-
tive arguments both on type structure and on reduction length, to prove that
all reducible expressions satisfy certain reducibility properties including strong
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normalisation, and then to prove that that all typable expressions are reducible
([37][15]).
We will basically adopt this idea, but unfortunately, common definitions of
reducibility (e.g. [16]) cannot obviously be adapted to include the reduction of
negations. A more suitable basis for our purposes is to use the notion of com-
putable expressions as defined in language theoretical studies of Automath [39],
see also [38]. This approach is basically extended here to cover additional oper-
ators, including negation.
We motivate the basic idea of the proof (precise definitions can be found in
the upcoming sections): Consider the following condition necessary to establish
strong normalization for an application (a b) in the context of an inductive proof
(where S denotes the set of strongly normalizable expressions):
• If a→∗ [x : c1]c2 ∈ S and b ∈ S then c2[b/x] ∈ S.
Similarly, the following condition is necessary to establish strong normalization
for a negation ¬a in the context of an inductive proof.
• If a→∗ [x : c1]c2 ∈ S then ¬c2 ∈ S.
These and other properties inspire the definition of the set of computable expres-
sions CΓ which are normable, strongly normalizable, and satisfy the property
that a, b ∈ CΓ implies ¬a, (a b) ∈ CΓ. Unfortunately, the closure properties of
computable expressions cannot be extended to abstractions. Instead, we need
to prove the stronger property that normable expressions are computable under
any substitution of their free variables to computable expressions. This implies
that all normable expressions are computable and therefore that normability
and computability are equivalent notions. The logical relations between the
various notions are graphically illustrated in Figure 4.1.
4.9.2 Basic properties of strong normalization
We begin with some basic definitions and properties related to strong normal-
ization.
Definition 25 (Strongly normalizable expressions). The set of strongly nor-
malizable expressions is denoted by S. An expression a is in S iff there is no
infinite sequence of one-step reductions a→ a1 → a2 → a3 . . .
Law 38 (Basic properties of strongly normalizable expressions). For all a, b, c, x:
i: a[b/x] ∈ S and b→∗ c imply a[c/x] ∈ S
ii: a, b ∈ S implies ⊕x(a, b) ∈ S.
iii: a ∈ S implies a.1, a.2 ∈ S.
iv: a, b, c ∈ S implies [x
.
=a, b : c] ∈ S.
v: a, b ∈ S implies [a, b], [a+ b], [a, :b], [:a, b], [a ? b] ∈ S.
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Γ⊢a
Γ |=a
or equivalently a ∈ CΓ
a ∈ S
Figure 4.1: Relation between validity, normability, computability, and strong
normalization
Proof.
i: Proof by contradiction: Assume that a[b/x] ∈ S, b→∗ c, and a[c/x] /∈ S,
i.e. there is an infinite reduction sequence from a[c/x]. Since b →∗ c by
Law 2(ii) we have a[b/x]→∗ a[c/x] hence a[b/x] /∈ S. This is obviously a
contradiction therefore a[c/x] ∈ S.
ii: Proof by contradiction: Assume a, b ∈ S and assume that there is an infi-
nite reduction sequence from ⊕x(a, b). Using basic properties of reduction
(Law 3(ii)) one can show that each element of any finite prefix of this
sequence has the form ⊕x(ai, bi) where a →∗ ai and b →∗ bi. The proof
is by induction on the length n of this prefix sequence, Hence obviously
a /∈ S or b /∈ S which is a contradiction to a, b ∈ S, therefore ⊕x(a, b) ∈ S.
iii: We show the property for a.1 (the proof of a.2 runs similar).
Proof by contradiction: Assume a ∈ S and assume there is an infinite
reduction sequence a.1 → b1 → b2 → . . .. If bi = b′i.1, where a →i b
′
i for
all i > 0, then we could construct an infinite reduction sequence from a
which would contradict our assumption. Hence there must be some index
j where a.1→ a1.1→j−2 aj−1.1→ bj and bj is not a left projection. An
analysis of the definition of →∗ shows that one of the axioms π1, π3, or
π5 must have been used do reduce aj−1.1→ a′.
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In case of π1 we know that bj = [x
.
=bj+1, c : d].1 for some c and d. We can
therefore write the sequence as a.1 → a1.1 →j−2 aj−1.1 → [x
.
= bj+1, c :
d].1 → bj+1 → . . . where a → a1 →j−2 aj−1 → [x
.
= bj+1, c : d]. We can
thus construct an infinite sequence from a as a→j [x
.
=bj+1, c : d]→ [x
.
=
bj+2, c : d]→ . . . which would contradict our assumption.
In case of π3 we know that bj = [bj+1, c].1 for some c. We can therefore
write the sequence as a.1→ a1.1→j−2 aj−1.1→ [bj+1, c].1→ bj+1 → . . .
where a → a1 →j−2 aj−1 → [bj+1, c]. We can thus construct an infinite
sequence from a as a→j [bj+1, c]→ [bj+2, c]→ . . . which would contradict
our assumption.
A similar argument can be made for the axiom π5.
iv: The proof is similar to case ii using Law 3(ii).
v: The proof is similar to case ii using Law 3(i).
Next we show conditions under which application and negation are strongly
normalizing.
Law 39 (Strong normalization conditions). For all a, b:
i: For all a, b ∈ S: (a b) ∈ S if for any c1, c2, d1, d2, and x, the following
conditions are satisfied:
C1: a→∗ ⊕x(c1, c2) implies that c2[b/x] ∈ S
C2: a→∗ [c1 ? c2] and b→∗ [d1, :d2] implies (c1 d1) ∈ S
C3: a→∗ [c1 ? c2] and b→∗ [:d1, d2] implies (c2 d2) ∈ S
ii: For all a ∈ S: ¬a ∈ S if for any b, c, and c, the following conditions are
satisfied:
C1: a→∗ [b⊕ c] implies ¬b, ¬c ∈ S
C2: a→∗ ⊕x(b, c) implies ¬c ∈ S
Proof.
i: Proof by contradiction: Assume a, b ∈ S as well as conditions C1, C2, and
C3 of i and assume there is an infinite reduction (a b) → e1 → e2 → . . .
for some e1, e2, . . .. Since a, b ∈ S, it is impossible that for all i we have
ei = (ai bi) where a →∗ ai and b →∗ bi. An analysis of the definition of
→∗ shows that therefore there must be a j where one of the axioms β1 to
β4 has been used (on-top-level) to reduce ej to ej+1.
In case of β1 and β2 there must be a j such that ej = (⊕x(c1, c2) bj) for
some c1 and c2, and ej+1 = c2[bj/x] where a →∗ ⊕x(c1, c2) and b →∗ bj .
From C1 we obtain c2[b/x] ∈ S. Since b→
∗ b′ by Law 38(i) we know that
c2[bj/x] ∈ S hence any reduction from ej+1 = c2[bj/x] must terminate.
96
This implies that the assumed infinite reduction from (a b) also terminates
which contradicts our assumption.
In case of the axiom β3 there must be a j such that ej = ([c1 ? c2] bj) for
some c1 and c2, bj = [d1, :d2] for some d1 and d2, and ej+1 = (c1 d1) where
a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and b →∗ [d1, : d2]. From C2 we obtain c1(d1) ∈ S hence
any reduction from ej+1 = (c1 d1) must terminate. This implies that the
assumed infinite reduction from (a b) also terminates which contradicts
our assumption.
A similar argument can be made for the axiom β4.
ii: Assume a, b ∈ S as well as conditions C1 and C2 of ii and assume there
is an infinite reduction ¬a → e1 → e2 → . . . for some e1, e2, . . .. Since
a, b ∈ S, it is impossible that for all i we have ei = ¬ai where a →∗ ai.
An analysis of the definition of→∗ shows that therefore there must be a j
where one of the axioms ν1 to ν10 has been used (on-top-level) to reduce
ej to ej+1. We will go through the different axioms one-by-one.
ν1: We have ej = ¬¬b and ej+1 = b for some b where a →∗ b.
Since a ∈ S we obviously have ej+1 = b ∈ S and therefore
the reduction from ej+1 must terminate.
ν2: We have ej = ¬[b, c] and ej+1 = [¬b + ¬c] for some b and
c where a →∗ [b, c]. From C1 we know that ¬b, ¬c ∈ S.
Hence by Law 38(ii) we know that ej+1 = [¬b + ¬c] ∈ S
and therefore the reduction from ej+1 must terminate.
ν3: We have ej = ¬[b+ c] and ej+1 = [¬b,¬c] for some b and c
where a →∗ [b + c]. This argument for this case is similar
to the one for ν2.
ν4: We have ej = ¬[x : b]c and ej+1 = [x!b]¬c for some b and c
where a→∗ [x : b]c. From C2 we know that ¬c ∈ S. Since
b ∈ S, by Law 38(ii) we know that ej+1 = [x!b]¬c ∈ S and
therefore the reduction from ej+1 must terminate.
ν5: We have ej = ¬[x!b]c and ej+1 = [x : b]¬c for some b and
c where a→∗ [x!b]c. This argument for this case is similar
to the one for ν4.
νi,6 ≤ i ≤ 10: In all these cases we have ej = ¬b and ej+1 = b for some b
where a→∗ b Since a ∈ S we obviously have ej+1 = b ∈ S
and therefore the reduction from ej+1 must terminate.
In all cases we have derived that all reduction from ej+1 must terminate.
This implies that the assumed infinite reduction from ¬a also terminates
which contradicts our assumption.
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4.9.3 Norms and normable expressions
Norms are a subset of expressions representing structural skeletons of expres-
sions. Norms play an important role to classify expressions in the course of the
proof of strong normalization.
Definition 26 (Norm). The set of norms E¯ is generated by the following rules
E¯ ::= {τ} | [E¯ , E¯ ]
Obviously norms are a form of binary trees and E¯ ⊂ E . We will use the notation
a¯, b¯, c¯, . . . to denote norms.
Definition 27 (Norming). The partial norming function ‖a‖Γ defines for some
expressions a the norm of a under an environment Γ. It is defined by the
equations in Table 4.3. The partial norming function is well-defined, in the
‖τ‖Γ = τ
‖x‖Γ = ‖Γ(x)‖Γ if Γ(x) is defined
‖⊕x(a, b)‖Γ = [ ‖a‖Γ, ‖b‖Γ,x:a]
‖(a b)‖Γ = c¯ if ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖b‖Γ, c¯]
‖[x
.
=a, b : c]‖Γ = [ ‖a‖Γ, ‖b‖Γ] if ‖b‖Γ= ‖c‖Γ,x:a
‖[a⊕ b]‖Γ = [ ‖a‖Γ, ‖b‖Γ]
‖a.1‖Γ = a¯ if ‖a‖Γ= [a¯, b¯]
‖a.2‖Γ = b¯ if ‖a‖Γ= [a¯, b¯]
‖[a, :b]‖Γ = [ ‖a‖Γ, ‖b‖Γ]
‖[:a, b]‖Γ = [ ‖a‖Γ, ‖b‖Γ]
‖[a ? b]‖Γ = [[a¯, b¯], c¯] if ‖a‖Γ= [a¯, c¯], ‖b‖Γ= [b¯, c¯]
‖¬a‖Γ = ‖a‖Γ
Table 4.3: Norming
sense that one can show by structural induction on a with context Γ that, if
defined, ‖a‖Γ is unique.
Definition 28 (Normable expression). An expression a is normable relative
under context Γ iff ‖a‖Γ is defined. This is written as Γ |=a. Similarly to typing
we use the notation Γ |=a1, . . . , an as an abbreviation for Γ |=a1, . . ., Γ |=an.
Remark (Examples). There are valid and invalid normable expressions and there
are strongly normalisable expression which are neither valid nor normable. We
present a few examples. We will show later that all valid expressions are
normable (Law 45) and that all normable expressions are strongly normaliz-
able (Laws 54 and 55). Let Γ = (p, q : τ, z : [x : p][y : q]τ, w : [x : τ ]x). Consider
the expression [x : p](z x):
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• We have Γ⊢ [x :p](z x).
• We have Γ |= [x : p](z x) since ‖[x : p](z x)‖Γ= [τ, ‖(z x)‖Γ,x:p] = [τ, [τ, τ ]].
The latter equality is true since ‖z‖Γ,x:p= ‖[x : p][y : q]τ ‖Γ,x:p= [τ, [τ, τ ]]
and ‖x‖Γ,x:p= ‖p‖Γ,x:p= τ .
Consider the expression [x :p](z p):
• We do not have Γ⊢ [x : p](z p) since we do not have Γ⊢p : p.
• We have Γ |=[x : p](z p) since ‖[x : p](z p)‖Γ= [τ, [τ, τ ]] and ‖p‖Γ,x:p= τ
As a third example consider the expression r = [x : [y : τ ]y](xx):
• Obviously r ∈ S.
• We do not have ()⊢r since the application (xx) cannot be typed.
• We do not have |=r: The definition of norming yields ‖[x : [y :τ ]y](xx)‖=
[[τ, τ ], ‖(xx)‖x:[y:τ ]y]. However the expression ‖(xx)‖x:[y:τ ]y is not defined
since ‖x‖x:[y:τ ]y= [τ, τ ] which implies ‖x‖x:[y:τ ]y 6= [ ‖x‖x:[y:τ ]y, a¯] for any
a¯. Hence the norming condition for application is violated.
4.9.4 Properties of normable expressions
We show several basic properties of normable expressions culminating in the
property that all valid expressions are normable. Some of these properties and
proofs are structurally similar to the corresponding ones for valid expressions.
However, due to the simplicity of norms, the proofs are much shorter.
Definition 29 (Induction on the definition of norming). A property P (Γ, a)
about a context Γ and expression a where Γ |= a is shown by structural induc-
tion on the definition of norming iff the structure of the individual inductive
argument corresponds to the definition of norming.
Law 40 (Norm equality in context). Let Γa = (Γ1, x : a,Γ2) and Γb = (Γ1, x :
b,Γ2) for some Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b. For all c: If Γ1 |= a, b, ‖a‖Γ1= ‖b‖Γ1, and Γa |= c
then Γb |=c and ‖c‖Γa= ‖c‖Γb .
Proof. The straightforward proof is by structural induction on the definition of
‖c‖Γa . The most interesting case c being an variable. There are two cases:
• If c = x then obviously ‖c‖Γa= ‖a‖Γ1= ‖b‖Γ1= ‖c‖Γb.
• If c = y 6= x then Γa(y) = Γb(y) and the property follows from the
inductive hypothesis.
Law 41 (Substitution and norming). Let Γa = (Γ1, x : a,Γ2) and Γb =
(Γ1,Γ2[b/x]) for some Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b. For all c: If Γ1 |= a, b, ‖ a ‖Γ1= ‖ b ‖Γ1 ,
and Γa |=c then Γb |=c[b/x] and ‖c‖Γa= ‖c[b/x]‖Γb .
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Proof. Proof is by structural induction on the definition of ‖c‖Γa .
c = τ : Obviously c[b/x] = c = τ , hence Γb |= c[b/x] and ‖c‖Γa= τ =
‖c‖Γb .
c = y: If y = x then obviously c[b/x] = b and therefore ‖x‖Γa= ‖
a‖Γ1= ‖b‖Γ1= ‖c[b/x]‖Γb which also implies Γb |=c[b/x].
If x 6= y then c[b/x] = y. There are two subcases:
• Γ1(y) is defined. Γ1(y) = d. Obviously ‖y‖Γa= d = ‖
y‖Γb .
• Γ1(y) is not defined and hence Γ2(y) = d, for some d.
This obviously implies (Γ2[b/x])(y) = d[b/x]. We can
argue as follows:
‖y‖Γa = (definition of norming)
‖Γa(y)‖Γa
= (see above)
‖d‖Γa
= (inductive hypothesis)
‖d[b/x]‖Γb
= (see above)
‖(Γ2[b/x])(y)‖Γb
= (definition of lookup of variable)
‖Γb(y)‖Γb
= (definition of norming)
‖y‖Γb
The arguments in both cases also imply Γb |=c[b/x].
c = ⊕y(c1, c2): As usual we may assume y 6= x. We can argue as follows:
‖⊕y(c1, c2)‖Γa
= (definition of norming)
[ ‖c1‖Γa , ‖c2‖Γa,y:c1]
= (inductive hypothesis)
[ ‖c1[b/x]‖Γb , ‖c2[b/x]‖Γb,y:c1[b/x]]
= (definition of norming)
‖⊕y(c1[b/x], c2[b/x])‖Γb
= (definition of substitution)
‖⊕y(c1, c2)[b/x]‖Γb
This argument also implies Γb |=c[b/x].
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c=[y
.
=c1, c2 :c3]: As usual we may assume y 6= x. As in the case of c =
⊕y(c1, c2) the proposition follows from the inductive hypoth-
esis and the definition of substitution:
‖[y
.
=c1, c2 : c3]‖Γa
= (definition of norming)
[ ‖c1‖Γa , ‖c2‖Γa ]
(where ‖c2‖Γa= ‖c3‖Γa,x:c1)
= (inductive hypothesis)
[ ‖c1[b/x]‖Γb , ‖c2[b/x]‖Γb ]
= (definition of norming)
‖⊕y(c1[b/x], c2[b/x])‖Γb
= (since the ind. hyp. implies
‖c2[b/x]‖Γb= ‖c3‖Γb,x:c1 [b/x])
‖[y
.
=c1[b/x], c2[b/x] : c3[b/x]]‖Γb
= (definition of substitution)
‖[y
.
=c1, c2 : c3][b/x]‖Γb
This argument also implies Γb |=c[b/x].
c = (c1 c2): We have ‖ (c1 c2) ‖Γa= c¯ where ‖ c1 ‖Γa= [ ‖ c2 ‖Γa , c¯]. By
inductive hypothesis ‖ c1 ‖Γa= ‖ c1[b/x] ‖Γb and ‖ c2 ‖Γa= ‖
c2[b/x]‖Γb. Hence ‖c1[b/x]‖Γb= [ ‖c2[b/x]‖Γb , c¯]. This implies
‖(c1 c2)[b/x]‖Γb= c¯ and therefore also Γb |=c[b/x].
c = c1.1: We have ‖c‖Γa= c¯2 where ‖c1 ‖Γa= [c¯2, c¯3]. By inductive
hypothesis ‖c1‖Γa= ‖c1[b/x]‖Γb . Hence ‖c[b/x]‖Γb= c¯2 and
therefore also Γb |=c[b/x].
c = c1.2: Similar (symmetric) to case c = c1.1.
c = [c1, c2]: We have ‖c‖Γa= [ ‖c1‖Γa , ‖c2‖Γa ]. The proposition follows
from the inductive hypothesis and the definition of substitu-
tion.
c = [c1 + c2]: Similar (symmetric) to case c = [c1, c2].
c = [c1, :c2]: Similar (symmetric) to case c = [c1, c2].
c = [:c1, c2]: Similar (symmetric) to case c = [c1, c2].
c = [c1 ? c2]: We have ‖ c‖Γa= [[c¯1, c¯2], d¯] where ‖ c1 ‖Γa= [c¯1, d¯] as well
as ‖c2 ‖Γa= [c¯2, d¯]. By inductive hypothesis ‖c1[b/x]‖Γb=
[c¯1, d¯] and ‖c2[b/x]‖Γb= [c¯2, d¯]. Hence obviously ‖c[b/x]‖Γb=
[[c¯1, c¯2], d¯] and therefore also Γb |=c[b/x].
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c = ¬c1: The proposition follows from the inductive hypothesis and
the definition of substitution.
Law 42 (Reduction preserves norms). For all Γ, a, b: Γ |=a and a→∗ b implies
‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ
Proof. It is obviously sufficient to show the property for single-step reduction
which we do here by induction on the definition of single-step reduction. We
begin with the axioms:
β1: We have a = ([x : a1]a2 a3), b = a2[a3/x], and ‖ ([x : a1]a2 a3)‖Γ=
‖a2‖Γ,x:a1 where ‖a1‖Γ= ‖a3‖Γ. Therefore by Law 41 we know that
‖a2‖Γ,x:a1= ‖a2[a3/x]‖Γ which implies the proposition.
β2: Similar to case β1.
β3: We have a = ([a1 ? a2] [a3, :a4]) and b = (a1 a3). By definition of norm-
ing ‖[a3, : a4]‖Γ= [ ‖a3‖Γ, ‖a4‖Γ] and ‖[a1 ? a2]‖Γ= [[ ‖a3‖Γ, ‖a4‖Γ], c¯]
for some c¯ where ‖a1‖Γ= [ ‖a3‖Γ, c¯] as well as ‖a2‖Γ= [ ‖a4‖Γ, c¯]. Hence
‖a‖Γ= c¯ = ‖(a1 a3)‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
β4: Similar to case β3.
π1: We have a = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a3].1 and b = a1. By definition of norming we
directly obtain ‖a‖Γ= ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
π2: Similar to case π1.
π3: We have a = [a1, a2].1 and b = a1. By definition of norming we directly
obtain ‖a‖Γ= ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
π4: Similar to case π3.
π5: We have a = [a1+a2].1 and b = a1. By definition of norming we directly
obtain ‖a‖Γ= ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
π6: Similar to case π3.
ν1 We have a = ¬¬a1 and b = a1. By definition of norming we directly
obtain ‖a‖Γ= ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
ν2: We have a = ¬[x : a1]a2 and b = [x!a1]¬a2. By definition of norming
we have ‖¬[x : a1]a2‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ,x:a1] = ‖[x!a1]¬a2‖Γ.
ν3: Similar to case ν2.
ν4: We have a = ¬[a1, a2] and b = [¬a1,¬a2]. By definition of norming we
have ‖¬[a1, a2]‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = ‖[¬a1,¬a2]‖Γ
ν5: Similar to case ν4.
102
ν6: We have a = ¬τ and b = τ . By definition of norming we directly obtain
‖a‖Γ= τ = ‖b‖Γ.
νi: i > 6: Similar to case ν6.
Next, we turn to the structural rules.
⊕x( , )1: We have a = ⊕x(a1, a3), b = ⊕x(a2, a3), and a1 → a2. By
definition of norming ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ,x:a1]. By inductive
hypothesis ‖a1‖Γ= ‖a2‖Γ. Hence we can argue that ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖
a1‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ,x:a1]. By Law 40 we know that ‖a3‖Γ,x:a1= ‖a3‖Γ,x:a2
hence ‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
⊕x( , )2: We have a = ⊕x(a1, a2), b = ⊕x(a1, a3), and a2 → a3. By
definition of norming ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ,x:a1]. By inductive
hypothesis ‖ a2 ‖Γ,x:a1= ‖ a3 ‖Γ,x:a1. Hence we can argue that
‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ,x:a1] = [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ,x:a1 ] = ‖b‖Γ.
[x
.
= , : ]1: We have a = [x
.
= a1, a3 : a4], b = [x
.
=a2, a3 : a4], and a1 → a2.
By definition of norming ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ] where ‖a4‖Γ=
‖a4‖Γ,x:a1. By inductive hypothesis ‖a1‖Γ= ‖a2‖Γ. By Law 40
we know that ‖a4‖Γ,x:a1= ‖a4‖Γ,x:a2. Hence we can argue that
‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ] = [ ‖a2‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ] = ‖b‖Γ.
[x
.
= , : ]2: We have a = [x
.
= a1, a2 : a4], b = [x
.
=a1, a3 : a4], and a2 → a3.
By definition of norming ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] where ‖a2‖Γ= ‖
a4‖Γ,x:a1. By inductive hypothesis ‖a2‖Γ= ‖a3‖Γ. Hence we can
argue that ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ] = ‖b‖Γ.
[x
.
= , : ]3: We have a = [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3], b = [x
.
=a1, a2 : a4], and a3 → a4.
By definition of norming ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] where ‖a2‖Γ= ‖
a3‖Γ,x:a1. By inductive hypothesis ‖a3‖Γ,x:a1= ‖a4‖Γ,x:a1. Hence
we can argue that ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = ‖b‖Γ.
(⊕
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i): We have a = ⊕(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an) and b = ⊕(a1, . . . , bi, . . . , an)
where ai → bi. From Γ |=a it obviously follows that Γ |=a1. By
inductive hypothesis ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b1‖Γ. By definition of norming
this implies ‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
Law 43 (Context extension). For all Γ1,Γ2, x, a, b where x /∈ dom(Γ1,Γ2):
Γ1,Γ2 |=a implies (Γ1, x : b,Γ2) |=a and ‖a‖Γ1,Γ2= ‖a‖Γ1,x:b,Γ2 .
Proof. Obviosly Γ1,Γ2 |=a implies that FV ([Γ1,Γ2]a) = ∅. Therefore the addi-
tional declaration x : b will never be used when evaluating ‖a‖Γ1,x:b,Γ2 . Hence
the successful evaluation of ‖a‖Γ1,Γ2 can be easily transformed into an evaluation
of ‖a‖Γ1,x:b,Γ2 with identical result.
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Law 44 (Typing implies normability and preserves norm). For all Γ, x, a, b: If
Γ⊢a : b then Γ |=a, b and ‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
Proof. Proof by induction on the definition of Γ⊢a : b.
ax: Obvious, since a = b = τ .
start: We have a = x, Γ = (Γ′, x : b) for some Γ′ and x, and Γ′ ⊢ b : c for
some c. By inductive hypothesis Γ′ |= b. Since x /∈ FV (b), by Law 43
we know that Γ |=b and ‖b‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ′. Hence Γ |=x where ‖x‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
weak: We have Γ = (Γ′, x : c) for some Γ′, x, and c where Γ′⊢c and Γ′⊢a : b.
By inductive hypothesis Γ′ |= a, Γ′ |= b and ‖a‖Γ′= ‖b‖Γ′. Since x /∈
FV (a), by Law 43 we know that Γ |=a and ‖a‖Γ= ‖a‖Γ′ as well as Γ |=b
and ‖b‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ′ . Hence ‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
conv: We have Γ ⊢ a : b where c =λ b for some c where Γ ⊢ c : d for some d.
By inductive hypothesis Γ |= a, Γ |= b and ‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ as well as Γ |= c.
Hence by Laws 19 and 42 we know that ‖ b‖Γ= ‖ c‖Γ which implies
‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
absU : We have a = [x : c]a1 and b = [x : c]a2, for some c, a1, and a2 where
(Γ, x : c)⊢a1 : a2 and Γ⊢ c : d, for some d. By inductive hypothesis we
know that Γ |= c, (Γ, x : c) |=a1, a2, and ‖a1‖Γ,x:c= ‖a2‖Γ,x:c. Hence by
definition of norming ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖c‖Γ, ‖a1‖Γ,x:c] = [ ‖c‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ,x:c] = ‖b‖Γ
which implies Γ |=a, b.
absE : Smilar to case absU .
appl: We have a = (a1 a2) and b = c2[a2/x], for some a1, a2, x, and c2 where
Γ⊢a1 : [x : c1]c2 and Γ⊢a2 : c1 for some c1.
By inductive hypothesis we know that Γ |= a1, a2, [x : c1]c2, c1 where
‖[x : c1]c2‖Γ= ‖a1‖Γ and ‖c1‖Γ= ‖a2‖Γ.
Hence ‖a1‖Γ= [ ‖a2‖Γ, ‖c2‖Γ,x:c1] and therefore by definitioin of norming
‖(a1 a2)‖Γ= ‖c2‖Γ,x:c1 which implies Γ |=a.
Since ‖ a2 ‖Γ= ‖ c1 ‖Γ we can apply Law 41 to obtain ‖ c2 ‖Γ,x:c1= ‖
c2[a2/x]‖Γ. Hence Γ |=b and ‖a‖Γ= ‖(a1 a2)‖Γ= ‖c2[a2/x]‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
def: We have a = [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] and b = [x!b1]a3, for some x, a1, a2, a3,
and b1 where Γ⊢a1 : b1, Γ⊢a2 : a3[a1/x], and (Γ, x : b1)⊢a3 : a4.
By inductive hypothesis we know that Γ |=a1, b1, a2, a3[a1/x] and (Γ, x :
b1) |=a3, a4 where ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b1‖Γ and ‖a2‖Γ= ‖a3[a1/x]‖Γ.
Since ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b1‖Γ, by Law 41 we know that ‖a3‖Γ,x:b1= ‖a3[a1/x]‖Γ.
By Law 40 we know that ‖a3‖Γ,x:b1= ‖a3‖Γ,x:a1 and therefore we obtain
‖a2‖Γ= ‖a3‖Γ,x:a1. Therefore, by definition of norming we know that
Γ |=a and ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ].
Obviously Γ |= b where ‖b‖Γ= [ ‖b1‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ,x:b1] = [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a3‖Γ,x:a1
] = [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = ‖a‖Γ.
104
chI : We have a = a1.1 where Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!b]a2 for some a2. By inductive
hypothesis we know that Γ |= a1, [x!b]a2 and ‖a1 ‖Γ= ‖ [x!b]a2‖Γ. By
definition of norming ‖[x!b]a2‖Γ= [ ‖b‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ,x:b] and ‖a1.1‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
Therefore Γ |=a, b and ‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
chB : We have a = a1.2 and b = a3[a1.1/x] for some a1, x, anda3 where
Γ ⊢ a1 : [x!a2]a3 for some a2. By inductive hypothesis we know that
Γ |= a1, [x!a2]a3 and ‖a1‖Γ= ‖[x!a2]a3‖Γ. By definition of the norming
we have ‖ [x!a2]a3 ‖Γ= [ ‖ a2 ‖Γ, ‖ a3 ‖Γ,x:a2], ‖ a1.1 ‖Γ= ‖ a2 ‖Γ, and
‖a1.2‖Γ= ‖a3‖Γ,x:a2. Hence we can apply Law 41 to obtain ‖a3‖Γ,x:a2=
‖a3[a1.1/x]‖Γ. Hence Γ |=a, b where ‖a‖Γ= ‖a3‖Γ,x:a2= ‖a3[a1.1/x]‖Γ=
‖b‖Γ.
prd: We have a = [a1, a2] and b = [b1, b2] for some a1, a2, b1, and b2 where
Γ ⊢ a1 : b1 and Γ ⊢ a2 : b2. By inductive hypothesis we know that
Γ |= a1, b1, and ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b1‖Γ, as well as Γ |= a2, b2, and ‖a2‖Γ= ‖b2‖Γ.
Hence Γ |=a and ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ]. Similarly Γ |= b and ‖b‖Γ= [ ‖
b1‖Γ, ‖b2‖Γ]. Hence ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = [ ‖b1‖Γ, ‖b2‖Γ] = ‖b‖Γ.
sum: Similar to case prd.
prL: We have a = a1.1 where Γa ⊢ a1 : [b, b2] for some b2. By inductive
hypothesis we know that Γa |=a1, [b, b2] and ‖a1‖Γ= ‖[b, b2]‖Γ= [ ‖b‖Γ, ‖
b2‖Γ]. Hence ‖a‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
prR: Similar (symmetric) to case prL.
injL: We have a = [a1, : a2] and b = [b1, a2] where Γ⊢ a1 : b1 and Γ⊢ a2 : c2
for some c2. By inductive hypothesis we know that Γ |= a1, b1, and
‖a1‖Γ= ‖b1‖Γ, as well as Γ |=a2. Hence Γ |=a and ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ].
Similarly Γ |= b and ‖b‖Γ= [ ‖b1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ]. Hence ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ
] = [ ‖b1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = ‖b‖Γ.
injR: Similar to case injL.
case: We have a = [a1 ? a2] and b = [z : [b1 + b2]]b3 for some a1, a2, b1, b2, b3,
and z where Γ⊢a1 : [x : b1]b3, Γ⊢a2 : [y : b2]b3, and Γ⊢ b3 : c for some
x, y, and c.
Γ ⊢ b3 : c obviously implies x, y, z /∈ FV (b3). Hence for any d we
have ‖b3‖Γ,x:d= ‖b3‖Γ Therefore and by inductive hypothesis and the
definition of norming we know that Γ |= a1, a2, [x : b1]b3, [y : b2]b3, b3
and ‖a1‖Γ= ‖[x : b1]b3‖Γ= [ ‖b1‖Γ, ‖b3‖Γ] and ‖a2‖Γ= ‖[y : b2]b3‖Γ= [ ‖
b2‖Γ, ‖b3‖Γ].
Hence ‖a‖Γ= [[ ‖b1‖Γ, ‖b2‖Γ], ‖b3‖Γ] = ‖[z : [b1 + b2]]b3‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
neg: We have a = ¬a1 for some a1 where Γ⊢a1 : b. By inductive hypothesis
we know that Γ |=a1, b, and ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ Hence by definition of norming
we know that ‖a‖Γ= ‖a1‖Γ= ‖b‖Γ.
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Law 45 (Valid expressions are normable). For all Γ, a: Γ⊢a implies Γ |=a.
Proof. Γ⊢a means that Γ⊢a : b, for some b. By Law 44 this implies Γ |=a.
4.9.5 Computable expressions
First we introduce a simple induction principle that we will use several times in
this section.
Definition 30 (Induction on the size of norms). The size of a norm a¯ is defined
as the number of primitive constants τ it contains. A property P (Γ, a¯) is shown
by norm-induction iff for all b¯ we know that: If P (Γ, c¯) for all c¯ of size strictly
smaller that b¯ then P (Γ, b¯).
Remark (Use of norm-induction in proofs). The clause defining norm-induction
can be reformulated into a more convenient form for its use in proofs.
• Inductive base: P (Γ, τ).
• Inductive step: For all b¯, c¯: If P (Γ, a¯) for all a¯ of size strictly smaller
than the size of [b¯, c¯] then P (Γ, [b¯, c¯]).
Computable expressions are organized according to norm structure and satisfy
strong normalization conditions (Law 39).
Definition 31 (Computable expressions). The set of computable expressions of
norm a¯ under context Γ is denoted by CΓ(a¯). a ∈ CΓ(a¯) iff a ∈ S, Γ |=a where
‖a‖Γ= a¯, and if a¯ = [b¯, c¯] for some b¯ and c¯ then the following computability
conditions are satisfied:
α: For all x, b, c: If a →∗ ⊕x(b, c) or ¬a →∗ ⊕x(b, c) then c ∈ CΓ,x:b(c¯) and
c[d/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯) for any d ∈ CΓ(b¯).
β: For all b, c: If a→∗ [b⊕ c] or ¬a→∗ [b⊕ c] then b ∈ CΓ(b¯) and c ∈ CΓ(c¯).
γ: For all x, b, c, d: a→∗ [x
.
=b, c : d] implies both b ∈ CΓ(b¯) and c ∈ CΓ(c¯),
a→∗ [b, :d] implies b ∈ CΓ(b¯), and a→∗ [:d, c] implies c ∈ CΓ(c¯).
δ: If b¯ = [b¯1, b¯2], for some b¯1 and b¯2, then, for all b1, b2: a→∗ [b1 ? b2] implies
both b1 ∈ CΓ([b¯1, c¯]) and b2 ∈ CΓ([b¯2, c¯]).
Remark (Motivation for the computability conditions). The conditions α, β,
γ, and δ are motivated by the strong normalization condition for applications
(Law 39(i)) and negations (Law 39(ii)) and by the need for a monotonicity
argument of computability with respect to injections and case distinctions.
Law 46 (Computable expressions are well-defined for all norms). For all Γ and
a¯, the set CΓ(a¯) exists and is well-defined.
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Proof. Proof by norm-induction on a¯. Γ |=a means that ‖a‖Γ is defined.
Inductive base: In case of a¯ = τ , the conditions α, β, γ, and δ are trivially
satisfied and hence the set CΓ(a¯) obviously exists and is well-defined.
Inductive step: Let a¯ = [b¯, c¯] for some b¯, c¯. In case of conditions α, β,
and γ, by inductive hypothesis, CΓ(b¯) and CΓ(c¯) exist and are well-defined.
Therefore, by construction of the conditions α, β, and γ, obviously CΓ(a¯) exists
and is well-defined. In case of conditions δ, b¯ = [b¯1, b¯2], by inductive hypothesis,
CΓ([b¯1, c¯]) and CΓ([b¯1, c¯]) exist and are well-defined (the sizes of [b¯1, c¯] and [b¯2, c¯]
are both strictly smaller than the size of a¯). Therefore, by construction of the
condition γ, obviously CΓ(a¯) exists and is well-defined.
We begin with some basic properties of computable expressions.
Law 47 (Basic properties of computable expressions). For all Γ,Γ1,Γ2, a, a1,
a2, b, x:
i: a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) implies a ∈ S.
ii: Γ⊢x implies x ∈ CΓ( ‖x‖Γ).
iii: τ ∈ CΓ(τ).
iv: Γ1 |=a1, a ∈ CΓ1,x:a1,Γ2(a¯), and a1 →
∗ a2 imply a ∈ CΓ1,x:a2,Γ2(a¯).
v: a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) and a→∗ b imply b ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ).
Proof.
i: By definition of computable expressions a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) implies that a ∈ S.
ii: Obviously x ∈ S. From Γ ⊢ x, by Law 45 we obtain Γ |= x. The com-
putability conditions are trivially satisfied.
iii: Obviously τ ∈ S and ‖τ‖Γ= τ . The computability conditions are trivially
satisfied.
iv: In general we can argue as follows: Assume Γ1 |=a1 and a ∈ CΓ1,x:a1,Γ2(a¯)
where a¯ = ‖a‖Γ1,x:a1,Γ2 and a1 →
∗ a2. By Law 42 we obtain Γ1 |= a2
and ‖a1‖Γ1= ‖a2‖Γ1 . We need to show that a ∈ CΓ1,x:a2,Γ2(a¯). From
a ∈ CΓ1,x:a1,Γ2(a¯) we know that (Γ1, x : a1,Γ2) |=a. Since ‖a1‖Γ1= ‖a2‖Γ1 ,
by Law 40 we obtain (Γ1, x : a2,Γ2) |=a and ‖a‖Γ1,x:a1,Γ2= ‖a‖Γ1,x:a2,Γ2 .
We now show this part by norm-induction on a¯. More precisely, by norm-
induction on a¯ we show that for all Γ1, Γ2, a, a1, a2, x and a¯, that Γ1 |=a1,
a ∈ CΓ1,x:a1,Γ2(a¯), and a1 →
∗ a2 imply a ∈ CΓ1,x:a2,Γ2(a¯). The argument
above takes care of all aspects of this proof except for the computability
conditions.
Inductive base: In case of a¯ = τ , the computability conditions become
trivial and given the argument above we are finished.
Inductive step: Let a¯ = [b¯, c¯] for some b¯ and c¯. We additionally have to
show the computability conditions for a under context Γ1, x : a2,Γ2:
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α: Let a →∗ ⊕y(b, c) or ¬a →∗ ⊕y(b, c), for some y, b, and c. From
computability condition α for a under context Γ1, x : a1,Γ2 we
know that c ∈ CΓ1,x:a1,Γ2,y:b(c¯) and that c[d/y] ∈ CΓ1,x:a1,Γ2(c¯) for
any d ∈ CΓ1,x:a1,Γ2(b¯). By inductive hypothesis this implies c ∈
CΓ1,x:a2,Γ2,y:b(c¯) and c[d/y] ∈ CΓ1,x:a2,Γ2(c¯). Hence the condition
is satisfied.
β, γ, δ: A similar argument as for condition α can be used.
v: We have that a ∈ CΓ(a¯) where ‖a‖Γ= a¯. By i we know that a ∈ S.
Obviously b ∈ S and by Law 42 we obtain ‖b‖Γ= ‖a‖Γ. We have to show
that b ∈ CΓ(a¯): It is easy to prove the computability conditions, since
from b→∗ c we can always infer a→∗ c and hence use the corresponding
condition from the assumption a ∈ CΓ(a¯).
The closure of computable expressions against negation is shown first due to its
frequent use in other monotonicity arguments.
Law 48 (Computable expressions are closed against negation). For all Γ, a:
a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) implies ¬a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ).
Proof. Assume that a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ). Let a¯ := ‖a‖Γ. By definition of norming
obviously ‖¬a‖Γ= a¯. We show that a ∈ CΓ(a¯) implies ¬a ∈ CΓ(a¯) by norm-
induction on a¯.
Inductive base: We have a¯ = τ , therefore the computability conditions
become trivial and it remains to show that ¬a ∈ S. Since a ∈ S, according to
Law 39(ii), we need to show that for any x, b, c:
(C1) a→∗ [b ⊕ c] implies ¬b, ¬c ∈ S
(C2) a→∗ ⊕x(b, c) implies ¬c ∈ S
Both conditions are satisfied since a →∗ [b ⊕ c] as well as a →∗ ⊕x(b, c), by
definition of norming and Law 42, imply that a¯ 6= τ .
Inductive step: Let a¯ = [b¯, c¯] for some b¯ and c¯. First, we show that ¬a ∈ S.
Since a ∈ S, according to Law 39(ii), for any x, b, c, we need to show conditions
(C1) amd (C2):
(C1) Let a→∗ [b⊕ c]. Since a ∈ CΓ(a¯), by computability condition β we know
that b ∈ CΓ(b¯) and c ∈ CΓ(c¯). By inductive hypothesis ¬b ∈ CΓ(b¯) and
¬c ∈ CΓ(c¯) and therefore by Law 47(i),¬b,¬c ∈ S.
(C2) Let a →∗ ⊕x(b, c). Since a ∈ CΓ(a¯), by computability condition α we
know that c ∈ CΓ,x:b(c¯). By inductive hypothesis ¬c ∈ CΓ,x:b(c¯) and
therefore by Law 47(i), ¬c ∈ S.
Hence ¬a ∈ S.
To finish the proof we have to show the computability conditions for ¬a:
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α: We have to consider four cases:
Cases 1 and 2: ¬a →∗ [x : a1]a2 or ¬a →∗ [x!a1]a2 for some x, a1, and
a2. By Law 3(v) we know that a→
∗ ⊕x(a
′
1, a
′
2) for some a
′
1 and a
′
2 where
a′1 →
∗ a1 and ¬a′2 →
∗ a2 .
The first part of α can be argued as follows:
a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯])
⇒ (by α, since a→∗ ⊕x(a
′
1, a
′
2) )
a′2 ∈ CΓ,x:a′1(c¯)
⇒ (inductive hypothesis)
¬a′2 ∈ CΓ,x:a′1(c¯)
⇒ (by Law 47(v), since ¬a′2 →
∗ a2)
a2 ∈ CΓ,x:a′
1
(c¯)
⇒ (by Law 47(iv), since a′1 →
∗ a1)
a2 ∈ CΓ,x:a1(c¯)
For the second clause, for any d ∈ CΓ(c¯), we can argue as follows:
a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯])
⇒ (by α)
a′2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (inductive hypothesis)
¬(a′2[d/x]) ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (definition of substitution)
(¬a′2)[d/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (by Laws 47(v) and 2(i), since ¬a′2 →
∗ a2)
a2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯)
Cases 3 and 4: ¬¬a →∗ [x : a1]a2 or ¬¬a →∗ [x!a1]a2 for some x, a1,
and a2. By Law 3(v) we know that ¬a→∗ ⊕x(a′1, a
′
2) for some a
′
1 and a
′
2
where a′1 →
∗ a1 and ¬a
′
2 →
∗ a2. Applying Law 3(v) again we know that
a →∗ ⊕′x(a
′′
1 , a
′′
2) for some a
′′
1 and a
′′
2 where a
′′
1 →
∗ a′1 and ¬a
′′
2 →
∗ a′2.
This means that a′′1 →
∗ a1 and ¬¬a′′2 →
∗ a2.
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The first part of α can then be argued as follows:
a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯])
⇒ (by α, since a→∗ ⊕′x(a
′′
1 , a
′′
2) )
a′′2 ∈ CΓ,x:a′′1 (c¯)
⇒ (inductive hypothesis, applied twice)
¬¬a′′2 ∈ CΓ,x:a′′1 (c¯)
⇒ (by Law 47(v), since ¬¬a′′2 →
∗ a2)
a2 ∈ CΓ,x:a′′
1
(c¯)
⇒ (by Law 47(vi), since a′′1 →
∗ a1)
a2 ∈ CΓ,x:a1(c¯)
For the second clause, for any d ∈ CΓ(c¯), we can argue as follows:
a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯])
⇒ (by α)
a′′2 [d/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (inductive hypothesis, applied twice)
¬¬(a′′2 [d/x]) ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (definition of substitution)
(¬¬a′2)[d/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (by Laws 47(v) and 2(i), since ¬¬a′2 →
∗ a2)
a2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯)
β: We have to consider four cases:
Cases 1,2: ¬a →∗ [a1, a2] or ¬a →∗ [a1 + a2] for some a1 and a2. By
Law 3(v) we know that a→∗ [a′1⊕a
′
2] for some a
′
1 and a
′
2 where ¬a
′
1 →
∗ a1
and ¬a′2 →
∗ a2.
Since a ∈ CΓ(a¯) and a →∗ [a′1 ⊕ a
′
2] by computability condition α we
obtain a′1 ∈ CΓ(b¯) anf a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯). By inductive hypotheses we know that
also ¬a′1 ∈ CΓ(b¯) and ¬a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯). By Law 47(v) we get a1 ∈ CΓ(b¯) and
a2 ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Cases 3,4: ¬¬a →∗ [a1, a2] or ¬¬a →∗ [a1 + a2] for some a1 and a2.
By Law 3(v) we know that ¬a →∗ [a′1 ⊕ a
′
2] for some a
′
1 and a
′
2 where
¬a′1 →
∗ a1 and ¬a′2 →
∗ a2 . Applying Law 3(v) again we know that
a →∗ [a′′1 ⊕
′ a′′2 ] for some a
′′
1 and a
′′
2 where ¬a
′′
1 →
∗ a′1 and ¬a
′′
2 →
∗ a′2.
This means that ¬¬a′′1 →
∗ a1 and ¬¬a
′′
2 →
∗ a2.
Since a ∈ CΓ(a¯) and a →∗ [a′′1 ⊕
′ a′′′2 ] by computability condition α we
obtain a′′1 ∈ CΓ(b¯) anf a
′′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯). By inductive hypotheses (applied
twice) we know that also ¬¬a′1 ∈ CΓ(b¯) and ¬¬a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯). By Law 47(v)
we get a1 ∈ CΓ(b¯) and a2 ∈ CΓ(c¯).
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γ: We have to consider three cases:
Case 1: ¬a →∗ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3] for some x, a1, a2, a3. By Law 3(v) we
know that a →∗ [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3]. Since a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]), by computability
condition β, we know that a1 ∈ CΓ(b¯), a2 ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Cases 2,3: ¬a →∗ [a1, : a2] or ¬a →∗ [: a1, a2] for some a1 and a2. By
Law 3(v) we know that a →∗ [a1, : a2] or a →
∗ [: a1, a2]. Since a ∈
CΓ([b¯, c¯]), by computability condition β, we know that a1 ∈ CΓ(b¯) or
a2 ∈ CΓ(c¯), respectively.
δ: Let b¯ = [b¯1, b¯2] for some b¯1 and b¯2. Let ¬a →∗ [a1 ? a2] for some a1 and
a2. By Law 3(v) we know that a→
∗ [a1 ? a2]. By computability condition
δ we know that a1 ∈ CΓ([b¯1, c¯]) and a2 ∈ CΓ([b¯2, c¯]).
Closure of computability against application has the most involved proof of
monotonicity.
Law 49 (Closure of computable expressions against application). For all Γ, a,
b: Γ |= (a b), a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ), and b ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ) implies ‖a‖Γ= [ ‖b‖Γ, c¯] and
(a b) ∈ CΓ(c¯) for some c¯.
The large size of the proof comes from many repetitions of similar arguments
when showing the computability conditions of application.
Proof. Assume that Γ |=(a b), a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ), and b ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ). Let a¯ = ‖a‖Γ
and b¯ = ‖b‖Γ. Γ |=(a b) implies that a¯ = [b¯, c¯] for some c¯. By induction on a¯ we
will show that a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) and b ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ) implies (a b) ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Inductive base: Trivial since a¯ 6= τ .
Inductive step: We first need to show that (a b) ∈ S. By Law 39(i) we
have to show conditions (C1) and (C2). For any x, b1, c1, c2, d1, d2:
(C1) Let a →∗ ⊕x(b1, c1). Since a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]), by computability condition α,
for any d ∈ CΓ(b¯) we know that c1[d/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯). Hence also c1[b/x] ∈
CΓ(c¯). By Law 47(i) this implies c1[b/x] ∈ S hence condition (C1) is
satisfied.
(C2) Let a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and b →∗ [d1, : d2]. From b →∗ [d1, : d2], by Law 42
and by definition of norming we know that b¯ = [d¯1, d¯2] and hence a¯ =
[[d¯1, d¯2], c¯]. Since b ∈ CΓ([d¯1, d¯2]) by computability condition β we know
that d1 ∈ CΓ(d¯1) and d2 ∈ CΓ(d¯2). Since a ∈ CΓ([[d¯1, d¯2], c¯]) by com-
putability condition δ we know that c1 ∈ CΓ([d¯1, c¯]), c2 ∈ CΓ([d¯2, c¯]).
By inductive hypothesis (the sizes of [d¯1, c¯] and [d¯2, c¯] are both strictly
smaller than that of a¯), we know that (c1 d1) ∈ CΓ(c¯) and (c2 d2) ∈ CΓ(c¯).
By definition of computability therefore (c1 d1), (c2 d2) ∈ S.
Therefore by Law 39(i) we know that (a b) ∈ S. It remains to show the com-
putability conditions for (a b). Let c¯ = [d¯, e¯] for some d¯ and e¯:
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α: If (a b) →∗ ⊕x(a1, a2) or ¬(a b) →∗ ⊕x(a1, a2), for some a1 and a2 then,
since Γ |=(a b), by Law 42 we have
‖⊕x(a1, a2)‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ,x:a1] = [d¯, e¯]
Therefore ‖a1 ‖Γ= d¯ and ‖a2 ‖Γ,x:a1= e¯. We have to show that a2 ∈
CΓ,x:a1(e¯) and a2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(e¯) for any d ∈ CΓ(d¯).
We have to distinguish two cases:
Case α1: If (a b) →∗ ⊕x(a1, a2) then by Law 3(vi) we know that there
are two cases:
– Case α1.1: a→∗ [y : a3]a4, b→∗ b′, and a4[b′/y]→∗ ⊕x(a1, a2) for
some y, a3, a4, and b
′. We can argue as follows:
a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯])
⇒ (by α, since by Law 47(v) we know that b′ ∈ CΓ(b¯))
a4[b
′/x] ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (by Law 47(v), since a4[b
′/y]→∗ ⊕x(a1, a2))
⊕x(a1, a2) ∈ CΓ(c¯)
– Case α1.2: a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and either b →
∗ [b1, : b2] and c1(b1) →
∗
⊕x(a1, a2) or b→∗ [:b1, b2] and c2(b2)→∗ ⊕x(a1, a2) for some c1, c2,
b1, and b2.
This means that b¯ = [b¯1, b¯2] for some b¯1 and b¯2 where ‖c1‖Γ= [b¯1, c¯]
and ‖c2‖Γ= [b¯2, c¯]. Since Γ |=(a b) we also know that ‖b1‖Γ= b¯1 and
‖b2‖Γ= b¯2. We will show the first case, the proof of the second case
is similar.
From b→∗ [b1, :b2], by computability condition γ we know that b1 ∈
CΓ(b¯1). From a →∗ [c1 ? c2], by computability condition δ we know
that c1 ∈ CΓ([b¯1, c¯]) and c2 ∈ CΓ([b¯2, c¯]). Since the size of [b¯1, c¯] is
strictly smaller than the size of a¯ we can apply the inductive hypoth-
esis to obtain (c1 c3) ∈ CΓ(c¯). Hence, since (c1 b1)→∗ ⊕x(a1, a2), by
Law 47(v) we have ⊕x(a1, a2) ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Therefore in both cases we have shown ⊕x(a1, a2) ∈ CΓ(c¯). From com-
putability condition α we obtain a2 ∈ CΓ,x:a1(e¯) and a2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(e¯).
Case α2: If ¬(a b)→∗ ⊕x(a1, a2) then we need to consider two subcases:
– Case α2.1: ⊕x(a1, a2) = [x : a1]a2: By Law 3(v) we know that
(a b)→∗ [x!a′1]a
′
2 for some a
′
1 and a
′
2 where a
′
1 →
∗ a1 and ¬a′2 →
∗ a2.
Therefore, by Law 3(vi) we know that there are two cases:
∗ Case α2.1.1: a →∗ [y : a3]a4 and b →
∗ b′ and a4[b
′/y] →∗
[x!a′1]a
′
2 for some y, a3, a4, and b
′. As in case α1.1 we can show
that [x!a′1]a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯)
112
∗ Case α2.1.2: a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and either b →∗ [b1, : b2] and
(c1 b1) →∗ [x!a′1]a
′
2 or b →
∗ [: b1, b2] and c2(b2) →∗ [x!a′1]a
′
2
for some c1, c2, b1, and b2. As in case α1.2 we can show that
[x!a′1]a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Hence in all cases we have [x!a′1]a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯). We can now show the
first part of α as follows:
[x!a′1]a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (by α)
a′2 ∈ CΓ,x:a1(e¯)
⇒ (by Law 48)
¬a′2 ∈ CΓ,x:a1(e¯)
⇒ (by Law 47(v), since ¬a′2 →
∗ a2)
a2 ∈ CΓ,x:a1(e¯)
Let d ∈ CΓ(d¯). We can show the second part of α as follows:
[x!a′1]a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(c¯)
⇒ (by α, since d ∈ CΓ(d¯))
a′2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(e¯)
⇒ (by Law 48)
¬(a′2[d/x]) ∈ CΓ,x:a1(e¯)
⇒ (definition of substitution )
(¬a′2)[d/x] ∈ CΓ,x:a1(e¯)
⇒ (by Law 47(v) and 2(i), since ¬a′2 →
∗ a2)
a2[d/x] ∈ CΓ,x:a1(e¯)
– Case α2.2: ⊕x(a1, a2) = [x!a1]a2: This can be shown in a similar
(symmetric) way as case α2.1.
β: We have to distinguish two cases:
Case β1: If (a b) →∗ [a1 ⊕ a2] for some a1 and a2, then, since Γ |=(a b),
by Law 42 we have
‖(a b)‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = [d¯, e¯]
By Law 3(vii) we know that there are two cases:
– Case β1.1: a →∗ ⊕x(a3, a4), b →∗ b′, and a4[b′/x] →∗ [a1 ⊕ a2] for
some x, a3, a4, and b
′. By the same argument as in case α1.1 we can
show that [a1 ⊕ a2] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
– Case β1.2: a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and either b →∗ [b1, : b2] and (c1 b1) →∗
[a1 ⊕ a2] or b →∗ [: b1, b2] and (c2 b2) →∗ [a1 ⊕ a2] for some c1, c2,
b1, and b2. By the same argument as in case α1.2 we can show that
[a1 ⊕ a2] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
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Hence in both cases we have [a1⊕a2] ∈ CΓ(c¯). By computability condition
β we obtain a1 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and a2 ∈ CΓ(e¯).
Case β2: If ¬(a b)→∗ [a1⊕ a2] for some a1 and a2, then, since obviously
Γ |=¬(a b), by Law 42 we have
‖¬(a b)‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = [d¯, e¯]
We need to consider two subcases:
– Case β2.1: If ¬(a b) →∗ [a1, a2] then by Law 3(v) we know that
(a b)→∗ [a′1 + a
′
2] where ¬a
′
1 →
∗ a1 and ¬a
′
2 →
∗ a2 for some a
′
1 and
a′2. Therefore by elementary properties of reduction (Law 3(vii))
there are two cases
∗ Case β2.1.1: a →∗ ⊕x(a3, a4), b →∗ b′, and ¬a4[b′/x] →∗
[b1 + b2] for some x, a3, a4, and b
′. By the same argument as in
case α1.1 we can show that [a′1 + a
′
2] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
∗ Case β2.1.2: a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and either b →∗ [b1, : b2] and
(c1 b1) →∗ [a′1 + a
′
2] or b →
∗ [: b1, b2] and (c2 b2) →∗ [a′1 + a
′
2]
for some c1, c2, b1, and b2. By the same argument as in case
α1.2 we can show that [a′1 + a
′
2] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Hence in all cases we have [a′1 + a
′
2] ∈ CΓ(c¯). By Law 48 we have
¬[a′1+a
′
2] ∈ CΓ(c¯) and hence by Law 47(v) we have [¬a
′
1,¬a
′
2] ∈ CΓ(c¯)
and therefore by definition of computable expressions (condition β)
we obtain we have ¬a′1 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and ¬a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(e¯). Since ¬a
′
1 →
∗ a1
and ¬a′2 →
∗ a2 by Law 47(v) we have a1 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and a2 ∈ CΓ(e¯).
– Case β2.2: ¬(a b) →∗ [a1 + a2]: This can be shown in a similar
(symmetric) way as case β2.1.
γ: We have to distinguish three cases:
Case γ1: If (a b) →∗ [x
.
= a1, a2 : c] for some a1 , a2, and c then, since
Γ |=(a b), by Law 42 we have
‖(a b)‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = [d¯, e¯]
By Law 3(vi) we know that there are two cases
– Case γ1.1: a→∗ ⊕y(a3, a4), b→∗ b′, and ¬a4[b′/y]→∗ [x
.
=a1, a2 :
c] for some y, a3, a4, and b
′. By the same argument as in case α1.1
we can show that [x
.
=a1, a2 : c] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
– Case γ1.2: a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and either b →
∗ [b1, : b2] and c1(b1) →
∗
[x
.
=a1, a2 : c] or b→∗ [:b1, b2] and c2(b2)→∗ [x
.
=a1, a2 : c] for some
c1, c2, b1, and b2. By the same argument as in case α1.2 we can
show that [x
.
=a1, a2 : c] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Hence in all cases [x
.
= a1, a2 : c] ∈ CΓ(c¯). By computability condition γ
we know that a1 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and a2 ∈ CΓ(e¯).
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Case γ2: If (a b) →∗ [a1, : c] for some a1 and c, then, since Γ |=(a b), by
Law 42 we have
‖(a b)‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖c‖Γ] = [d¯, e¯]
By Law 3(vii) we know that there are two cases
– a →∗ ⊕y(a3, a4), b →∗ b′, and a4[b′/y] →∗ a4[b′/y] →∗ [a1, : c]. By
the same argument as in case α1.1 we can show that [a1, :c] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
– a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and either b →∗ [b1, : b2] and c1(b1) →∗ [a1, : c] or
b →∗ [: b1, b2] and c2(b2) →∗ [: a1, c] for some c1, c2, b1, and b2. By
the same argument as in case α1.2 we can show that [a1, :c] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Hence in all cases we have [a1, :c] ∈ CΓ(c¯). By computability condition β
we obtain a1 ∈ CΓ(d¯).
Case γ3: ¬(a b) →∗ [: c, a2] for some a2 and c: This case is shown in a
similar (symmetric) way as case γ2.
δ: Let d¯ = [d¯1, d¯2] for some d¯1 and d¯2: (a b)→∗ [a1 ? a2] for some a1 and a2
then, since Γ |=(a b), by Law 42 we have
‖[a1 ? a2]‖Γ= [d¯, e¯]
where ‖a1‖Γ= [d¯1, e¯] and ‖a2‖Γ= [d¯2, e¯]. By Law 3(vii) we know that
there are two cases
– Case δ1: a →∗ [y : a3]a4, b →∗ b′, and a4[b′/y] →∗ a4[b′/y] →∗
[a1 ? a2]. By the same argument as in case α1.1 we can show that
[a1 ? a2] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
– Case δ2: a →∗ [c1 ? c2] and either b →∗ [b1, : b2] and (c1 b1) →∗
[a1 ? a2] or b→∗ [: b1, b2], and (c2 b2)→∗ [a1 ? a2] for some c1, c2, b1,
and b2. By the same argument as in case α1.2 we can show that
[a1 ? a2] ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Hence in all cases we have [a1 ? a2] ∈ CΓ(c¯). By computability condition
β we obtain a1 ∈ CΓ([d¯1, e¯]) and a2 ∈ CΓ([d¯2, e¯]).
We now show all the other closure properties of computable expressions, some
of which require normability of the operator.
Law 50 (Closure properties of computable expressions). For all Γ, x, a, b, c, d,
a¯, b¯, c¯:
i: Γ |= [x
.
= a, b : c], a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖γ), b ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖γ), and c ∈ CΓ,x:a( ‖b‖γ)
implies [x
.
=a, b : c] ∈ CΓ([ ‖a‖γ , ‖b‖γ ]).
ii: a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) and b ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ) implies [a ⊕ b], [a, : b], [:a, b] ∈ CΓ([ ‖a‖Γ
, ‖b‖Γ]).
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iii: Γ |=a.1 and a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]) implies a.1 ∈ CΓ(b¯).
iv: Γ |=a.2 and a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]) implies a.2 ∈ CΓ(c¯).
v: a ∈ CΓ([a¯, c¯]) and b ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]) implies [a ? b] ∈ CΓ([[a¯, b¯], c¯]).
Proof. For all Γ, x, a, b, c, d, a¯, b¯, c¯:
i: Since Γ |= [x
.
= a, b : c] by definition of computable expressions we know
that ‖[x
.
= a, b : c]‖Γ= [ ‖a‖Γ, ‖b‖Γ] where ‖c‖Γ,x:a= ‖b‖Γ. Let a¯ = ‖a‖Γ
and b¯ = ‖b‖Γ. Assume a ∈ CΓ(a¯), b ∈ CΓ(b¯), and c ∈ CΓ,x:a(b¯). We have
to show [x
.
=a, b : c] ∈ CΓ([a¯, b¯]).
Since by definition of computable expressions a, b, c ∈ S, by Law 38(iv) we
have [x
.
= a, b : c] ∈ S. It remains to show the computability conditions:
By Law 3(ii), [x
.
= a, b : c] →∗ d and ¬[x
.
= a, b : c] →∗ d each imply
d = [x
.
= a′, b′ : c′] for some a′, b′, and c′. Therefore, the computability
conditions α, β, and δ are trivially satisfied. The condition γ is trivially
satisfied except for the case [x
.
=a, b : c] →∗ [x
.
=a′, b′ : c′] for some a′, b′,
and c′. By Law 3(ii) we know that a →∗ a′, b →∗ b′, and c →∗ c′. By
Law 47(v) we know that a′ ∈ CΓ(a¯) and b′ ∈ CΓ(b¯)-
ii: Let a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ), and b ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ). We show that [a, b], [a + b], [a, :
b], [:a, b] ∈ CΓ([ ‖a‖Γ, ‖b‖Γ]). Obviously Γ |=[a, b], [a+ b], [a, : b], [:a, b] and
[a, b], [a+ b], [a, :b], [:a, b] ∈ S.
First we turn to the computability conditions for [a, b]: Since products
or negated products always reduce to product or sums, the conditions α,
γ, and δ are trivially satisfied. It remains to show the condition β: Let
Γ⊢ [a, b] →∗ [a1 ⊕ a2] or Γ⊢¬[a, b] →∗ [a1 ⊕ a2] for some a1 and a2. By
Law 3(i,v) we know that a→∗ a1 or ¬a→∗ a1 and b→∗ a2 or ¬b→∗ a2.
By Law 48 we know that ¬a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) and ¬b ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ). Hence, by
Law 47(v) in each case we know that a1 ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) and a2 ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ).
The proof of the computability conditions for [a+ b] is similar.
Next we show the computability conditions for [a, : b] and [: a, b]. Since
injections or negated injections always reduce to injections, the conditions
α, β, γ (partially), and δ are trivially satisfied. It remains to show the
non-trivial cases of the condition γ: Let Γ⊢ [a, :b]→∗ [a1, :a2] for some a1
and a2. By Law 3(i) we know that a →∗ a1 and a →∗ a2. The required
conclusions a1 ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) and a2 ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ) follow by Law 47(v).
iii: Since Γ |= a.1 by definition of computable expressions we know that ‖
a.1‖Γ= b¯ where ‖a‖Γ= [b¯, c¯]. Assume a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]). We have to show
a.1 ∈ CΓ(b¯).
Since a ∈ S by Law 38(iii) we know that a.1 ∈ S. It remains to show the
computability conditions for a.1. Let b¯ = [d¯, e¯] for some d¯ and e¯.
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α: Assume a.1 →∗ ⊕x(a1, a2) or ¬(a.1) →∗ ⊕x(a1, a2) for some a1 and
a2. By Law 42 we have
‖a.1‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = [d¯, e¯]
If a.1 →∗ ⊕x(a1, a2), by Law 3(iii) we have a →∗ [y
.
=a3, a4 : a5] or
a→∗ [a3 ⊕ a4], for some y, a3, a4, and a5, where a3 →
∗ ⊕x(a1, a2).
If ¬(a.1)→∗ ⊕x(a1, a2), Law 3(v), we have a.1→∗ ⊕′x(a
′
1, a
′
2) where
a′1 →
∗ a1 and ¬a′2 →
∗ a2 for some a
′
1 and a
′
2. By Law 3(iii) we know
that a →∗ [y
.
=a3, a4 : a5] or a →∗ [a3 ⊕ a4], for some y, a3, a4, and
a5, where a3 →∗ ⊕′x(a
′
1, a
′
2).
In both cases, by Law 47(v) we can conclude that [y
.
=a3, a4 : a5] ∈
CΓ(a¯) or [a3 ⊕ a4] ∈ CΓ(a¯). By computability condition β and γ we
have a3 ∈ CΓ(b¯). Since a3 →∗ ⊕x(a1, a2) or a3 →∗ ⊕′x(a
′
1, a
′
2), by
Law 47(v) we know that ⊕x(a1, a2) ∈ CΓ(b¯) or ⊕′x(a
′
1, a
′
2) ∈ CΓ(b¯).
If ⊕x(a1, a2) ∈ CΓ(b¯), by computability condition α we obtain a2 ∈
CΓ,x:a1(d¯) and a2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(e¯) for any d ∈ CΓ(d¯).
If ⊕′x(a
′
1, a
′
2) ∈ CΓ(b¯), by computability condition α we obtain a
′
2 ∈
CΓ,x:a1(d¯).
Hence, by Law 48 we know that ¬a′2 ∈ CΓ,x:a1(d¯) and therefore by
Law 47(v) we know that a2 ∈ CΓ,x:a1(d¯).
Furthermore a′2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(e¯) for any d ∈ CΓ(d¯). Hence by Law 48
and definition of substitution we obtain (¬a′2)[d/x] ∈ CΓ(e¯).c Since
¬a′2 →
∗ a2, by Laws 2(i) and 47(v) we know that a2[d/x] ∈ CΓ(e¯).
β: Assume a.1→∗ [a1 ⊕ a2] or ¬(a.1)→∗ [a1 ⊕ a2]. By Law 42 we have
‖a.1‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = [d¯, e¯]
If a.1 →∗ [a1 ⊕ a2], by Law 3(iv) we have a →∗ [y
.
= a3, a4 : a5] or
a→∗ [a3 ⊕
′ a4], for some y, a3, a4, and a5, where a3 →
∗ [a1 ⊕ a2].
If ¬(a.1) →∗ [a1 ⊕ a2], Law 3(v), we have a.1 →∗ [a′1 ⊕
′ a′2] where
¬a′1 →
∗ a1 and ¬a′2 →
∗ a2 for some a
′
1 and a
′
2. By Law 3(iii) we
know that a →∗ [y
.
= a3, a4 : a5] or a →∗ [a3 ⊕′′ a4], for some y, a3,
a4, and a5, where a3 →∗ [a′1 ⊕
′ a′2]→
∗ [a1 ⊕′ a2].
In both cases, by Law 47(v) we can conclude that [y
.
=a3, a4 : a5] ∈
CΓ(a¯) or [a3 ⊕
′ a4] ∈ CΓ(a¯). By computability condition β and γ
we have a3 ∈ CΓ(b¯). Since a3 →∗ [a1 ⊕ a2] or a3 →∗ [a1 ⊕′ a2], by
Law 47(v) we know that [a1 ⊕ a2] ∈ CΓ(b¯) or [a′1 ⊕
′ a′2] ∈ CΓ(b¯).
Hence, by computability condition β we obtain a2 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and a3 ∈
CΓ(e¯) or a
′
2 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and a
′
3 ∈ CΓ(e¯). In the second case by Law 48
and definition of substitution we obtain ¬a′2 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and ¬a
′
3 ∈
CΓ(e¯). Since ¬a′2 →
∗ a2 and ¬a′3 →
∗ a2, by Law 47(v) we know that
a2 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and a3 ∈ CΓ(e¯).
γ: We have to consider three cases:
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Case 1: Assume that a.1 →∗ [x
.
= a1, a2 : c] for some c. By Law 42
we have
‖a.1‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖a2‖Γ] = [d¯, e¯]
By Law 3(iii) we have a →∗ [y
.
= a3, a4 : a5] or a →∗ [a3 ⊕ a4], for
some y, a3, a4, and a5, where a3 →∗ [x
.
=a1, a2 : c]. By Law 47(v) we
have [y
.
=a3, a4 : a5] ∈ CΓ(a¯) or [a3 ⊕ a4] ∈ CΓ(a¯). By computability
condition β we have a3 ∈ CΓ(b¯). Since a.1 →
∗ [x
.
= a1, a2 : c],
by Law 47(v) we have [x
.
= a1, a2 : c] ∈ CΓ(b¯). By computability
condition γ we obtain a1 ∈ CΓ(d¯) and a2 ∈ CΓ(e¯).
Case 2: Assume that a.1→∗ [a1, : c] for some a1 and c. By Law 42
we have
‖a.1‖Γ= [ ‖a1‖Γ, ‖c‖Γ] = [d¯, e¯]
By Law 3(iv) we have a →∗ [y
.
= a3, a4 : a5] or a →∗ [a3 ⊕ a4], for
some y, a3, a4, and a5, where a3 →∗ [a1, : c]. By Law 47(v) we have
[y
.
= a3, a4 : a5] ∈ CΓ(a¯) or [a3 ⊕ a4] ∈ CΓ(a¯). By computability
condition β we have a3 ∈ CΓ(b¯). Since a.1→∗ [a1, :c], by Law 47(v)
we have [a1, : c] ∈ CΓ(b¯). By computability condition γ we obtain
a1 ∈ CΓ(d¯).
Case 3: Assume that a.1 →∗ [a1, : c] or a.1 →∗ [: c, a2] for some a2,
and c. The proof is similar to the one for the case 2.
δ: Let d¯ = [d¯1, d¯2] for some d¯1 and d¯2. Assume that a.1 →
∗ [a1 ? a2].
By Law 42 we have
‖a.1‖Γ= [[d¯1, d¯2], e¯]
where ‖a1 ‖Γ= [d¯1, e¯] and ‖a2‖Γ= [d¯2, e¯]. By Law 3(iii) we have
a →∗ [y
.
= a3, a4 : a5] or a →∗ [a3 ⊕ a4], for some y, a3, a4, and a5,
where a3 →
∗ [a1 ? a2]. By Law 47(v) we have [y
.
=a3, a4 : a5] ∈ CΓ(a¯)
or [a3 ⊕ a4] ∈ CΓ(a¯). By computability condition β we have a3 ∈
CΓ(b¯). Since a3 →∗ [a1 ? a2], by Law 47(v) we have [a1 ? a2] ∈ CΓ(b¯).
By computability condition δ we obtain a1 ∈ CΓ([d¯1, e¯]) and a2 ∈
CΓ([d¯2, e¯]).
iv: Since Γ |= a.2 by definition of computable expressions we know that ‖
a.2‖Γ= c¯ where ‖a‖Γ= [b¯, c¯]. Assume a ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]). We have to show
a.2 ∈ CΓ(c¯).
Since a ∈ S by Law 38(iii) we know that a.2 ∈ S. It remains to show
the computability conditions for a.2. The proof is very similar to the one
for a.1: When having established, in each of the various sub-cases, that
[y
.
= a3, a4 : a5] ∈ CΓ(a¯) or [a3 ⊕ a4] ∈ CΓ(a¯), then by computability
condition β we infer a4 ∈ CΓ(c¯) and proceed in each case with a4 instead
of a3.
v: Assume that a ∈ CΓ([a¯, c¯]) and b ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]). We will show that [a ? b] ∈
CΓ([[a¯, b¯], c¯]). Obviously Γ |= [a ? b] and [a ? b] ∈ S. Since case distinction
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or negated case distinctions always reduce to distinctions, the conditions
α, β, and γ are trivially satisfied.
It remains to show the condition δ: Assume that [a ? b] →∗ [a1 ? a2]. By
Law 3(i) we know that a →∗ a1 and a →∗ a2. The required conclusions
a1 ∈ CΓ([a¯, c¯]) and a2 ∈ CΓ([b¯, c¯]) follow by Laws 47(v).
Note that abstraction is missing from the properties of Law 50 since from a ∈
CΓ,x:b(a¯) we can not conclude that a[c/x] ∈ CΓ for any c ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ). This is
made precise by the following lemma.
Law 51 (Abstraction closure for computable expressions). For all Γ, x, a, and
b where Γ |= ⊕x(a, b): If a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ), b ∈ CΓ,x:a( ‖ b‖Γ,x:a), and for all c
with c ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ) we have b[c/x] ∈ CΓ( ‖b‖Γ,x:a) (this last assumption about
substitution is crucial) then ⊕x(a, b) ∈ CΓ( ‖⊕x(a, b)‖Γ).
Proof. Let a¯ = ‖a‖Γ and b¯ = ‖b‖Γ,x:a. From a ∈ CΓ(a¯) and b ∈ CΓ,x:a(b¯), by
Law 47(i) we have a, b ∈ S. By Law 38(ii) this implies [x : a]b ∈ S.
To show that ⊕x(a, b) ∈ CΓ([a¯, b¯]), it remains to show the computability
conditions for ⊕x(a, b):
α: By Law 3(ii), only the cases [x : a]b →∗ [x : c]d, [x!a]b →∗ [x!c]d,
¬[x : a]b →∗ [x!c]d, and ¬[x!a]b →∗ [x : c]d for some c and d are
possible. By Law 3(ii,v) we know that a →∗ c and either b →∗ d or
¬b→∗ d. We have to show the following properties:
i: We have to show d ∈ CΓ,x:c(b¯): From the assumption b ∈ CΓ,x:a(b¯)
either by directly using Law 47(v) or by first applying Law 48 we
obtain d ∈ CΓ,x:a(b¯). Since a →
∗ c, by Law 47(iv) we obtain that
d ∈ CΓ,x:c(b¯).
ii: Let e ∈ CΓ(a¯). We have to show that d[e/x] ∈ CΓ(b¯) which follows
from the assumption about substitution (by instantiating c to e).
βγδ: The computability conditions β, γ, and δ are trivially satisfied since
(negated) abstractions reduce to abstractions only.
4.9.6 Computability law
To prove computability of all normable expressions, due to of Law 51, we need
to prove the stronger property that normable expressions are computable under
any substitution of their free variables to computable expressions. First we need
to extend the notion of substitution.
Definition 32 (Extended substitution). The substitution operation a[b/x] to
replace free occurrences of x in a by b can be extended as follows: Given se-
quences of pairwise disjoint variables X = (x1, . . . , xn) and expressions B =
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(b1, . . . , bn) where n ≥ 0, a substitution function σX,B is defined on expressions
and contexts as follows:
σX,B(a) = a[b1/x1] · · · [bn/xn]
σX,B(()) = ()
σX,B(x : a,Γ) =
{
(x : σX,B(a), σX,B(Γ)) if x 6= xi
σX,B(Γ) otherwise
If x 6= xi we write σX,B [b/x] for σ(x1,...,xn,x),(b1,...,bn,b).
Definition 33 (Norm-matching substitution). A substitution σX,B where X =
(x1, . . . , xn) and B = (b1, . . . , bn) is called norm matching w.r.t. Γ iff Γ =
(Γ0, x1 : a1,Γ1 . . . xn : an,Γn), for some ai and Γi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and further-
more for all these i we have, with σ abbreviating σX,B :
σ(Γ) |=σ(ai), σ(Γ) |=σ(bi) and ‖σ(ai)‖σ(Γ)= ‖σ(bi)‖σ(Γ)
Norm-matching substitutions indeed preserve norms:
Law 52 (Norm preservation of norm-matching substitutions). Let σX,B be
norm-matching w.r.t. Γ, then for all Γ and a we have ‖σX,B(a)‖σX,B (Γ)= ‖a‖Γ.
Proof. Proof is by induction on the number k of variables in X : If k = 0 the
property is obviously true.
If k = n + 1 where n ≥ 0 consider σ = σX,B where X = (x1, . . . , xn, x),
B = (b1, . . . , bn, b). Since σ is norm-matching w.r.t. Γ, it can be written as Γ =
(Γ′, x : a,Γn+1) where Γ
′ = (Γ0, x1 : a1,Γ1 . . . xn : an,Γn) for some a, a1, . . . , an.
Let σ′ = σ(x1,...,xn),(b1,...,bn). Obviously σ
′ is norm-matching under w.r.t. Γ′ and
we can argue that:
‖a‖Γ′ = (inductive hypothesis)
‖σ′(a)‖σ′(Γ′)
= (σ′ is norm-matching)
‖σ′(b)‖σ′(Γ′)
= (inductive hypothesis)
‖b‖Γ′
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We can now show that σ is norm-matching w.r.t. Γ:
‖a‖Γ = (rewriting Γ)
‖a‖Γ′,x:a,Γn+1
= (by Law 41 since ‖a‖Γ′= ‖b‖Γ′)
‖a[b/x]‖Γ′,(Γn+1[b/x])
= (inductive hypothesis)
‖σ′(a[b/x])‖σ′(Γ′,Γn+1[b/x])
= (definition of σ′)
‖σ(a)‖σ(Γ′,x:a,Γn+1)
= (rewriting Γ)
‖σ(a)‖σ(Γ)
As a consequence of Law 52, for any norm-matching substitution σ we have
Γ |=a if and only if σ(Γ) |=σ(a).
Law 53 (Normability implies computability of all norm-matching substitutions
to computable expressions). For all Γ and a: If Γ |= a then for any norm-
matching substitution σX,B w.r.t. Γ with σX,B(xi) ∈ CσX,B (Γ)( ‖bi‖Γ), for 1 ≤
i ≤ n, we have σX,B(a) ∈ CσX,B(Γ)( ‖a‖Γ).
Proof. Let a¯ = ‖a‖Γ and b¯i = ‖bi‖Γ, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let σ = σX,B be a norm
matching substitution w.r.t. Γ with σ(xi) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(b¯i). The proof is by induction
on the structure of a:
• a = τ : Since σ(τ) = τ the property follows from Law 47(iii).
• a = x : We have Γ |=x and a¯ = ‖x‖Γ. There are two cases:
– x = xi, for some i. Obviously σ(x) = σ(bi). We know that σ(bi) ∈
Cσ(Γ)(b¯i).
a¯ = ‖x‖Γ
= (Law 52)
‖σ(x)‖σ(Γ)
= (definition of substitution)
‖σ(bi)‖σ(Γ)
= (Law 52)
‖bi‖Γ
= (rewriting)
b¯i
Hence σ(x) = σ(bi) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(a¯).
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– If x 6= xi then σ(x) = x and by Law 47(ii) we have σ(x) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(c¯).
• a = ⊕x(b, c): We have Γ |= b and Γ, x : b |= c. Let b¯ = ‖b‖Γ and c¯ = ‖
c‖Γ,x:b. Applying the inductive hypothesis with the empty substitution
σ(),(), which is obviously norm-matching w.r.t. any context, we obtain
b ∈ CΓ(b¯) and c ∈ CΓ,x:b(c¯).
By Law 52 we know that σ( ‖b‖σ(Γ)) = ‖b‖Γ= b¯. By inductive hypothesis
σ(b) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(b¯).
Consider a d where d ∈ CΓ(b¯). In order to apply Law 51 we have
to show that σ(c)[d/x] ∈ Cσ(Γ)(c¯). If we define X
′ = (x1, . . . , xn, x),
B′ = (b1, . . . , bn, d), and σ
′ = σ[d/x] then obviously σ′ is norm-matching
w.r.t (Γ, x : a) and substitutes to computable expressions. Therefore by
inductive hypothesis for c we know that σ′(c) = σ(c[d/x]) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(c¯).
Hence by Law 51 it follows that ⊕x(σ(b), σ(c)) ∈ Cσ(Γ)([b¯, c¯]) which by
definition of substitution is equivalent to σ(⊕x(b, c)) ∈ Cσ(Γ)([b¯, c¯]).
• a = [x
.
= a1, a2 : a3]: We have Γ |= a1, a2, Γ, x : a1 |= a3, and ‖a2‖Γ= ‖
a3‖Γ,x:a1. Let a¯1 = ‖a1‖Γ, a¯2 = ‖a2‖Γ.
By inductive hypothesis with σ we know that σX,B(a1) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(a¯1),
σ(a2) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(a¯2), and σX,B(a3) ∈ Cσ(Γ,x:a1)(a¯2) = C(σ(Γ),x:σ(a1))(a¯2).
By Law 50(i) we then obtain [x
.
= σ(a1), σ(a2) : σ(a3)] ∈ Cσ(Γ)([a¯1, a¯2]).
By definition of substitution this is equivalent to σ([x
.
= a1, a2 : a3]) ∈
Cσ(Γ)([a¯1, a¯2]).
• a = ⊕(a1, . . . , an): We have Γ |=a and Γ |=ai. Let a¯ = ‖a‖Γ, a¯i = ‖ai‖Γ. By
inductive hypothesis σ(ai) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(a¯i). By Laws 48, 49, and the various
cases of Law 50 we obtain ⊕(σ(a1), . . . , σ(an)) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(a¯). By definition
of substitution this is equivalent to σ(⊕(a1, . . . , an)) ∈ Cσ(Γ)(a¯).
Law 54 (Computability law: Normability implies computability). For all Γ and
a: If Γ |=a then a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ).
Proof. Follows from Law 53 when taking the empty substitution σ(),() which
obviously satisfies the required properties.
4.9.7 Putting things together
Law 55 (Strong normalization of valid expressions). For all Γ and a: Γ ⊢ a
implies a ∈ S.
Proof. Assume Γ ⊢ a. By Law 45 this implies Γ |= a. By Law 54 this implies
a ∈ CΓ( ‖a‖Γ). By Law 47(i) this implies a ∈ S.
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Definition 34 (Normal form). If a ∈ S then N (a) denotes the unique expres-
sion to which a is maximally reducible. Note that this definition is well-founded
due to confluence of reduction (Law 17). Furthermore, due to strong normali-
sation (Law 55), Γ⊢a implies that N (a) exists.
Law 56 (Valid normal form and typing). For all Γ, a, and b: If Γ ⊢ a and
Γ⊢a : b then Γ⊢N (a) : b
Proof. By Law 55 we know that a ∈ S and hence that N (a) exists. Obviously
a→∗ N (a). By Law 32 this implies Γ⊢N (a) : b.
4.10 Decidability of the typing relation
Law 57 (Decidability of the typing relation). For any expression a and context
Γ there is a terminating algorithm such that Γ⊢a iff the algorithm is not failing
but computing an expression b with Γ⊢a : b.
Proof. The algorithm to attempt to compute a type b of a is recursive on the
structure of a under the context Γ. We outline the steps of this algorithm in-
cluding its termination argument which is based on the weight functionW (E, a)
from the proof of Law 12 with E = () and extended to contexts by the law
W ((), x1 : a1, . . . , xn : an) =W ((), a1) + . . .+W ((), an)
summing up the number of syntactic constructions in Γ.
a = τ : Obviously b = τ .
a = x: If Γ(x) is defined, i.e. Γ = (Γ1, x : b,Γ2) then try to compute
a type of b under Γ1. The recursion will terminate since the
weight of Γ1 and a is smaller than the weight of Γ and x. If
the algorithm is successful then the result is b. In all other
cases the algorithm fails.
a = ⊕x(a1, a2): First try to compute a type of a1 under Γ. If the algorithm is
successful then try to compute a type of a2 under (Γ, x : a1).
The recursion will terminate since the weight of (Γ, x : a1)
and a2 is smaller than the weight of Γ and ⊕x(a1, a2). If the
algorithm is successful and delivers a result b2 then the result
is [x : a1]b2. In all other cases the algorithm fails.
a = (a1 a2): The algorithm is recursively applied to both a1 and a2 under
Γ. If both applications are successful, we obtain expressions
b1 and b2 where Γ ⊢ a1 : b1, and Γ ⊢ a2 : b2. Due to strong
normalization we can now check if N (b1) = [x : N (b2)]d for
some d. If the check is positive, the result is d[a2/x]. In all
other cases the algorithm fails.
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a = a1.1: The algorithm is recursively applied to a1 under Γ. If the
applications is successful, we obtain an expression b1 with
Γ ⊢ a1 : b1. Due to strong normalization we can now check
if N (b1) = [c, d] or N (b1) = [x
.
= c, d : e] for some c, d, and
e. If check is positive, the result is c. In all other cases the
algorithm fails.
a = a1.2: This case is similar to a1.1.
. . .: All other cases are straightforward constructions along the
lines of the previous cases.
This shows that the algorithm always delivers a correct result if it terminates.
On the other hand, if Γ⊢a : b for some b, then one can show by a straightforward
induction on the definition of Γ⊢a : b that our algorithm will compute a typing
Γ⊢ a : b′ where b =λ b′, hence the algorithm is also complete. We go through
some crucial typing rules:
ax: Obviously b′ = b = τ .
start: We have a = x and Γ = (Γ′, x : b) and Γ′⊢b : c for some c. By inductive
hypothesis our algorithm will compute a typing Γ⊢b : c′ where c =λ c′.
Hence our algorithm will compute b as type of x, i.e. b′ = b.
weak: We have Γ = (Γ′, x : c) where Γ′ ⊢ c : d and Γ′ ⊢ a : b for some d.
By inductive hypothesis our algorithm will compute a typing Γ′⊢a : b′
where b =λ b
′. Since x /∈ FV (a), obviously our algorithm will also
compute Γ⊢a : b′ where b =λ b′.
conv: We have Γ ⊢ a : b where c =λ b and Γ ⊢ c : d for some c and d.
By inductive hypothesis our algorithm will compute typings Γ ⊢ a : b′
where b =λ b
′. Obviously b′ =λ c which implies the proposition.
absU : a = [x : c]c1: We have b = [x : c]c2 where (Γ, x : c) ⊢ c1 : c2 and
Γ ⊢ c : d for some x, c, c1, c2. By inductive hypothesis our algorithm
will compute typings (Γ, x : c) ⊢ c1 : c′2 where c2 =λ c
′
2 and Γ ⊢ c : d
′
where d =λ d
′. Hence it will compute Γ⊢a : [x : c]c′2 which implies the
proposition since [x : c]c′2 =λ b.
. . . All other cases are straightforward constructions along the lines of the
previous cases.
4.11 Normal forms and consistency
Due to confluence and the strong normalization result for valid expressions it
is often sufficient to consider the normal form N (a) instead of the expression
a itself when proving properties about expressions of d. In Chapter 1, we have
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informally developed a stepwise characterization of the normal forms of valid
expressions of d. In this section, we study this more rigorously and use a char-
acterization of valid normal forms to show consistency of d.
Definition 35 (Valid normal forms). The set of valid normal forms is a subset
of E and denoted by N . The recursive characterization of valid normal forms
in Table 4.4 also uses the auxiliary set of dead ends denoted by D.
N = {τ} ∪ {[x : a]b, [x!a]b, [x
.
=a, b : c] | a, b, c ∈ N}
∪ {[a, b], [a+ b], [a, :b], [:a, b], [a ? b] | a, b ∈ N} ∪ D
D = {x | x ∈ V} ∪ {(a b), a.1, a.2, [b ? c](a) | a ∈ D, b, c ∈ N}
∪ {¬a | a ∈ D, a is not a negation}
Table 4.4: Valid normal forms
The following law shows that N indeed characterizes the normal forms of valid
expressions.
Law 58 (Normal forms of valid expressions). For all a where⊢a we have that
a ∈ N iff N (a) = a.
Proof. We will prove the more general property that for all a and Γ with Γ⊢a
we have that a ∈ N iff N (a) = a. Obviously, by construction, all elements of
N are irreducible. For the reverse direction assume Γ⊢ a and N (a) = a. The
proof of a ∈ N is by induction on a and Γ.
• If a = x or a = τ then obviously a ∈ N .
• The cases of a being an abstraction, a product, a sum, a protected defini-
tion, a case distinction, or an injection, follow from the inductive hypoth-
esis and the definition of N .
• If a = (a1 a2) then obviously Γ⊢a1, a2 and therefore by inductive hypoth-
esis a1, a2 ∈ N . We proceed by a case distinction on a1:
– Since Γ⊢(a1 a2), a1 cannot be the primitive constant, an injection, a
protected definition, a sum, or a product.
– Since N (a) = a, a1 cannot be a universal or existential abstraction.
– If a1 = x then obviously a1 ∈ D and since a2 ∈ N we have a ∈ D ⊆
N .
– If a1 = (a3 a4), a1 = a3.1, a1 = a3.2, or a = [a3 ? a4] then a1 ∈ N
(by definition of N ) obviously implies a1 ∈ D. Hence a ∈ D ⊆ N .
– If a1 = ¬a3 then since N (a1) = a1 we know that a3 can only be an
variable. Obviously a1 ∈ D. Obviously this implies a ∈ D ⊆ N .
• If a = a1.1 then obviously Γ ⊢ a1 and therefore by inductive hypothesis
a1 ∈ N . We proceed by a case distinction on a1:
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– Since Γ ⊢ a1.1, a1 cannot be the primitive constant, a universal or
existential abstraction, an injection, or a case distinction.
– Since N (a) = a, a1 cannot be a protected definition, a product, or a
sum.
– If a1 = x then obviously a1 ∈ D and therefore a ∈ D ⊆ N .
– If a1 = (a2 a3), a1 = a2.1, a1 = a2.2, or a = [a2 ? a3] then a1 ∈ N
(by definition of N ) obviously implies a1 ∈ D. Hence a ∈ D ⊆ N .
– If a1 = ¬a2 then since N (a1) = a1 we know that a2 can only be an
variable. Obviously a1 ∈ D. Obviously this implies a ∈ D ⊆ N .
• The case a = a1.2 can be treated analogously to the previous case.
• If a = ¬a1 then obviously Γ ⊢ a1 and therefore by inductive hypothesis
a1 ∈ N . Since N (a) = a, we know that N (a1) = a1 and that a1 can only
be an variable. Obviously a ∈ D ⊆ N .
We need a couple of easy lemmas for the consistency proof. First we note a
property which motivated the construction of dead ends.
Law 59 (Dead ends contain free variables). For all a: FV (a) = ∅ implies a /∈ D
Proof. The property is obvious by definition of D.
Law 60 (Valid normal forms of universal abstraction type). For all x, a, b, and
c: If a ∈ N and ⊢ a : [x : b]c then there is some d ∈ N such that a = ⊕x(b, d)
and x : a1⊢d : c.
Proof. Since FV (a) = ∅, by Law 59 we know that a /∈ D. From⊢a : [x : b]c, by
Laws 29 and 26(i) we know that ⊢ b and x : b⊢ c. Therefore we need to check
the following remaining cases
• a is the primitive constant, a protected definition, an injection, a sum,
or a product, and ⊢ a : [x : b]c: By definition of typing and properties of
reduction this cannot be the case.
• a = ⊕x(a1, a2). By Law 26(i) we know that ⊢ a1 and x : a1 ⊢ a2. From
⊢ ⊕x(a1, a2) : [x : b]c, by Law 25(i) we have x : a1 ⊢ a2 : d
′ for some d′
where [x : a1]d
′ =λ [x : b]c. Hence a1 =λ b and d
′ =λ c.
Therefore, since x : b1 ⊢ b2 : d′ and b1 =λ b, by Law 30 we know that
x : b⊢ b2 : d′. Similarly since d′ =λ c, by typing rule conv we know that
x : b⊢b2 : c. Hence we have shown the property with d = b2.
We also need the following strengthening of Law 25(ii).
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Law 61 (Abstraction property). For all Γ, x, a, b, and c: If Γ⊢⊕x(a, b) : [x : a]c
then Γ, x : a⊢b : c.
Proof. By Law 25(ii) we know that Γ, x : a⊢ b : d for some d with c =λ d. By
Law 29 we know that⊢ [x : a]c. By Law 26(i) we know that x : a⊢c. Hence by
rule conv we can infer that Γ, x : a⊢b : c.
Law 62 (τ -declaration property). For all a and b: x : τ ⊢ a : b implies that
b 6=λ x.
Proof. Du to Law 32 (subject reduction) we may assume that a ∈ N . The
various cases of Law 25 imply that b 6=λ x in case a is an abstraction, a sum,
a product, a protected definition, a case distinction, or an injection. Hence by
definition of N , it remains to look at the case a ∈ D. By definition of D, since
x : τ ⊢ a, a can only be an variable x or a negated variable ¬x and obviously
b =λ τ . The property follows since τ 6=λ x and τ 6=λ ¬x.
Law 63 (Consistency of d). There is no expression a such that⊢a and⊢a : [x :
τ ]x.
Proof. Assume that there is an expression a with ⊢ a and ⊢ a : [x : τ ]x. By
Law 55 (strong normalization) and by Definition 35 we know that there is a
normal form a′ ∈ N with a →∗ a′. By Law 33 we know that ⊢ a′. By Law 32
(subject reduction) we know that⊢a′ : [x : τ ]x.
Since a′ ∈ N , by Law 60 there is a c where⊢⊕x(τ, c) : [x : τ ]x. By Law 61
this implies x : τ ⊢ c : x. By Law 62 thus implies that x 6=λ x. Thus we have
inferred a contradiction and therefore the proposition is true.
Remark (Limitations of the consistency result). Law 63 shows that there is no
inherent flaw in the typing mechanism of d by which one could prove anything
from nothing. Note that the consistency result is limited to empty environ-
ments, hence it does not cover the case of using negation or casting axioms (see
Appendix A).
Remark (Extension of the empty type). It is an open issue if we can generalize
the empty type [x : τ ]x to [x : a]x for any a with⊢a.
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Chapter 5
Comparison to other
systems and possible
extensions
Due to the proposed systems use of λ-structured types, d falls outside the scope
of PTS (see e.g. [4]). In Section 1.3 we have indicated the differences between
the core of dand PTS.
Due to its origins from λλ and its use of a reflexive typing axiom d does
not use the concept of dependent product and it does not use a typing relation
that can be interpreted as set membership. Instead d introduces a number
of operators which can be functionally interpreted by untyped λ-expressions
by stripping of the type tags and negations, interpreting both sum, product,
and protected definitions as binary pairs and both universal and existential
abstraction as λ-abstraction (see Appendix B). The typing rules of d then induce
a relation between untyped λ-expressions.
Logically, the typing relation of d is restricted in the sense that additional
axioms are required to obtain the complete set of negation properties.
In this chapter we discuss the use of d as a logic and then sketch several
extensions of d, including paradoxical ones. This will also illustrate the relation
of d to other systems.
5.1 Logical interpretation
d is treating proofs and formulas uniformly as typed λ-expressions, and allows
each of its operators to be used on both sides of the typing relation. A subset
of the operators of d, if used as types, can be associated with common logical
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predicates and connectors:
τ ≃ primitive constant
(. . . (xa1) . . . an) ≃ atomic formula
[x : a]b ≃ universal quantification
[x!a]b ≃ existential quantification
[a, b] ≃ conjunction
[a+ b] ≃ disjunction
¬a ≃ negation
In Section 3.1 we have shown that based on the type system of d many logical
properties of these connectors can be derived without further assumptions. Fur-
thermore, based on a strong normalization result we have shown (Law 63) that
d is consistent in the sense that the type [x : τ ]x is empty in d under the empty
context. In this sense, d can be seen as a (higher-order) logic where typing can
be interpreted as a deduction typing to the proposition it has deduced [20].
However, in order to have the complete properties of classical negation ad-
ditional axioms have to be assumed and we could not show consistency of the
type system under these axioms by means of strong normalization. Similarly,
formalizations of mathematical structures in d were introduced axiomatically.
In this sense the expressive power of d is limited and each axiomatization has
to be checked carefully for consistency.
Furthermore, there are two important pragmatic issues which differ from
common approaches:
• First, inference systems for higher-order logic based on typed-λ-calculus
such as [8][36] typically make a distinction between the type of propositions
and one or more types of individuals. In d, one the one hand there is no
such distinction, all such types must either be τ itself or declared using τ .
On the other hand, due to the restricted formation rules which serve to
ensure consistency as well as uniqueness of types, in d, τ does not allow
to quantify over all propositions of d and additional axioms schemes must
be used when reasoning with formulas of complex structure.
• Second, d has several operators which are not common logical connectors:
[x
.
=a, b : c] ≃ protected definition
a.1, a.2 ≃ projections
[a ? b] ≃ case distinction
[a, :b], [:a, b] ≃ left and right injection
However, these operators have meaningful type-roles for defining functions
over propositions.
Note also that there is a strong relation between left projection a.1 on a de-
duction a and Hilberts ǫ-operator ǫx.P on a formula P as sometimes used in
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higher-order logic [8][36] with a law like:
∀x.(P ⇒ P [ǫx.P/x])
In a classical logical setting this is obviously implied by
(∃x.P )⇒ P [ǫx.P/x]
The latter property can be approximated in d by
[y : [x!τ ](P x)](P y.1)
and actually is a law since
[y : [x!τ ](P x)]y.2 : [y : [x!τ ](P x)](P y.1)
This illustrates again how existential abstraction and the projection operators
together embody a strong axiom of choice.
Finally there is no explicit equality operator in d, a notion of equality is
defined indirectly only through equality of expressions modulo reduction
5.2 Negation
In Section 1.7 we have explained that the direct encoding of negation of a as
[a ⇒ ff ], where ff abbreviates [x : τ ]x, is not possible due to the use of λ-
structured types. This is a major obstacle to completely internalize negation
properties into d, since encoding negation in the above style is very common in
logic.
In d rather than defining negation by implication to falsehood, negation is
incorporated by defining a subset of the equivalence laws of negation as equalities
(=λ). The purpose is to have unique formal forms with respect to negation in
order to simplify deductions. Direct isomorphism between ¬¬a and a has been
advocated in [31]. De-Morgan-style laws for propositional operators have been
used to define an involutive negation in a type language [3].
As shown in Section 3.1, additional axioms schemes must be assumed to
have the full set of properties of logical negation. While this is adequate when
assuming computationally irrelevant proofs, it leaves the issues of consistency
of the axiomatic extensions, i.e. the question if typing with axioms ?⊢a : b1 is
consistent. We briefly discuss this drawback of d and why it seems inevitable.
Several approaches have been proposed to internalize classical reasoning into
λ-calculus. λµ-calculus is adding classical reasoning to λ-calculus by additional
control operators [34][35][11][25]. Control operators give explicit control over
the context in which an expression is evaluated. On the one hand, extending
d by control operators for negation, obliterating the need for negation axioms,
would extend its deductive means without clear necessity. On the other hand,
1See Appendix A
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we are not aware of a lambda-typed system with control operators for negation
in which one could translate d with negation axioms.
A major obstacle towards the use of control operators in d seems to be due to
the use of a case distinction operator. To illustrate this issue in a more concrete
way, suppose we would, along the lines of [6], define an negation introduction
operator [x :µ a, b] by means of the following typing rule:
Γ, x : a ⊢ b : [c,¬c]
Γ ⊢ [x :µ a, b] : ¬a
For any a with Γ ⊢ a we could then prove:
Γ ⊢ [x :µ [¬a, a], x] : [a+ ¬a]
However, in order to normalize expressions so as to prove consistency of the
system based on normal forms, we would have the need to define reduction
rules for [x :µ a, b]. First of all, it not possible to reduce a negation introduction
as an argument of a case distinction, i.e. when normalizing a function with a
sum domain.
([c ? d] [x :µ a, b]) →
∗ ?
Symmetrically, the same problem would arise when normalizing a function with
an existential abstraction (intuitively an infinite sum) as domain.
[x :µ [y!c]d, b].1 →
∗ ? [x :µ [y!c]d, b].2 →
∗ ?
This phenomenon seems to be a consequence of Lafont’s critical pairs ([16]).
Note that d is using a simplified setting as we do not deal with general cut
elimination, which would correspond to a function composition operator, but
only a more specific elimination operator where a function is applied to an
argument.
Note also that there are fundamentally different approaches towards classical
logic in type system, e.g. in [28] a modular approach is proposed where various
logical foundations can be combined with type systems.
5.3 Paradoxical extension by subsumptive sub-
typing
In Section 1.8 we have mentioned that extending the core of d (Table 1.5) by
an subsumptive subtyping mechanism would lead to the property a : τ for any
a. We present this argument here in more detail.
There is a well-known system with the property type : type which is incon-
sistent [15]. This system, referred to as λ∗ in [4] (Section 5.5), can be presented
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as a pure type system (S = ∗, A = {∗ : ∗};R = {(∗, ∗)}) as follows.
(axioms)
⊢∗ : ∗
(start)
Γ⊢A : ∗
Γ, x : A⊢x : A
(weakening)
Γ⊢A : B Γ⊢C : ∗
Γ, x : C⊢A : B
(product)
Γ⊢A : ∗ Γ, x : A⊢B : C
Γ⊢(Πx : A.B) : ∗
(application)
Γ⊢F : (Πx : A.B) Γ⊢a : A
Γ⊢(Fa) : B[a/x]
(abstraction)
Γ, x : A⊢b : B Γ⊢(Πx : A.B) : ∗
Γ⊢(λx : A.b) : (Πx : A.B)
(conversion)
Γ⊢A : B Γ⊢B′ : ∗ B =λ B
′
Γ⊢a : B′
Here A, B, C range over types and a, b, c range over λ-expressions. x, y, z
range over variables of both.
When replacing (Πx : A.B) and λx : A.b by (universal) abstraction [x : a]b and
writing τ for ∗ the above rules rewrite as
(axioms)
⊢τ : τ
(start)
Γ⊢a : τ
Γ, x : a⊢x : a
(weakening)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : τ
Γ, x : c⊢a : b
(product)
Γ⊢a : τ Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢ [x : a]b : τ
(application)
Γ⊢c : [x : a]b Γ⊢d : a
Γ⊢(c d) : b[d/x]
(abstraction)
Γ, x : a⊢b : c Γ⊢ [x : a]c : τ
Γ⊢ [x : a]b : [x : a]c
(conversion)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢b′ : τ b =λ b
′
Γ⊢a : b′
These rules would all be true in an extension of core of d with a subsumptive
subtyping rule and axiom as defined in Section 1.8:
Γ ⊢ a : b b 6 c Γ ⊢ c : d
Γ ⊢ a : c a 6 τ
For example consider the rule product: Assume that Γ⊢a : τ and Γ, x : a⊢b : c.
By typing rule absU we can infer Γ⊢ [x : a]b : [x : a]c and then, since [x : a]c 6 τ
by the type inclusion rule we obtain Γ⊢ [x : a]b : τ .
Hence such a system (and thus obviously d) would be inconsistent in the
sense that there would be an expression a such that⊢a : [x : τ ]x.
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5.4 Paradoxical extension with casting opera-
tors
In Section 1.8 we have mentioned that extending the core of d with τ -casting
and cast introduction and elimination operators, (), ()+a b, and ()
−
a b where
Γ⊢a : b
Γ⊢()a : τ
Γ⊢a : b
Γ⊢()+b a : ()b
Γ⊢a : ()b
Γ⊢()−b a : b
as well as a reduction axiom for canceling out pairs of cast introduction and
elimination, i.e.
()−c ()
+
b a→
∗ a
would lead to an inconsistent system. To motivate this consider the following
reconstruction of λ∗ (see Section 5.3) using τ -casting operations:
(axioms)
⊢τ : τ
(start)
Γ⊢a : τ
Γ, x : a⊢x : a
(weakening)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : τ
Γ, x : c⊢a : b
(product)
Γ⊢a : τ Γ, x : a⊢b : c
Γ⊢()[x : a]b : τ
(application)
Γ⊢c : ()[x : a]b Γ⊢d : a
Γ⊢(()−[x:a]bc d) : b[d/x]
(abstraction)
Γ, x : a⊢b : c Γ⊢()[x : a]c : τ
Γ⊢()+[x:a]c[x : a]b : ()[x : a]c
(conversion)
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢b′ : τ b =λ b′
Γ⊢a : b′
This motivates the following mapping δΓ(A) from a PTS expression A and a
PTS-context Γ where Γ⊢A : B, for some B, to an expression in d with extended
τ -casting:
δΓ(∗) = τ
δΓ(x) = x
δΓ(Πx : A.B) = ()[x : δΓ(A)]δΓ,x:A(B)
δΓ(λx : A.B) = ()
+
c [x : δΓ(A)]δΓ,x:A(B) where δ(Γ)⊢δΓ(λx : A.B) : c
δΓ((AB)) = (()
−
c δΓ(A) δΓ(B)) where δ(Γ)⊢δΓ(A) : ()c
where the mapping δ(Γ) from PTS-contexts to contexts in d is recursively de-
fined as follows:
δ(Γ) = δ()(Γ)
δΓ(()) = ()
δΓ(x : A,Γ
′) = (x : δΓ(A), δΓ,x:A(Γ
′))
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It is straightforward to show that this translation preserves reduction in λ∗ and
therefore typing.
Γ⊢A : B A→β nC
δΓ(A)→m δΓ(C) where m ≥ n
Γ ⊢ A : B
δ(Γ) ⊢ δΓ(A) : δΓ(B)
Here A →β nC denotes a n-step beta reduction in a PTS. The crucial step of
the β-reduction preservation proof is using extended τ -casting:
δΓ((λx : A.B C)) = (()
−
d δΓ(λx : A.B) δΓ(C))
= (()−d ()
+
d [x : δΓ(A)]δΓ,x:A(B) δΓ(C))
→ ([x : δΓ(A)]δΓ,x:A(B) δΓ(C))
→ δΓ,x:A(B)[δΓ(C)/x]
= δΓ(B[C/x])
where δ(Γ)⊢δΓ(λx : A.B) : ()d for some d.
Hence a (nonterminating) proof A of Πx : ∗.x in λ∗ could be transformed into
a (nonterminating) proof of ()[x : τ ]x, and therefore obviously also of [x : τ ]x,
in d with extended casting rules.
5.5 Relaxing uniqueness of types
Note that uniqueness of types (36) was not needed in the strong normalisation
proof but only the weaker property 45.
Protected definitions [x
.
=a, c : d] carry a type tag d allowed to use x in order
to ensure uniqueness of types. Law 45 would be retained if we remove the type
tag and the binding of x from protected definitions:
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : d[a/x] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [
.
=a, c] : [x!b]d
However, this may exponentially increase the type variants of a protected defi-
nition, e.g.:
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : [d⇒d] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [
.
=a, c] : [x!b][d⇒d]
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : [d⇒d] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [
.
=a, c] : [x!b][x⇒d]
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : [d⇒d] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [
.
=a, c] : [x!b][x⇒d]
Γ⊢a : b Γ⊢c : [d⇒d] Γ, x : b⊢d : e
Γ⊢ [
.
=a, c] : [x!b][x⇒x]
In case of universal abstractions the situation is different: Adding the following
type rule for universal abstractions
Γ, x : a⊢b : τ
Γ⊢ [x : a]b : τ
would violate both 36 and 45 and together with ⊢ τ : τ result in a paradoxical
system [40].
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5.6 Lack of extensionality
As indicated in Section 1.2, d introduces universal and existential abstractions
(and similarly products and sums) as functions that are semantically distinct
but have equivalent behavior on arguments. This naturally precludes adding
axioms of extensionality as their sole purpose is to deny such distinctions.
While this restriction can be criticized on a theoretical level, from a prag-
matic point of view it seems less relevant as in formalizations one can always
replace a function reference x where e.g. x : [y : τ ]τ or x : [y!τ ]τ by [y : τ ](x y).
5.7 Abbreviation systems
Complex systems of abbreviations spanning over several conceptual or abstrac-
tion levels play a major conceptual role in mathematical work. A multitude
of proposals for incorporating definitions into typed λ-calculi have been made,
e.g. [14] [19] [23]. Support for definitional extensions for systems closely related
to Automath’s Λ have been investigated in [17]. While support for definitional
extensions is undoubtedly important, in our setting, they have not been nec-
essary to formulate d. Note that in other settings this might be different and
abbreviation systems become indispensable, e.g. [27]. In our case, these con-
cepts must of course play a major role in any practically useful approach for
formal deductions based on d.
5.8 Inductively defined datatypes and functions
d has computationally-irrelevant proofs, i.e. it is not possible to extract for
example primitive recursive functions from valid expressions. This constitutes
a major difference to well-known typing systems such as Coq [7]. Therefore in
d, it is not possible to extract programs from proofs or to support verification
of programs using (recursively-defined) custom datatypes. However, one could
argue to include generic mechanisms for axiomatizing well-grounded inductive
definitions as this may relieve the notational burden of specifying constructors
and induction principles, e.g. instead of the declarations of N , 0, s, S1, S2, and
ind in Section 3.6, one could introduce a shorthand notation such as
Inductive N : Sort := 0 : N | S : [N⇒N ]
However, note that the equality relation used to state injectivity of constructors
on natural numbers was not predefined but axiomatized. Therefore one would
need an extended shorthand notation to also define injectivity with respect to
a equality relation e : Equality
Inductive(e : Equality) N : Sort := 0 : N | S : [N⇒N ]
where all laws involving equality would be stated using the following definition:
()=() := e.2
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Again, we see such generic notational extensions and specific support for induc-
tive proofs as part of practically useful languages for formal deductions based
on d.
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Appendix A
Typing and validity with
axioms for negation and
casting
We can define a weakening of the typing relation, which assumes a finite number
of declarations instantiating axiom schemes for negation and casting, as follows:
Definition 36 (Typing and validity with axioms). In Chapter 3, we have been
using the following axiom schemes:
¬+a,b : [[a+ b]⇒ [¬a⇒b]]
¬−a,b : [[¬a⇒b]⇒ [a+ b]]
()a : [a⇒τ ]
()+a : [x : a][x⇒()ax]
()−a : [x : a][()ax⇒x]
()++a,b : [x : a; y : [x⇒b]; z : x][y(z)⇒y(()
−
a (x, ()
+
a (x, z)))]
()−−a,b : [x : a; y : [x⇒b]; z : x][y(()
−
a (x, ()
+
a (x, z)))⇒y(z)]
where we assumed ¬+a,b,¬
−
a,b, ()a, ... ∈ V form an infinite subset of variables IAx
indexed over expressions.
Formally, typing with axioms ?,Γ ⊢ a : b under the above axiom scheme
could be defined so as to require that FV ([Γ]b) = ∅ and that there is a context
Γ′ consisting of (a finite set of) declarations of variables from IAx with type-
mappings as defined above, such that Γ′,Γ⊢a : b.
Similar to typing ?⊢a : b abbreviates ?, ()⊢a : b. We also use the notion of
validity with axioms, defined by
?,Γ ⊢ a := ∃b : ?,Γ⊢a : b
If Γ = () we just write ?⊢a : b.
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Appendix B
Mapping to untyped
λ-calculus
This chapter defines tentative steps towards a set-theoretical semantics of d.
As we do not make a distinction between λ and Π we do not take the aproach
to interpret the typing relation as set inclusion in additive domains as done in
the semantic of classical Automath [5]. Rather, we take a two-level approach:
the typing relation will be interpreted as a ternary relation involving untyped
λ-calculus expressions which are then themselves interpreted e.g. in reflexive do-
mains as usual. Obviously the semantic interpretations should reflect intended
properties of d. To this end we define a semantic space and some fundamental
properties our semantic interpretations are to satisfy. We define two straight-
forward mappings from d expressions into the semantic space and discuss their
properties. Both interpretations are non-trivial but both abstract from some of
the properties of d. We briefly discuss how more granular semantics spaces and
corresponding mappings could recover more detailed properties of d.
B.1 The semantic space
B.1.1 λ-calculus
We use λ-expressions with the usual notations λx.t for λ-abstraction and (t1 t2)
for application. We use the notation →β for β-contraction and =β for β-
contraction-induced congruence, Furthermore, to avoid notational clutter we
often use the following notations:
λx1 · · ·xn.t ≡ λx1 · · · .λxn.t
(t t1 t2 · · · tn) ≡ (· · · ((t t1) t2) · · · tn)
We also often omit the brackets around the outermost applications when ex-
pression are sufficiently disambiguated. We assume a special constant τ .
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B.1.2 A rudimentary semantic structure
Definition 37 (λ-Context). A λ-context C is a sequence (x1 : t1, · · · , xn : tn)
where xi 6= xj and ti ∈ D. The lookup C(x) is defined in an obvious way.
We now characterize a subset of triples (C, t1, t2).
Definition 38 (d-Structure). A d-structure Ds is a set of triples (C, t1, t2)
where C is a λ-context, t1, t2 ∈ D and which respects the following rules
i: ((), τ, τ) ∈ Ds.
ii: (C, t1, t2) ∈ Ds implies ((C, x : t1), x, t1) ∈ Ds.
iii: (C, t1, t2), (C, t3, t4) ∈ Ds implies ((C, x : t3), t1, t2) ∈ Ds.
iv: (C, t1, t2) ∈ Ds, t2 =β t3, and (C, t3, t4) ∈ Ds imply (C, t1, t3) ∈ Ds.
v: (C, t1, t2) ∈ Ds, t1 =β t3, and (C, t3, t4) ∈ Ds imply (C, t3, t2) ∈ Ds.
vi: (C, t1, t2), (C, t3, t4) ∈ Ds imply (C, λx.(x t1 t2), λx.(x t3 t4)) ∈ Ds.
vii: (C, t1, t2) ∈ Ds imply (C, t1 λxy.x, t2 λxy.x), (C, t1 λxy.y, t2 λxy.y) ∈ Ds.
Note that due to the first condition ∅ is not a d-structure.
B.2 A type-stripping interpretation
B.2.1 Mapping to functional content
Definition 39 (Mapping to D). The function M˙ translates a d expression into
D (Table B.1). For a context Γ, M˙(Γ) is defined by applying M˙ to all expressions
M˙(τ) = τ
M˙(x) = x
M˙([x : a]b) = M˙([x!a]b) = λx.M˙(b)
M˙((a b)) = M˙(a) M˙(b)
M˙([x
.
=a, b : c]) = M˙([a, b]) = M˙([a+ b]) = λx.(x M˙(a) M˙(b))
M˙(a.1) = M˙(a) λxy.x
M˙(a.2) = M˙(a) λxy.y
M˙([a ? b]) = λx.(x M˙(a) M˙(b))
M˙([a, :b]) = λxy.(x M˙(a))
M˙([:a, b]) = λxy.(y M˙(b))
M˙(¬a) = M˙(a)
Table B.1: Type-stripping mapping to D
in Γ to yield a λ-context, i.e. M˙() = () and M˙(x : a,Γ) = (x : M˙(a), M˙(Γ)).
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Remark (Examples). Consider the expression [x : τ ][y : x]y which is of type
[x : τ ][y : x]x. It is interpreted as λxy.y of type λxy.x. As a slightly more
involved example consider the derivation of the modus-ponens rule
[p : τ ][q : τ ][x : p][y : [z : p]q](y x)
which is of type
[p, q : τ ][x : p][y : [z : p]q]q
Is interpreted as λ pqxy.(y x) of type λ pqxy.q.
Law 64 (Reduction law). a→∗ b implies M˙(a)→β M˙(b).
Proof. The proposition is shown by induction on the definition of reduction.
• β1:
M˙(([x : a]b c)) = (M˙([x : a]b) M˙(c))
= ((λx.M˙(b)) M˙(c))
→β M˙(b)[M˙(c)/x]
= M˙(b[c/x])
• β2: Similar
• β3:
M˙(([a ? b] [c, :d])) = (λx.(x M˙(a) M˙(b)) λxy.(x M˙(c)))
→β λxy.(x M˙(c)) M˙(a) M˙(b)
→β λy.(M˙(a) M˙(c)) M˙(b)
→β M˙(a) M˙(c)
= M˙((a c))
• β4: Similar
• π1:
M˙([x
.
=a, b : c].1) = M˙([x
.
=a, b : c]) λxy.x
= λx.(x M˙(a) M˙(b)) λxy.x
→β λxy.x M˙(a) M˙(b)
→β λy.M˙(a) M˙(b)
→β M˙(a)
• π2, . . ., π6: Similar
• ν1:
M˙(¬¬a) = M˙(¬a)
= M˙(a)
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• ν2:
M˙(¬[x : a]b) = M˙(¬[x : a]b)
= λx.M˙(b)
= λx.M˙(¬b)
= M˙([x!a]¬b)
• ν3, . . . , ν10, κ: Similar
• (⊕
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i): If ai → bi then by inductive hypothesis M˙(ai) →β M˙(bi)
and therefore obviously
M˙(⊕(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an)→β M˙(⊕(a1, . . . , bi, . . . , an))
• (⊕x
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
( , . . . , )i): Similar
Law 65 (Irreducibility of semantic range). Γ ⊢ a then if a is irreducible in d
then M˙(a) is irreducible in D.
Proof. Let N˙ be the set of semantic normal forms, i.e. the set of all M˙(a) where
a ∈ N . By induction on the structure of d expressions one can calculate that N˙
can be characterized as follows where D˙ denotes the set of semantic dead ends.
N˙ = {τ}
∪ {λx.t | t ∈ N˙}
∪ {λx.(x t1 t2) | t1, t2 ∈ N˙}
∪ {λxy.(x t), λxy.(y t) | t ∈ N˙}
∪ D˙
D˙ = {x | x variable}
∪ {t1 t2 | t1 ∈ D˙, t2 ∈ N˙}
∪ {(t λxy.x), (t λxy.y) | t ∈ D˙}
By induction on the structure of λ-expressions one can calculate that N˙ are
normal forms of D. This implies the proposition.
Law 66 (Congruence law). Γ⊢a, b and a =λ b imply M˙(a) =β M˙(b).
Proof. Due to strong normalization, a and b have unique normal forms a′ and
b′. If a =λ b then due to Law 19 we know that a
′ = b′ and by Law 64 that
M˙(a) =β M˙(b). Note that M˙(a) = M˙(b) does not imply a = b since the latter
may contain inequivalent type assignments.
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Law 67 (Validity law). Γ ⊢ a implies M˙(a) is normalizing and has a unique
normal form.
Proof. By Law 55 we have a ∈ S. Let a′ = N (a). Due to Law 64 we have
M˙(a) =β M˙(a
′). By Law 65 M˙(a′) is irreducible. Due to confluence of extended
λ-calculus, this normal form is unique.
B.2.2 Typing relation
Definition 40 (Induced semantic typing relation). The semantic typing relation
C ⊢˙ t1 : t2 induced by M˙ is defined as follows:
C ⊢˙ t1 : t2 ≡ ∃ Γ, a, b : Γ⊢a : b ∧ M˙(Γ) = C ∧ M˙(a) = t1 ∧ M˙(b) = t2
Law 68 (Semantic typing relation does not depend on reduction). If C ⊢˙ t1 : t2,
t1 =β t3, and t2 =β t4 then C ⊢˙ t3 : t4.
Proof. Follows from the definition of semantic typing
It is interesting to investigate the properties of the semantic typing relation.
Since the λ-expressions have been stripped of type information we cannot expect
to get a property such as
C ⊢˙ t1 : λx.t2
C ⊢˙ (t1 t) : t2[t/x]
A counterexample would be C = (), t1 = λx.x, t2 = τ , and t = (τ τ). Since
⊢ [x : τ ]x : [x : τ ]τ we know that ⊢˙ λx.x : λx.τ which means C ⊢˙ t1 : λx.t2.
However (t1 t) =β (τ τ) and it is easy to see there is no valid expression a such
that M˙(a) = (τ τ). Hence it is not possible that C ⊢˙ (t1 t) : τ .
Nevertheless, we can show the semantic typing relation is a d-structure.
Law 69 (Properties of the semantic typing relation). The relation C ⊢˙ t1 : t2 is
a d-structure.
Proof. We have to show the properties of d-structures:
i: () ⊢˙ τ : τ follows from axiom ax and the definition of M˙.
ii: Assume that C ⊢˙ t1 : t2. Hence Γ ⊢ a : b where M˙(Γ) = C, M˙(a) = t1,
and M˙(b) = t2. Hence by rule start we know that Γ, x : a ⊢ x : a. The
proposition follows by definition of M˙.
iii: Follows from rule weak and the definition of M˙.
iv: Follows from rule conv and the definition of M˙.
v: Follows from Laws 19 and 32 and the definition of M˙.
vi: Follows from rule prod and the definition of M˙.
vii: Follows from rule neg and the definition of M˙.
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Remark (Limitation of type-stripping interpretation). Law 63 states that there
is no valid expression a with ⊢ a : [x : τ ]x. Obviously M˙([x : τ ]x) = λx.x.
One would like to extend the consistency result to semantic typing, i.e. there
is no t such that ⊢˙ t : λx.x. However, due to type stripping, this does not
hold under some reasonable additional assumptions: In remark 4.11, assuming
some additional axiom schemes for cast introduction and elimination, we have
constructed an expression a with ⊢ a : [x : [y : τ ]y]x. Since M˙(x : [y : τ ]y]x) =
λx.x we have⊢M˙(a) : λx.x. In this sense the semantic typing relation is logically
limited.
B.3 A type-encoding interpretation
B.3.1 Mapping to annotated functional content
The basic idea is to encode an abstraction [x : a]b as a pair 〈a, λx.b〉 and to
encode application (a b) as (a.2 b). We do not need to assume new operators,
because pairs and projections are already available.
Definition 41 (Mapping to D). The function M translates a d expression into
D (Table B.2). For a context Γ, M(Γ) is defined by applyingM to all expressions
M(τ) = τ
M(x) = x
M([x : a]b) = M([x!a]b) = λy.(y M(a) λx.M(b))
M((a b)) = M(a) λxy.y M(b)
M([x
.
=a, b : c]) = M˙([a, b]) = M([a+ b]) = λx.(x M(a) M(b))
M(a.1) = M(a) λxy.x
M(a.2) = M(a) λxy.y
M([a ? b]) = λx.(x M(a) M(b))
M([a, :b]) = λxy.(x λxy.yM(a))
M([:a, b]) = λxy.(y λxy.y M(b))
M(¬a) = M(a)
Table B.2: Type-encoding mapping to D
in Γ to yield a λ-context, i.e. M() = () and M(x : a,Γ) = (x : M(a),M(Γ)).
Remark (Examples). Consider the expression [x : τ ][y : x]y which is of type
[x : τ ][y : x]x. These two expressions are interpreted as follows:
M([x : τ ][y : x]y) = λz.(z τ λx.(λz.(z x λy.y)))
M([x : τ ][y : x]x) = λz.(z τ λx.(λz.(z x λy.y)))
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As another example consider the derivation of the modus ponens rule [p : τ ][q :
τ ][x : p][y : [z : p]q](y x) which is of type [p : τ ][q : τ ][x : p][y : [z : p]q]q. The
expression M([p :τ ][q :τ ][x :p][y : [z :p]q](y x)) is interpreted as follows:
λw.(w τ
λp.(
λw.(w τ
λq.(
λw.(w τ
λx.(
λw.(w p
λy.(
λw.(w λw.(w p λz.q) (y λxy.y x))))))))))
The expression M([p : τ ][q : τ ][x : p][y : [z : p]q]q) is interpreted as follows:
λw.(w τ
λp.(
λw.(w τ
λq.(
λw.(w τ
λx.(
λw.(w p
λy.(
λw.(w λw.(w p λz.q) q)))))))))
Several laws of the type stripping interpretation are also satisfied by the type-
encoding variant.
Law 70 (Reduction law). a→∗ b implies M(a)→β M(b).
Proof. The proof is similar as for Law 64. The only deviation is the handling
of the β-reduction axioms, e.g.:
• β1:
M(([x : a]b c)) = M([x : a]b) λxy.y M(c)
= λy.(y M(a) λx.M(b)) λxy.y M(c)
→β λxy.y M(a) λx.M(b) M(c)
→β λy.y λx.M(b) M(c)
→β λx.M(b) M(c)
→β M(b)[M(c)/x]
= M(b[c/x])
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Law 71 (Irreducibility of semantic range). If Γ⊢a and a is irreducible in d then
M(a) is irreducible in D.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Law 65. The sets N˙ ′ and D˙′ are
slightly different due to the different λ-encoding.
N˙ ′ = {τ}
∪ λy.(y t1 λx.t2) | t1, t2 ∈ N˙
′}
∪ {λx.(x t1 t2) | t1, t2 ∈ N˙
′}
∪ {λxy.(x λxy.y t), λxy.(y λxy.y t) | t ∈ N˙ ′}
∪ D˙′
D˙′ = {x | x variable}
∪ {t1 λxy.y t2 | t1 ∈ D˙
′, t2 ∈ N˙
′}
∪ {(t λxy.x), (t λxy.y) | t ∈ D˙′}
Law 72 (Congruence law). Γ⊢a, b implies that a =λ b implies M(a) =β M(b).
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Law 66.
Law 73 (Validity law). Γ ⊢ a implies M(a) is normalizing and has a unique
normal form.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Law 67.
Note that the following law does not hold for the type-stripping interpretation.
Law 74 (Uniqueness law). If M(a) = M(b) then Γ⊢a : c iff Γ⊢ b : c. Similarly
if M(Γ) = M(Γ′) = C then Γ⊢a : b iff Γ′⊢a : b
Proof. Follows from the definition of M and uniqueness of types (Law 36).
B.3.2 Typing relation
Definition 42 (Induced semantic typing relation). The semantic typing relation
C⊢ t1 : t2 is defined as follows:
C ⊢ t1 : t2 ≡ ∃ Γ, a, b : Γ⊢a : b ∧ M(Γ) = C ∧ M(a) = t1 ∧ M(b) = t1
Law 75 (Semantic typing relation does not depend on reduction). If C⊢ t1 : t2,
t1 =β t3, and t2 =β t4 then C⊢ t3 : t4.
Proof. Follows from the definition of semantic typing
The following structural properties can be shown:
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Law 76 (Properties of the semantic typing relation).
i : The relation C ⊢˙ t1 : t2 is a d-structure
ii: If C, x : t⊢ t1 : t2 then C ⊢λy.(y t λx.t1) : λy.(y t λx.t1)
iii: If C ⊢ t1 : λy.(y t3 λx.t2) and C⊢ t4 : t3 then C⊢(t1 λxy.y t4) : t2[t4/x]
Proof.
i: The proof of the properties of d-structures is as for Law 69.
ii : C, x : t⊢ t1 : t2 implies that Γ, x : a⊢ b1 : b2 where M(Γ) = C, M(a) = t,
M(b1) = t1, and M(b2) = t2. Hence Γ⊢ [x : a]b1 : [x : a]b2 which implies
C ⊢λy.(y t λx.t1) : λy.(y t λx.t1).
iii: C ⊢ t1 : λy.(y t3 λx.t2) implies that Γ⊢b1 : b2 where M(Γ) = C, M(b1) = t1
and M(b2) = λy.(y t3 λx.t2). Due to basic properties of typing we may
assume that b2 ∈ N . By definition of M this is only possible if b2 = [x :
c1]c2 where M(c1) = t3 and M(c2) = t2. Since C ⊢ t4 : t3 we know that
there is some b3 such that M(b3) = t4 and Γ
′ ⊢ b3 : c1 where M(Γ′) = C.
By Law 74 and by definition of typing we know that Γ⊢ b1(b3) : c2[b3/x].
This implies C⊢(t1 λxy.y t4) : t2[t4/x].
Remark (Limitations of type-encoding interpretation). The type-encoding in-
terpretation is already capturing some but not quite all aspects of d. On the
positive side it allows for richer properties of the semantic structure as shown
in Law 76.
On the negative side negation and casting are still interpreted as neutral op-
erations which is clearly undesirable. Similarly, the type encoding interpretation
is identifying existential and universal abstraction, hence it cannot mirror the
consistency result of d. By adding more variables to D-spaces and adaptation
of the semantic mapping one could increase the details of the semantics to a
point where it distinctively models all operations and properties of d in detail.
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Appendix C
d as a logical framework
In this chapter we sketch how d can be used to present logic in such a way
that provability of a formula in the original logic reduces to a type inhabitation
problem in d. Note that d as a logical framework plays the role of a meta-
logic, therefore while d itself is a classical logic, this does not prevent its use for
modeling non-classical ones.
C.1 Adequate formalization
Assume that some logical system T is formalized as a pair (F ,Fval) where F
is the set of well-formed formulas of that theory and Fval is the subset of F
consisting of those formulas which are considered as valid within the system.
The goal is to adequately formalize that system in d. This can be achieved
through the declarations and definitions of a context ΓT such that the following
proposition becomes true.
For all f ∈ F : f ∈ Fval iff there is some expression a such that ΓT ⊢a : α(f)
where α is an injective function from F to expressions in d.
The direction from left to right in the above proposition establishes the
completeness of the formalization, i.e. ΓT allows deriving everything which
is valid in T. This direction is usually not difficult to prove, especially if ΓT
contains axioms and inference rules which are direct translations of those used
in T.
The direction from right-to-left establishes the correctness of the formaliza-
tion, i.e. every formula α(f) derived under ΓT is valid in T. The problem with
the proof of this direction is that the derivation of α(f) may be an arbitrary
expression. A proof by structural induction on valid expressions is difficult be-
cause many such expressions are equivalent modulo reduction. However due to
Law 56 of d the above proposition can be simplified as follows:
For all f ∈ F : f ∈ Fval iff there is some a ∈ N such that ΓT ⊢a : α(f)
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This allows for proving correctness by induction on the recursive structure of
normal forms.
C.2 Example: Minimal logic
Formulas F of minimal logic are build from the constants T, F and the binary
function ⇒. The set of valid formulas can be defined e.g. by a sequent logic (Γ
denotes a list of formulas).
Γ, A ⊢ A
Γ, A ⊢ B
Γ ⊢ A⇒ B
Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ A⇒ B
Γ ⊢ B
A formula A is valid iff ⊢ A. In d, minimal logic can be axiomatized by the
context Min defined in Section 3.3. Next, we define the following injective
mapping from minimal logic formulas to d expressions
α(T ) = t
α(F ) = f
α(A⇒ B) = ((I α(A))α(B))
Obviously a ∈ ran(α) implies thatMin⊢a : F . To prove adequate formalization
we have to show that for any A ∈ F:
⊢A iff there is some a ∈ N such that Min⊢a : α(A)
It is straightforward to see the direction from left-to-right as any derivation
of valid formulas in minimal logic can be directly formalized in Min. In the
following sections, we consider the direction from right-to-left, i.e. no invalid
formulas of minimal logic can be derived from Min.
Consider the set of expressions a with Min⊢a : α(A) for some A.
P := {a ∈ N | Min⊢a : b, b ∈ ran(α)}
Our goal is to find a recursive characterization of P that is, based on the partic-
ular context Min, simpler than that of N . To this end, let a ∈ P . Since a ∈ N
we have several case to consider. The following ones can be excluded:
• a = [x1 : a1]a2: We would have Min ⊢ a : [x : a1]b2, where Min, x : a1 ⊢
a2 : b2 and [x : a1]b2 ∈ ran(α). This implies Min⊢ [x : a1]b2 : F which is
impossible.
• a = [x1!a1]a2, a = [x1
.
=a1, a2 : a3]: For similar reasons as in the previous
case, this case is impossible.
• a = [a1, a2]: We would have Min⊢a : [b1, b2] where [b1, b2] ∈ ran(α). This
implies Min⊢ [b1, b2] : F which is impossible.
• a = [a1 + a2], a = [a1, : a2], a = [: a1, a2] For similar reasons as in the
previous case, this case is impossible.
148
By definition of N this implies
P = {a ∈ D | Min⊢a : b, b ∈ ran(α)}
This completes the first step of the characterization of formula derivations.
Given the context Min we can specialize the result a ∈ D as follows: We
know that for any a with Min⊢a : b and b ∈ ran(α) we have a ∈M0 where the
set M0 is characterized as follows:
M0 = {x | x ∈ {F, t, f, I, i, o}}
∪ {(a1 a2) | a1 ∈ M0, a2 ∈ N}
∪ {a.1, a.2 | a ∈M0}
∪ {[a1 ? a2] | a1, a2 ∈M0}
∪ {¬a1 | a1 ∈M0, a1 is not a negation}
Obviously we have M0 ⊆ D. Let us now take a closer look at the various
operations characterizing the set M0:
In the characterization of M0, the case x = F is not possible since a = F
would imply τ ∈ ran(α) and all the other combinations would not be well-typed
except for a = ¬F . The case a = ¬F would imply τ ∈ ran(α) for some b which
is impossible. Similarly one can show that x = t, x = f , x = I are not possible
either since they would always lead to expressions in D whose types are not
equivalent to any expression in ran(α). This leaves us with the cases x ∈ {i, o}
which completes the second step of the characterization of formula derivations.
We now take a closer look at the types of elements of a ∈M0. By structural
induction one can show that for any a ∈ M0 exactly one of the following cases
must be true (n ≥ 0).
• Min⊢a : [x : F ][y : F ][[x⇒y]⇒((I x) y)],
• Min⊢a : [y : F ][[b⇒y]⇒((I b) y)] where Min⊢b : F
• Min⊢a : [[b⇒c]⇒((I b) c)] where Min⊢b : F and Min⊢c : F
• Min⊢a : [x : F ][y : F ][((I x) y)⇒ [x⇒y]]
• Min⊢a : [y : F ][((I b) y)⇒ [b⇒y]] where Min⊢b : F
• Min⊢a : [((I b) c)⇒ [b⇒c]] where Min⊢b : F and Min⊢c : F
• Min⊢a : [b⇒c] where Min⊢b : F and Min⊢c : F
• Min⊢a : b where Min⊢b : F
However this implies that Min⊢a : [b, c] is not possible and hence the cases a.1
and a.2 are not possible. Similar arguments can be made for for Min⊢a : [b+c],
Min⊢ a : [b, : c], Min⊢ a : [: b, c], Min⊢ a : [x!b]c, and Min⊢ a : [x
.
= b, c : d], are
not possible implying also that [a1 ? a2] is not possible.
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This completes the third step of the characterization of formula derivations.
We can summarize our results up to this point as follows:
P = {a ∈M1 | Min⊢a : b, b ∈ ran(α)}
where
M1 = {x | x ∈ {i, o}} ∪ {(a b) | b ∈ N , a ∈M1} ∪ {¬a | a ∈M1, a 6= ¬b}
All together we can summarize that for a given formula A:
{a ∈ N | Min⊢a : α(A)}
(see above) = {a ∈M1 | Min⊢a : α(A)}
This means that Min⊢a : α(A) implies that a ∈M1.
It remains to show that only valid formulas are produced by M1. To this
end we define the partial mapping β from d to expressions in F extended by
variables:
β(x) =


T if x = t
F if x = f
x othwerwise
β((a b)) = β(c)⇒ β(b) if a = I(c)
β([x : a]b) =
{
β(b) if a = F
β(a)⇒ β(b) otherwise
Obviuosly we have β(α(A)) = A. By structural induction on a one can show
that Min⊢a : b and a ∈M1 implies that β(b) is defined and⊢β(b). Together it
follows that Min⊢a : α(A) implies that⊢A.
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